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The main objective of Good Practices in Nordic Innovation Policies has been to develop a survey and an analysis of Nordic 
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council RANNIS.  
 
Innovation policy trends and rationalities The main chapter of this report gives a thorough presentation a comparison of 
contemporary innovation policies and policy instruments in the Nordic countries, historically and contemporary. The chapter 
ends up with several policy recommendations. A separate chapter discusses how policy development actually takes place in 
ministries and agencies, and introduces the concept of rationalities – i.e. common mental maps or frameworks of 
understanding that underpins policy development. This chapter also examine policy learning practices in the Nordic countries 
and gives some concrete advice on how to improve such learning processes. The report then goes on to a presentation of 
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Nordic countries. 
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A readers guide to GoodNIP 
The Nordic Industrial Fund SME Forum has funded the trans-Nordic research project on 
good practices in Nordic innovation policies (GoodNIP). The Nordic Industrial Fund  
Center for Innovation and Commercial Development is an institution under the Nordic 
Council of Ministers. Its aim is to strengthen the Nordic business sector through the 
creation of a Nordic knowledge market, and the organisation does this by initiating and 
financing projects and activities that create synergy between actors in the Nordic 
innovation system. 
 
The main objective of Good Practices in Nordic Innovation Policies has been to 
develop a survey and an analysis of Nordic innovation policy instruments that directly 
or indirectly are targeting small and medium sized enterprises.  The project is to provide 
Nordic policy makers with information to be used in the development of new or 
adjusted policy instruments on a national or Nordic level. The project unites researchers 
from the five Nordic countries: Norway, Iceland, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. The 
study is coordinated by Norwegian STEP, a part of SINTEF Industrial Management. 
The other participants are NUTEK and VINNOVA of Sweden, VTT of Finland, 
Denmark's Technological University and the Icelandic research council RANNIS.  
 
Many of the researchers are also involved in the EU Trend Chart on innovation a 
European effort providing policy makers and managers of innovation support schemes 
with summarised information and statistics on innovation policies, performances and 
trends.1 The objective for GoodNIP has not been  to duplicate Trend Chart efforts, but 
to use Trend Chart data and reports as a foundation for further in depths studies. The 
GoodNIP study may hopefully be considered a contribution to the work done by the EU 
Commission, the OECD and the Nordic Council.  
 
The GoodNIP deliveries consist of three reports: 
Report 1: Summary and policy recommendations 
Report one contains a summary of the GoodNIP exercise, presentations of modern 
innovation theory and innovation policy developments in the Nordic countries, as well 
as various policy recommendations. 
 
Report 2: Innovation policy trends and rationalities 
The main chapter of Report 2 gives a thorough presentation a comparison of 
contemporary innovation policies and policy instruments in the Nordic countries, 
historically and contemporary. The chapter ends up with several policy 
recommendations. A separate chapter discusses how policy development actually takes 
place in ministries and agencies, and introduces the concept of rationalities  i.e. 
common mental maps or frameworks of understanding that underpins policy 
development. This chapter also examine policy learning practices in the Nordic 
countries and gives some concrete advice on how to improve such learning processes. 
 
The report then goes on to a presentation of relevant innovation policy statistics and 
indicators.  This is more than a listing of numbers and tables, however.  The chapter 
uses these figures in order to gain a better understanding of the current status of  
                                                 
1 http://www.trendchart.org 
 innovation and R&D in the Nordic countries, and tries to analyse to what extent there is 
a connection between this status and current innovation policies. The final chapter of 
Report 2 contains more general theoretical reflections on innovation theory and 
innovation policy development. It discusses the interaction between innovation research 
and innovation policy as well as various rationales for innovation policy development. 
 
In an appendix the reader will find national rapports on the historical background for 
innovation policies in the Nordic countries. 
 
Report 3: Innovation policy measures, documents and government structures 
Report 3 is essentially a reference book for innovation policies in the Nordic countries, 
and includes: 
 
• Presentations of the innovation policy governance structures of the Nordic 
countries 
• Summaries of relevant policy documents 
• “Datasheets” presenting selected innovation policy measures 
• An extended list of policy measures that goes beyond the ones included in the 
datasheet section 
 
For more information on GoodNIP, see the GoodNIP Web site at 
http://www.step.no/goodnip
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Introduction [Part 1] 
1. Innovation Policy Trends in the Nordic 
Countries 
Introduction 
In this chapter we are analysing differences and similarities between the innovation 
policies in the Nordic countries. Focus is on innovation structures, R&D and innovation 
policy priorities and policy designs targeting directly or indirectly small and medium 
sized enterprises. There are also examples of "good practice" that may serve as an 
inspiration for the development of national and Nordic policy measures. Overall, the 
report at hand together with the two other reports produced by the GoodNIP research 
team aims to provide reader with information on trends of innovation policies in 
comparable context of small and open economies of the Nordic countries.  
 
The first subchapter will shortly present some general remarks concerning Nordic 
countries. In this connection will be also touched upon a number of significant changes, 
which have taken place during the last 10 years in Nordic countries.  
 
In the second part of this chapter structures and co-ordination of national innovation 
systems at the higher policy level will be examined.  
 
The third part summarises main trends in national innovation policy priorities during the 
recent past.  
 
In subchapter 4 attention will be paid on major components of national innovation 
policies. Topics studied in this chapter include innovation financing; promotion of 
networking; commercialisation of research; entrepreneurs and SMEs role; and 
integration of innovation and regional policies.  
 
In subchapter 5 a overview on the innovation policy measures are presented with two 
complementary categorisations.  
 
Main conclusions will be discussed in the chapter 6, whereas the final chapter will 
address the main policy recommendations drawn in the GoodNIP project.  
Key trends in the Nordic countries since 1990 
The Nordic countries — Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden — form an 
unique group for policy studies, because of number of common societal characteristics, 
development trends and closely intertwining histories. At the same time there are wide 
variation in the industrial structures between the Nordic countries, which are explained 
among others by differing natural resources, development trajectories and past policy 
decisions.  
 
Large export oriented firms have played historically important role in Finland and 
Sweden. Some of the companies from forestry, engineering and – lately -- information 
and communication technology sectors are nowadays multinational corporations with 
sites and activities around globe, but with headquarters in the countries of origin. This 
small number of large companies give a distinct flavour for R&D spending in Finland 
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and Sweden, because these companies stand for an important share of total research and 
development expenditures. 
 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway each has an economy which is characterised by small 
and medium sized companies (SMEs). Otherwise industrial structures of the three 
countries differ. Beside a few large globally operating companies mainly in engineering, 
food processing and logistics Denmark has been successful in nurturing a vivid SME 
sector, which covers firms from more traditional as well as newer industries. Research 
and development expenditures are in par with the OECD average despite the industrial 
structure and R&D is currently defined to be a key future area in government strategies.  
 
Because of its natural resources Norway's economy is dominated to large degree of the 
oil and gas industries. Norway has in general an industrial structure which is focused in 
sectors which are not especially research and development intensive. However, the 
government has set as a long-standing goal that research and development investments 
should be increased substantially.  
 
During the last decade all the Nordic countries have vigorously searched for policies 
supporting renewal new paths in order to modernise their economies. Reasons for this 
quest for novel priorities are partly common to all the countries, but also partly country 
specific. We can mention the end of the Cold-War political divide, European integration 
and the development of the European Union, the economic recession at the beginning of 
the 1990s, increasing economic interdependence at global level and emergence of fast 
growing new industries such as information and communication technologies and 
biotechnology.  
 
Depending on various factors, such as a country's geopolitical position, national 
industrial and financial structure, direction of international trade flows etc. the Nordic 
countries have been affected by these global changes to a larger or lesser degree.  
 
Historically the state has played an important role in development of economy in the 
Nordic countries. Until the end of the 1980s active regulation of macro-economic 
factors and macro-economic environment was a dominant mode of economic policy 
making in countries like Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Governments, together 
with the national banks, actively regulated macroeconomic environment through 
monetary policies. Governments did not hesitate to support international 
competitiveness of major domestic industries through devaluation of national currency. 
High inflation was a consequence of this monetary policy.  
 
During the 1980s focus of government policies started however gradually change. This 
process has in all the Nordic countries led to a deregulation of financial markets, 
abolishment a number of protectionist measures concerning domestic markets and 
renewed monetary policy objectives. Monetary policies have been geared towards stable 
value of currency and the maintenance of price stability, i.e. low inflation. The 
strengthening of competition policy and privatisation of public companies took place 
side by side with an emphasis on price and exchange rate stability.  
 
The reasons for these changed economy policy objectives are to be found in 
international economic trends. The European integration process towards a single 
market has caused further pressure towards adjusting national economy policies to 
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changes in a broader environment. It should be remembered that although Denmark was 
the only Nordic country which was member of the European Union (EU) in the 
beginning of the 1990s, the other Nordic countries were included in the single market 
process through the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement between the EU and 
countries belonging to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The EEA Agreement 
was signed in May 1992 and came into effect at the beginning of 1994. Finland and 
Sweden became full members of the EU at the beginning of 1995. However, the EEA 
Agreement still covers Iceland and Norway.  
 
At the beginning of 2002 Finland, together with 11 other EU member countries, joined 
the Euro-zone, which meant the replacement of separate national currencies by the 
European Single Currency. This move is important, as deflation of the national currency 
is no longer an available policy tool for the Finnish government. 
 
The macro-economic environment of the Nordic countries is not the only area which 
has gone through drastic changes. During the last 10 years the countries' industrial 
structures have diversified and at the same time the business orientation of companies 
has changed quite considerably in countries, especially in  like Iceland and Finland. 
Nordic enterprises have been fast to capitalise on emergence of new growth areas, such 
as information technology, telecommunication and the biotechnology sector.  
 
There are no simple explanations for success of Nordic based companies in the 
emerging markets. The development since the mid-1990s has been well in line with the 
strategy of re-industrialisation adopted in the Nordic countries in the 1980s. The new 
strategy was based on the idea that future industrial expansion was dependent on 
success within a few core high-tech technologies. It was a widely shared opinion that 
economic growth could not be achieved by incremental improvement of old products 
only, or by increasing the efficiency of old mature industries. There was also a need for 
developing new products or even completely new industries. The success of Finnish and 
Swedish information and telecommunication industries in the last years of the 1990s 
were interpreted by many as a clear evidence of the “creative destruction” of industries 
and the birth of new ones. This stance was strengthened by mounting difficulties faced 
by traditional industries, as they struggled to maintain their competitive position in the 
middle of increasing international competition. This two coinciding trends seemed to 
proove that we are witnessing a process of structural replacement of old industries – 
often denoted as sunset industries – with new sunrise industries. For a moment, the road 
to the future seemed paved for “knowledge intensive industries”.2 
 
However, it is important to remember that the picture on industrial development of the 
Nordic countries is not that black and white. For example, Denmark has succeeded in 
maintain a competitive position in several industries which are usually seen as 
traditional and not R&D intensive and which, in addition, are dominated by small and 
medium sized companies. The Danish design, furniture and clothing industries are 
examples of successful adaptation to a changing market. Moreover, Norwegian and 
Icelandic fisheries and other industries based on raw materials can document growth 
                                                 
2 In political rhetoric ”knowledge intensive” is often understood as modern R&D intensive ”high tech” 
companies. It should be empasised that also ”low tech” companies make use of advanced technologies.  
Moreover, all human societies in the past and present are knowledge based. 
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and profitability during the recent past. Even in Finland and Sweden  traditional 
strongholds like the forest and engineering industries have not lost their foothold in the 
national economies. 
 
A distinct trend taken place during the last decade or so concerns the changing market 
orientation of businesses in geographical terms. In the past only a small proportion of 
industries were genuinely oriented towards international market, whereas many 
industries were focusing on domestic market. Today the number of Nordic companies 
targeting global markets has risen evidently.  
 
A related trend is the broadening of the definition of “home market” from covering the 
national level to larger regional entities, like the whole Northern Europe. Industrial 
firms, financial institutions and other service providers, alongside retail trade 
companies, are increasingly seeing Northern Europe as their home market. Also inter-
company mergers between the Nordic countries have intensified notably during the last 
ten years, including among others telecom companies, energy suppliers, forest 
industries, banking and IT services. 
 
All these changes put extra pressure on Nordic politicians and policy makers designing 
policies for the future welfare of society. It is not surprising that governments have 
started to look for policy mixes which can fit new policy rationalities. In this context the 
systemic approach of the national innovation systems thinking has attained a lot of 
attention. It is increasingly understood that sustainable competitiveness of industries 
cannot be enhanced through narrowly defined sector policies. Instead what is needed is 
more broad based policy approach covering not only traditional areas of research and 
technology development or industrial policies but also education, regional development, 
renewal of traditional “low-tech” industries etc.  
 
In Finland a quest for wider perspective was brought forth in policy discussion by the 
national Science and Technology Policy Council, which voiced need for “social 
innovations” — still vaguely defined — in its triennial review on science and 
technology policy, published in 2002. The same need is expressed in the Swedish 
debate on the Swedish paradox of having slow long-term economic growth and 
simultaneously a very high R&D-spending, primarily by industry. As a consequence the 
efficiency of the national system in terms of producing innovations and economic 
growth has been questioned. In these two examples it is not probably question of 
disillusionment with R&D per se, but rather realistic stance towards conditions and 
policies needed to ensure future welfare. 
 
In the following chapters we will review more thoroughly how and through which kind 
of measures the challenges are tackled in the Nordic countries.  
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Structures and co-ordination of national innovation systems 
Institutional characteristics of innovation policy structures3 
Higher level structures for innovation policy making differ modestly in the Nordic 
countries. At the ministry level it is usually ministries responsible for trade and industry 
and for education and research which the play major role in the policy fields most 
closely related to innovation policy making in narrow sense. Traditionally also various 
other ministries are included in decisions concerning research and technology 
development, for example through appropriations for sector specific research and sector 
research institutes. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance has a significant role in 
innovation policy making. Through its responsibility for the overall governmental 
budget allocation the Ministry of Finance has an important influence on the framework 
conditions of the innovation system.  
 
However, currently several Nordic countries are considering a possible reorganisation 
of the institutional layout and policy making structures in order to reflect a more 
systemic approach to innovation policy. Traditional administrative boundaries between 
sectors dealing with research financing, industry oriented R&D or innovation funding or 
more general business development needs are seen increasingly as problematic and 
unsuitable for more comprehensive approach to innovation policy. The issue will be 
dealt with more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
 
In every Nordic country there are a layer of important intermediate organisations, 
including research councils and other agencies, which main responsibility is to provide 
advisory services and allocate public research and innovation financing to universities, 
research institutes, and enterprises and to other research performers. Internationally 
there is substantial variation between countries as regards the authority of these 
intermediate agencies in relation to policy design and decision-making power on 
funding.  
 
In the Nordic context the most unique example is probably offered by the Swedish 
system, because there is a number of significant research funding organisations outside 
the control of the state. Apart from large private foundations there are research 
foundations established by the centre-right government in the early 1990s. The 
government created new financing institutions by liquidating the so-called wage earners 
funds and transferring the capital to a number of new research foundations. The statutes 
concerning the research foundations restrict the government's possibility to steer the 
foundations considerably. In practise this means that the influence of policy on the 
direction of research has decreased, because large-scale and multidisciplinary research 
investments in strategic technology fields are managed outside the policy domain.  
 
The third tier of the national innovation policy systems covers organisations and other 
actors that perform research and innovation. At this level the countries institutional 
arrangements differ greatly. Swedish public R&D system is heavily geared towards 
                                                 
3 In addition tothe material produded by the GoodNIP researchers also of Patries Boekholt & Erik Arnold 
et al (2002) The Governance of Research and Innovation — An international comparative study, 
Synthesis Report is used as a source in this chapter.  
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universities, whereas the public research institute sector is quite small in international 
comparisons. According to a long-standing principle publicly funded research should, as 
far as possible, be carried out in universities and not in research institutes. Therefore, 
the production of new knowledge, technology and innovations has centred in 
universities and enterprises.  
 
Contrary to Sweden government research institutes play an important role in the 
national innovation system in Norway and Denmark. In Denmark there are almost 30 
Government Research Institutions, which are established by the various Ministries. The 
primary task of these institutions is research and the provision of advice. The research 
institutions are presently regulated by the Act on National Government Research 
Institutions. An examination of role of the institutions in the future research and 
innovation system of Denmark is under preparation, and new Bill is to be prepared for 
Parliamentary hearing in 2003. In Norway a quarter of all R&D is performed in the 
institute sector. Even in Iceland and Finland the public research institute sector has, 
alongside universities, a visible role in national innovation system. Iceland has a number 
of sector research institutes. In Finland there are altogether 19 government research 
institutes.  
 
Co-ordination of innovation policy issues 
The co-ordination of innovation policy making between sector ministries and agencies 
dealing with innovation policy issues is arranged in different ways in the Nordic 
countries. It seems that in many instances the development of co-ordination is lagging 
behind the otherwise vigorous thrust for innovation policy development taking place in 
the Nordic countries. 
 
In Finland the co-ordinating role within the innovation policy field is played by the 
Science and Technology Policy Council. This government advisory body committee 
was established in March 1987 to continue, with a slightly different emphasis, the tasks 
of the Science Policy Council founded in 1963. The Council is chaired by the Prime 
Minister. Membership consists of the Minister of Education, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, the Minister of Finance, four other ministers, and ten other members well 
versed in science or technology from public and private sector (the Academy of Finland, 
Tekes - the National Technology Agency, industry, and employers’ and employees’ 
organisations). The government appoints the Science and Technology Policy Council 
for a three-year term. The composition of the council ensures co-ordination for 
innovation policy at the highest political level possible. 
 
The main tasks of the Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council include directing 
science and technology policy, dealing with the overall development of scientific 
research and education, and issuing statements on the allocation of public science and 
technology funds to the various ministries and fields. These guidelines and issue 
statements are made public in triennial key policy documents, in so called science and 
technology policy reviews. The reviews analyse past developments and draw 
conclusions and make proposals for the future.  
 
In Iceland a new ministerial level co-ordination body, the Science and Technology 
Policy Council has been established by law. The council has replaced some functions of 
the former Icelandic Research Council. The layout of the new body resembles the 
Finnish model. The Icelandic science and technology policy council will be headed by 
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the Prime Minister. Other members of the council are the Minister of Education, 
Science and Culture, the Minister of Industry and Commerce as well as the Minister of 
Finance. Furthermore 14 representatives of the science community have been 
nominated as council members. 
 
An impetus for the reform of innovation policy co-ordination at the ministerial level in 
Iceland was the OECD Review of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy in Iceland 
in 1992. In the review it was recommended that Iceland should establish an inter-
ministerial council on STI policy. The interest to establish such a council has been 
increasing in recent years. Apart from the establishment of the new policy co-ordination 
body there are also passed a new law for support for basic research and experimental 
development on one hand for support for technological development and innovation on 
the other. The law entered into force in the beginning of 2003. 
 
Probably the most radical reform concerning higher innovation policy making structures 
has been implemented in Denmark. In connection with the change of Danish 
government in the end of 2001, innovation related policies and measures were 
transferred from the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs to the new Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation. At the same time part of the competence of the 
former Ministry of Trade and Industry regarding trade and business services and 
innovation related policies was placed with the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation. Furthermore, the administration of the university sector was alos transferred 
from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.  
 
In effect, this reorganisation has allocated all innovation related policies to the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Innovation. The government expects that this transfer, in 
connection with other measures to be taken in the coming years, will contribute to a 
better co-ordination of innovation policies in Denmark. The creation of a new Council 
for Technology and Innovation points in the same direction.  
 
In Norway the issue of co-ordination of innovation policies has been under discussion at 
different points of time. For example, a White Paper on industrial policies already in 
1989 implied a stronger emphasis on inter-ministerial co-ordination of policies relating 
to R&D and industry. Historically formulation of Norwegian R&D policy, the core of 
narrowly defined innovation policy, has been based on the so-called sector principle, 
meaning that each ministry is responsible for promoting and funding research activities 
within their own areas. Main responsibility in the development of national innovation 
policies lays although in The Ministry for Education and Research, The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and the Ministry for Local Government and Regional Affairs. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Education and Research has had responsibility for the 
overall R&D policies, for funding large parts of basic science in the universities and 
colleges, and for co-ordinating sector R&D policies. 
 
Co-ordination of innovation policy issues at the governmental level in Norway takes 
place in two high level committees focusing on science and technology policy related 
issues: the inter-ministerial Research Forum for Government Officials 
(Departementenes forskningsutvalg) and the Government’s Research Board 
(Regjeringens forskningsutvalg – RFU). The Minister of Education and Research chairs 
RFU.  
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The Swedish institutional system is characterised by relatively small Ministries. This 
implies that functions assumed by ministries in other countries to some extent fall under 
the responsibility of government agencies in Sweden. All ministries support research 
activities in their own sector over their own budgets according to the sector research 
principle. Yet, Sweden has not designed a formal innovation policy but has separate 
governance structure for research policy and industrial policy. The responsibility for the 
Industrial policy rests on the ministry for Industry, Employment and Communication, 
whereas the Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for research policy and 
also the embryonic innovation policy through the Swedish agency for innovation 
system, VINNOVA. 
Reform of innovation policy structures 
Lately, national innovation policy structures and institutions have been under close 
scrutiny in all the Nordic Countries. Governments and ministries have assigned 
commissions and evaluators to assess how the public structures of innovation policy 
field could be improved. Another critical question is the integration and co-ordination of 
different policies dealing with research and innovation activities. The pressure to reform 
deeply rooted institutional and governance systems of research and innovation policies 
has led significant reforms in innovation policy structures in all the Nordic countries 
except Finland.  
 
In Finnish case the higher policy making structure and core institutional arrangements 
of R&D and innovation policies have been remarkably constant over the last two 
decades since the establishment of Tekes, the national technology agency in 1983 and 
the government advisory body the Science and Technology Policy Council in 1987. 
Over the years a number of changes have been carried out among institutions and 
agencies responsible for research and technology development or for company support 
services. Important changes were implemented during the first part of the 90s when the 
Academy of Finland and VTT (the Technical Research Centre of Finland) were 
reorganised. From the innovation systems point of view perhaps most important 
structural reform in the 1990s concerned the piloting of the polytechnic system and its 
establishment on a permanent basis. Overall, though, the development of Finnish 
innovation policy structures has taken place rather incrementally. 
 
In the other Nordic countries the innovation structures have gone through much deeper 
changes, some of which are still to be implemented. In Sweden, the reorganisation of 
the structures for public funding of research and technology development and support to 
business and regional development, has followed two government bills presented in the 
spring 2000. The first bill, issued by the Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communications, outlined a new organisational structure for public support to business 
and regional development and the other, issued by the Ministry of Education and 
Science, outlined a new organisational structure for public funding of research and 
technology development. The reorganisation of public support to business and regional 
development involved some 15 organisations. After the reform the number of 
organisations was reduced to six. The new structure is to enable more focused public 
efforts in areas of strategic importance, greater efficiency, and a better adaptation to the 
needs of target groups. The new agencies came into work in the beginning of 2001.  
 
On the research and R&D funding side the new Swedish Research Council was 
established. The council incorporates three separate councils for the humanities and 
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social sciences, for natural sciences and technology and for medicine. This body is the 
largest actor within the new organisation of research policy. Also, two special research 
councils were set up: one in the area of working life and social sciences, and the other 
one in the area of environment, spatial planning and agricultural sciences. Another 
feature of the new funding structure is VINNOVA (the Swedish Agency for Innovation 
Systems), an organisation for promoting sustainable economic growth by fostering 
effective innovation systems in Sweden and by funding research oriented towards the 
need of industry, primarily at the universities.  
 
A further novel element of the Swedish institutional structure is a Research Forum for 
dialogue among researchers, organisations funding research, the general public and 
others directly or indirectly concerned by the research performed. The aspect of co-
ordination is also in focus for the proposal of widening the Research Advisory Board to 
include innovation related issues. 
 
In Norway a cross-ministerial process, which aims towards a new holistic national 
innovation policy is under its way, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry is expected to 
present an action plan in connection with the national budget in October2003. The idea 
is to include all ministries in innovation policy development. The Government has also 
presented an evaluation of the structure of business-oriented policy instruments and 
institutions. The evaluation is focused on the future organisational solutions for public 
business services. Furthermore, the policy makers are looking into the mix of indirect 
and direct policy instruments and measures.  
 
The above mentioned process has resulted in a decision made by the Norwegian 
government to implement an institutional reform among public organisations supporting 
business and regional development. The main objective is to gather together public 
measures supporting innovation and internationalisation within a single organisation.  
 
The reform is to achieve this by incorporating three organisations – namely the 
Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), the Export Council of 
Norway and SVO, The Norwegian Government Consultative Office for Inventors. 
Some undefined policy measures belonging to the Research Council of Norway may 
also be included. According to the government proposal the reform is based on fact that 
internationalisation, regional development and innovation activities are today more and 
more closely part of each other and therefore services catering for the issues should be 
bundled together. SIVA is strangely enough not included. 
 
Another reform concerning the structure of the Norwegian innovation system is the plan 
to give counties more responsibility vis-à-vis policy measures targeting regions and 
districts. The Ministry of Regional and Local Affairs has decided to give the county 
administrators more influence over the administration and allocation of the ministry’s 
innovation policy measures and funds.  
 
In Denmark reform within public policy and R&D system is not limited to the 
reorganisation of ministries and their responsibilities but also include an extensive 
reform of the public research system. Over the years, various stakeholders have not 
been content with national research and innovation system, but have expressed their 
concern about its efficiency. It has been argued that the system in its present form is too 
fragmented to act as a framework for a coherent and efficient use of research resources. 
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Therefore the government has commissioned the Danish Research Commission to 
review the relevant legislation with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the entire 
research system. The results of the appraisal were presented in September 2001.  
 
Based on the Commissions recommendations the Parliament and the Government 
embarked on a reform of the entire public research system in 2002, when a new Act on 
Technology and Innovation was passed. The Act is a manifestation of the fact that 
policy areas covering technology and innovation are assembled in the Ministry of 
Technology, Science and Innovation.  
 
Furthermore a new body, the Council for Technology and Innovation, is set up to assist 
implementation of the new legislation. The council advises the Minister of Technology, 
Science and Innovation and is authorised to make decisions on a number of specific 
appropriation affairs. The council, whose members are appointed by the minister, is put 
together so that it represents those competencies deemed essential for viable innovation 
system. Furthermore the research advisory system is to be reformed, in order to ensure 
an optimal use of research resources. This comes about by simplifying the 
organisational structure of the advisory system and strengthening the management. The 
intention is furthermore to create a more open competition on research means not 
allocated as basic appropriations to institutions, and that a larger part of appropriations 
be channelled through the advisory system. 
 
The Danish government has also initiated reforms concerning the government research 
institution and the university sector. The aim is to sharpen up the profiles of individual 
institutions and increase collaboration. A new Bill on National Government Research 
institutions as well as amendments regarding the individual institutions are to be 
presented in early 2003. Moreover a new University Act is prepared by the government, 
and according to the original timetable the Act will be come into effect in the beginning 
of 2004. As a new element -- in addition to research and education -- an active role in 
knowledge exchange, technology transfer and mobility will be added to the university 
mission.  
 
Developing innovation policy priorities 
In the 1980's the policy of large national research programmes targeting strategic areas 
were a common phenomenon in Nordic countries as well as in many other OECD 
countries. Launching of these programmes was based on judgement that selected 
technologies would be strategic for future technical development and for the 
competitiveness of national industries.  
 
Large investments in the strategic research areas were also understood as means of 
supporting the development of new industries and diversification of national industry 
base. It was especially Japan, which was used as a point of reference when large scale 
national programmes were developed elsewhere. Because of Japan's success in 
economic and technological terms the Japanese organisational and institutional 
arrangements  of that time became a “good practice” which was imitated by other 
countries (e.g.the integration of science, technology and industry).  
 
In Norway in the 1980s, there was broad national consensus behind the idea to increase 
funding for a few selected technologies -- IT, oil and gas, new materials, biotechnology, 
and fish farming -- and to improve the co-ordination between public and private actors, 
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such as companies, universities, R&D institutes, public agencies, etc., within selected 
technology areas. It was generally accepted that the development of new industries was 
the outcome of scientific and technological processes. The new industries were defined 
as “science based industries”. R&D became the core element of this industrial strategy, 
and the main supporters of the strategy were people closely connected to the R&D 
system. Therefore the R&D system played a central role in the re-industrialisation 
policy of the 1980s. The policy had two main objectives: to expand the R&D sector 
(public and private), and to improve the industry-research relationship so that more 
science-based industries could be established. 
 
In Sweden programmes established in 1980s were targetingso-called generic 
technologies like micro-electronics, biotechnology and new materials. These 
technologies were judged to be of strategic importance for future technical development 
and for the competitiveness of national industries. In 1984 a national micro-electronic 
programme (NMP) was initiated, which included huge R&D investments, support for 
product development and promoting co-operation between universities and industry. 
Government and industry jointly financed the programme. The generation of the new 
technology was heavily dependent on investments in basic research, applied research 
and development activities. Later in the 1980s NMP was replaced by the IT4-
programme.  
 
Analogous development took place in Denmark in the 1980s. Large scale research 
programmes targeting hi-tech areas were introduced first by the Conservative-Liberal 
government in the early 1980s. Beginning with an IT–programme and shortly after 
passing initiatives in biotechnology, materials and ending in food technology the next 
ten years were dominated by such programmes. The most interesting feature with these 
programs were the relative large amounts of money transferred into these every year 
during time spans of 6 – 10 years even though the programmes formally had duration of 
3 – 4 years but they were prolonged one or two times during that phase. 
 
Tekes, which was established in 1983 as key agency for new technology-oriented 
policy, adopted concept of technology programmes into its service and instrument 
portfolio. At the time of the launching of the programmes it was thought that the new 
instrument would enable Tekes to control publicly funded R&D activities. The first of 
Tekes' programmes were focused on information technology and this emphasis 
continued until the late 1980's, even if the share of information technology in Tekes 
funding had been decreasing during the last part of the 1980s. First national technology 
programmes relating to information technologies were in fact launched already in the 
end of previous decade. The one dealt with solid state technology and the other with 
information technology.  
 
Icelandic research policy was going through a transformation in early years of the 
1980s. Up until then the nation's research and development efforts were 
overwhelmingly preoccupied by research and exploitation of natural resources on land 
and in the sea. In 1981 the focus of the National Research Council shifted towards 
policies, which were more technology and human capital orientated. At the same time 
more attention than ever before was paid to the role of private companies and their 
involvement in R&D activities. Since then industry's interest and share of national R&D 
expenditures has been rapidly growing.  
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Even if there were no large scale Icelandic research programmes in the 1980s there were 
nevertheless some visible priorities. It is of a great interest that Iceland started to pave 
the way for the present biotechnology development in the 80s by, for example, 
allocating some 45 per cent of the available funds to that field. These investments made 
it possible to educate people in biotechnology and carry out research projects.  
Turn of the 1990s - redefinition of priorities 
Until the turn of the 1990s Nordic countries were following familiar paths in 
development of science, technology and industrial policies. The late 1980's and the first 
years of the following decade were in many Nordic countries a time for strong 
economic fluctuations and increasing socio-economic problems.  
 
The economic downturn hit Norway as a result of the falling oil prices in 1986. That 
was followed by the stock market collapse in 1987, the bankruptcy of the high-tech 
national champions Norsk Data and KV in the years 1987-89, rapid de-industrialisation, 
increased immigration from the periphery to the centre, collapse of fishing resources 
and the fish farming industry, collapse of the national financial system, the highest 
unemployment figures since WW2 and social problems for large groups of people 
because of debts and high interest rates. The difficult period between 1986-1993 was 
clearly defined by politicians as a ”crisis”. The perceived emergency led to a departure 
from the “best industrial structure” orientation, which had prevailed in Norwegian 
industrial policies since the Second World War; old ideas and institutions were 
abolished, new ones were introduced.  
 
In Finland and Sweden the economy was still growing during the late 1980s, and the 
Finnish unemployment rate was at a record low level in 1989-1990. Strong optimism 
and dynamism was characterising the Finnish economy of the time – the financial 
markets had been deregulated some years earlier, the stock indexes were climbing and 
people had the confidence to aquire bank loans and mortgages. However, everything 
was turned upside-down in short period of time. The Finnish economy plunged into 
very severe recession in the beginning of the 1990s. Between 1990-1993 gross national 
product figures dropped by 13 percent; the national currency, the markka, was devalued 
by almost 40 percent and unemployment peaked near to 20 percent. The banking system 
was also in a serious crisis and this eventually led to the bankruptcy of ne bank and new 
alignments and mergers between the remaining banks. This negative economic spiral 
had a deteriorating effect on state finances, because at the same time as tax income 
dropped the need for public expenditure rose. This, in turn caused both a growth in the 
state budget deficit and in external debts. 
 
The challenges faced by Sweden and Finland were in many ways similar. The economic 
slow-down in the early 1990s caused increasing unemployment and budget deficits in 
Sweden. In 1991 the social democrats lost the elections and a centre right-wing 
government came into power — parallel to what happened in Finnish domestic politics 
after the 1991 elections.  
 
Overall, with hindsight it is possible to see that even if the Nordic countries all are small 
and internally open economies and societies, the economic crisis and later slow-down in 
economic activities had different trajectories. In Denmark the crisis began immediately 
after the first oil crisis 1973/74. In 1973 the rate of unemployment in Denmark was 1.1 
percentI, in 1975 6.0 percent.  
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Dissemination of the systemic approach 
The economic upheavals caused the drafting of new national industrial strategies. 
Norway's industrial strategy was written anew by the Brundtland government, which 
was in power 1986-1989. The strategy laid down priorities for the national industrial 
policy in coming years. Priorities included “healthy” macro economic conditions, the 
need to expand the industrial policy focus beyond the manufacturing industry, less 
direct support to most indusries and a de-centralising of instruments for industrial 
policy. Moreover, local communities and regional authorities were made responsible for 
development.  
 
The Norwegian government argued that the number of instruments available for 
industrial policies were rather limited. International agreements put a limit to the type of 
instruments, which could -- formally -- be used to shape industrial development. The 
government defined several main areas for governmental intervention, including R&D, 
technology and competence development, and capital supply (especially venture 
capital). 
 
The Norwegian policy of the late 1980s in Norway was focused on the development of 
a new basis for future welfare, which should be carried through a modernisation of the 
whole economy. It was argued that the Norwegian economy was too dependent on oil 
revenues and natural resources, and that long term welfare would require a successful 
transformation towards less resource based productions. Therefore, the government’s 
long term plans from the late 1980s argued for the need to transform the national 
economy and ensure a radical structural change. The main difference from the policies 
of the earlier 1980s was that the government now declined to indicate how the structure 
of the future economy ought to be. 
 
In Finland the government launched the preparation of a new national industrial strategy 
in 1992 in midst of the deep recession. The strategy was drafted and written within short 
time span from autumn 1992 to spring 1993 and it aimed among other things for an 
adoption of modern industrial policy thinking, which could target Finland's problems 
and strengthen the position of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in industrial policy-
making. Theoretically the strategy formulation rested on Porter's competitiveness model 
which was thought to offer “a natural framework for contemplation of a new industrial 
policy".  
 
The redefined strategy made a clear distinction between the old and new industrial 
policies. The old industrial policy was seen to rely too much on direct firm subsidies as 
well as regional and sector subventions, which were not promoting the birth of new 
economic dynamics but instead was supporting uncompetitive activities. Furthermore, 
the old approach was seen to rest on untenable assumptions concerning the competences 
of public policy makers and their ability to plan and steer structural development of 
industries. The new industrial strategy meant “the end of having a dispersed system of 
supports and financial aid”.4 
 
                                                 
4National Industrial Strategy for Finland (1993) The Ministry of Trade and Industry, Industry Department 
(Matti Pietarinen, Risto Ranki). Ministry of Trade and Industry publications 1/1993. 
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The juxtaposition of the old and the new way of thinking was apparent even at the level 
of policy goals: “the goal is not the reallocation of current resources but rather the 
influencing of quantity and quality of resources to be born in the future”. The new 
guidelines of industrial policy promoted structural changes indirectly by targeting the 
areas where markets are working insufficiently, by utilising external effects of 
investments into R&D, by developing production factors - mainly know-how and 
research - and by advancing working of markets.  
 
The redefined industrial policy strategy was in line with the ideas put forward by the 
Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council a few years before. The council had 
laid the groundwork for a “new” science and technology policy as published in its 
review in 1990. The concept of a national innovation system was introduced into 
Finnish policy making in this policy document. The concept offered a framework within 
which it was possible to take a broad and systematic approach to policy making and 
concerning “a whole set of factors influencing the development and utilisation of new 
knowledge and know-how”5.  
 
On other side of the Baltic Sea the Swedish centre-right government was also designing 
a policy response that was to turn the slow-down of the early 90s into economic growth. 
The government's strategy was built on policies targeting an increasing international 
competitiveness of the Swedish industry. The emergence of the IT-revolution and of a 
“knowledge society” -- including increased knowledge content of products and services 
– were identified as important global trends which significant policy implications.  
 
In this situation the government saw its responsibility to be the creation of favourable 
framework conditions for the transformation of society. This meant among other things 
supporting the development of high-tech industries. These industries are dependent on a 
well-functioning infrastructure including a public research system. Therefore, the role of 
research was to develop new fields of knowledge so that it could contribute to the 
renewal of industry. The link between research policy and growth policy was explicit; 
the task to support the competitiveness of Swedish industry became the prime task of 
research policy.  
 
It was in this context the concept of innovation policy -- i.e. the fostering of economic 
growth and the competitive power of national industry by creating favourable 
conditions for innovative activities -- entered the Swedish policy arena. The concept of 
innovation systems, and especially national innovation systems, began to spread in the 
policy debate and in policy thinking in the late 90s.  
 
At the end of the 1990s a policy reformulation took place against the background of 
comparatively slow economic growth and increasing regional economic imbalances. 
The government presented two major strategies for turning these trends. The first one 
focused on creating increased economic growth by increasing the co-ordination of 
industrial and research policies, which manifested itself in a considerable reorganisation 
of the public research funding structure in January 2001. The challenge of regional 
                                                 
5Review 1990 – guidelines for science and technology policy in the 1990s (1990) The Science and 
Technology Policy Council of Finland. 
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imbalances was meant to tackle by implementing so called “regional growth 
agreements”. 
 
Overall, the 1990s constituted a period when there was in many countries a quest for a 
more systemic approach in the development of policies related to science, technology 
and industrial development. For instance, in Norway the idea of an innovation policy 
was for first time explicitly presented in a White Paper on research policy in 1993.6 The 
direct impact of this document was relatively weak — it did not give an impetus for 
broader debate, nor did it lead to any substantial increase in national investments in 
R&D. Some elements of broader approaches were, though, involved in the 
establishment of new body, the Research Council of Norway in 1990. The Research 
Council was given a strengthened and formalised agenda that went beyond the role as a 
classical research council cum funding agency. Besides being a research council in the 
established sense, the new body was given the explicit task of being a central policy 
formulating and advising body for national R&D and innovation policies.  
 
In Norway and Denmark, just as in Sweden the real breakthrough of innovation systems 
thinking at the policy-making level took place in the latter half of the 1990s. A 
Norwegian White Paper on research policy published in 1999 was to a large extent 
structured around innovation theory.7 The White Paper contained an analysis of the 
whole Norwegian knowledge system, from university and college research to industrial 
innovation activities. It recommended that national R&D funding should reach the 
OECD average, measured as a proportion of GDP, in the course of five years. This goal 
was later affirmed by the Norwegian government. It further argued that a main priority 
in the use of public funds should be the strengthening of long-term fundamental 
research, and priority should be given to increased research commitment in the fields of 
marine research; information and communication technology; medical and health-care 
research; and research in the area of intersection between energy and the environment. 
 
The changing rationalities of R&D and innovation policies emphasising innovation 
based growth have not though totally wiped out “old” political concerns. This is 
especially true in relation to the position and importance of large companies in such 
small and open economies as in Nordic countries. Such concerns usually surface when a 
successful national company are sold abroad or a large company decides to relocate its 
headquarter or significant R&D units abroad. Also, changes in economic performance 
of large companies, which are in many sense industrial locomotives, tend to be quickly 
reflected in small economies —for better or worse. 
The growing importance of international co-operation 
International interaction and collaboration is essential issue for small countries like the 
Nordic ones. The limited size of domestic market drives growth oriented or niche 
market companies to internationalise their activities at a very early stage. In addition, 
the small size of a country often correlates with rather specialised industrial structures 
and exports. SME dominated and specialised industrial structures tend to make the 
economies of small countries sensitive and vulnerable to external developments. At the 
                                                 
6 St. meld. nr. 36 (1992 – 1993). 
7 St. Meld. nr. 39 (1998 – 1999). 
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field of science and technology policy, small size may cause extra challenges especially 
with respect to the availability of resources.8 
 
Against this background it has been in the Nordic countries’ interest that international 
research collaboration has grown rapidly during the last few decades. This development 
has opened up new horizons, increased cross-border networking and enabled pooling of 
resources for common goals. The European Union Framework Programme is today 
probably the single most important measure, which supports cross-border pre-
competitive research collaboration between research organisations and companies in 
Europe. The Framework Programme is open not just to the EU member countries but 
also to other European, non-EU countries. This means that all the Nordic countries can 
participate in the Framework programmes, as they have also done with good track 
records.  
 
A recent Finnish study9 revealed that the participation of universities in the European 
Union Framework programmes has had a positive impact on international research co-
operation and has increased international visibility of Finnish research. Furthermore, the 
collaboration with companies has increased awareness among academics of the 
commercial use of research results. These results are well in line with current innovation 
policy aspirations in Finland. 
 
Another study10 assessing impacts of the Fourth Framework programme found that 
Finnish firms collaborated more with universities and research institutes in the 
framework programme projects than in their R&D activities in general. It was 
concluded in the study that the promotion of cross-sector collaboration has been an 
important added value of the framework programme.  
 
Another important finding was that projects in industries with the lowest R&D 
intensities had the largest additionality. These result indicates that the EU Framework 
Programme concept has succeeded in promoting R&D activities in companies that 
perform little R&D themselves.  
 
The study further confirmed an earlier finding that framework programme collaboration 
plays a different role for different research sectors. Thus the EU project was of strategic 
importance for research performing institutions, government research institutes and 
universities, and SMEs. For large companies and non-profit organisations, it was most 
often of potential future importance. For all research sectors, EU funding is important in 
enabling them to carry out cross-country collaborative projects. 
 
Apart from the Framework programme the EU Structural Funds Programmes encourage 
innovation and knowledge based growth in areas that are lagging behind. The 
                                                 
8Elina Berghäll et al. (2002) The Role of Science and Technology Policy in Small Economies. Valtion 
taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus (Government Institute for Economic Research). VATT-Research Reports 
91. 
9 Niskanen, Pirjo (2001) Finnish universities and the EU Framework Programme - Towards a New Phase. 
VTT Group for Technology Studies. VTT Publications: 440. 
10 Luukkonen, Terttu; Hälikkä, Sasu (2000) Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Diffusion Networks - 
Impacts in Finland of the EU's Fourth Framework Programme for Research and Development. Tekes, 
National Technology Agency. Publications of the Finnish Secretariat for EU R&D : 1/2000 
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motivation for the programmes comes from the treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Treaty lays down the principle of economic and social cohesion, under 
which every effort is made to reduce disparities between the levels of development of 
the various regions. Under-developed and declining regions are assisted through 
regional and structural policy measures financed by the EU Structural Funds. The 
Structural Funds Programmes cover, however, only the EU member countries, which in 
the Nordic context leaves out Iceland and Norway.  
 
A current trend is that an increasing share of the Structural Funds resources is deployed 
in the EU countries for economic development and innovation policies. A Finnish 
study11 analysing the impacts of the EU Structural Funds on regional innovation 
activities confirmed that regionally the structural support has been an important 
additional resource, which has complemented national R&D and innovation funding.  
 
The regions eligible for the structural support are typically getting only a small share of 
national research and technology development financing. The additional input has 
supported the strengthening of regional innovation environments. It has had also 
positive impact on the networking between participating firms, and between firms and 
technology centres, universities and research institutes. Furthermore, the study showed 
that the Structural Funds programmes have had an effect on Finnish innovation policy-
making. The latter effects were most visible in the range of policy-makers and in 
working practices at the regional level. New actors, who have not been active in this 
sector before, have entered the field of technology policy and become involved in 
design its regional contents and aims.  
 
As a whole the significance of international co-operation in research and innovation will 
without doubt increase in the future in Europe as well as in the Nordic countries. The 
topic is currently high on national innovation policy agendas, like in Finland. At the 
EU-level the development towards more integrated European research and innovation 
policies is a cornerstone of the European Research Area (ERA). The EU has identified 
two broad objectives to improve innovation in the community context: strengthening the 
bridge between research and innovation and secondly renewing the human potential for 
research. What clearly seems to be at stake here is the strengthening of interaction 
between research community and other innovation actors and enhancing working of 
knowledge transfer between actors. The second policy proposal concerns need to 
improve and enlarge knowledge base continuously. 
                                                 
11 Kuitunen Soile & Oksanen Juha (2002) Mikä rooli EU:n rakennerahastoilla on alueiden 
innovaatiotoiminnassa ja innovaatiopolitiikassa (Role of the EU Structural Funds in Innovation Activity 
and Innovation Policy of the Regions). Ministry of Trade and Industry: Studies and Reports 10/2002. 
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Main components of public innovation policies in the Nordic 
countries 
Innovation financing 
In this sub chapter will be offered a description on research and development and 
innovation financing in the Nordic countries. For a more detailed analysis of relevant 
innovation policy indicators, see report no. 1. 
 
As regards certain main features of R&D financing the Nordic countries differ from 
each other.When comparing total investments in research and technology development 
it is Finland and Sweden which invest most in R&D as a percentage of GDP. Currently, 
alongside Japan the two Nordic countries occupy top positions in international 
comparisons.  
 
Sweden has a long track record as regards internationally high R&D expenditures. 
Finland's spending on R&D was until the early 1990s under the OECD average, even if 
the trend was a constant growth ever since the 1970s. It was during the second part of 
the 1990s that Finnish R&D spending grew especially rapidly. As regard the other 
Nordic countries, Denmark and Iceland’s investments in R&D is around the OECD 
average, while Norway is below. However, during the 1990s Denmark was allocating a 
steadily growing proportion of its resources to R&D activities. In Norway's case the 
volume of R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP has stayed more or less intact for a 
longer period of time.12 
 
Furthermore, the Nordic countries are different from each other as regard the 
composition of R&D inputs. In Finland and Sweden the enterprise sector stands for 
majority of the R&D expenditures — in the recent years the private sector has covered 
over 70 per cent of all R&D inputs in the both countries. This means that a large part of 
new knowledge and new technologies is produced outside academia or other public 
research organisations. The situation is different in Iceland and Norway, where the 
government is the main source of funding. In Iceland also foreign funding plays an 
important role. Denmark could be placed somewhere in between these two groups.  
 
Key trends in public innovation finance in Nordic countries 
During the last decade one of the most prominent trends of Finnish innovation policy 
has been the rapid increase in both public and private research funding. In 1991 R&D 
expenditure accounted for 2.1 per cent of GDP, whereas in 2001 the figure was 3.4 per 
cent of GDP. The increase is mainly explained by increased R&D investments in the 
business sector. Also the government input rose markedly particularly within the second 
part of the 1990's. This was largely because of the Government additional research 
appropriation programme implemented in the late 1990s. Part of the resources gained 
from the privatisation of the state companies was channelled to R&D activities. As a 
result of the additional research appropriation programme Finnish government spending 
on R&D rose by FIM 1.5 billion (around € 250 million) between 1997 and 1999. 
                                                 
12 For a more elaborate description of Nordic national R&D investments, see  GoodNIP report no. 1. 
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After the end of the additional funding programme the government input into R&D has 
stayed almost intact for last couple of years. Because of this the public share of total 
R&D expenditure has continued to diminish. This situation has caused concern among 
innovation policy actors. The Science and Technology Policy Council has explicitly 
stated in its Review 2003 that the level of public research and development and 
innovation financing should be raised from 2003 to 2007 by a total of € 405 million. 
This is seen as an essential step in order to speed up the internationalisation of the 
innovation system and to further develop innovation in Finland.  
 
The Science and Technology Policy Council has lifted up three main targets for the 
development of funding. The first concerns education, the development of research 
careers and broad-based increases in researched knowledge, the second, the 
strengthening of social and technological innovation and the third flexible, expert 
development of innovation funding.  
 
All in all, the new recommendation of the Science and Technology Policy Council is 
well in line with long standing Finnish R&D and innovation policy approach: during the 
last three decades Finnish science and technology policy has often been expressed 
through targets set for the growth of R&D expenditure in relation to GDP. International 
statistics on R&D expenditures, usually produced by the OECD, has over the years 
served as an important base for the setting of quantified targets. However, this time the 
growth target for the public R&D financing is not defined against an international 
yardstick, but as the GDP share of government research funding — the goal is to lift 
public R&D expenditures over 1 per cent of GDP.13 
 
In Norway, public funding for industrial R&D has had played major role in innovation 
policies throughout the last two decades. In the early 1980s up to 1986 corporate 
funding was still increasing more rapidly than public funding mainly because of R&D 
funded by oil and gas companies, which was to dominate substantial parts of the 
industrially oriented research system. However, the collapse of the price of crude oil on 
international markets in 1986 affected negatively the profitability of a range of oil and 
gas fields off shore. As a result of this industrial R&D related to exploration, 
construction of production facilities etc. was rapidly scaled down.  
 
At the turn of the century a need to allocate more public resources towards R&D re-
emerged on Norwegian policy agenda. Government assigned expert commissions have 
stressed the need for an increase in public investments in R&D. The government has 
also set as a national goal that Norway should reach the OECD average level of R&D 
expenditures (as measured percentage of GDP) by 2005 as the latest.  
 
The need for strengthening of the national investments in R&D have been advocated by 
pointing to concepts like “the new economy”, “the knowledge society” or “the 
information society”, based on a feeling that Norway ought to invest more in high-tech 
                                                 
13 Lemola Tarmo (2001) The Role of Science and Technology Policy in Finland's* Economic 
Development. Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology. 
Portland, OR, 7 July - 8 Aug. 2001  
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industries and ICT. It has also been argued that the State invests too little in basic 
university research. The debate has shown, however, that few have any clear concept of 
what is meant by a “knowledge society”.  
 
The current Icelandic innovation policy strategy is to strengthen the role of the 
university sector in underpinning the “knowledge based society” while holding the 
public support to public laboratories performing research relating to traditional 
economic sectors constant. The exception is that funds targeting research in marine 
environment and fisheries management related research are to be increased, reflecting 
concern over the sustainability of marine fisheries.  
 
The government decided in early 2001 to award additional funding to university 
research. Simultaneously a decision was made to award additional funds for the next 
three years for the Science Fund and the Graduate Training Fund under the Icelandic 
Research Council. Out of these 1/5 will go to the Graduate Education Fund. This 
reflects a policy to give higher priority to basic research and graduate training meeting 
the strong interest of the university sector to expand in this direction. 
 
When discussing the public funding of research the question of a critical mass of 
activities cannot be avoided. In all small economies the pressure to target limited R&D 
resources strategically is a question of high relevance. The Icelandic Research Council 
Rannis had been criticised for allotting to small resources and having too stringent 
procedures. As a response the Icelandic Research Council redesigned its grants policies 
for 2002 by creating a new scheme of a limited number of substantially larger grants for 
excellence from its Science Fund. Funding requires scientific teams and matching 
institutional funding. This type of funding is partly intended to match other international 
schemes to support Centres and Networks of Excellence.  
 
In Sweden the public R&D and innovation financing was growing during the first part 
of the 1990s. At that time was also established a new element into the Swedish system: 
The centre-right government in power established new research foundations, through 
which the public funding was mainly channelled. The foundations were established by 
liquidating the so-called wage earners funds and transferring the capital to a number of 
new research foundations. The objective of the foundations’ funding was to promote the 
emergence of new industries and thus future economic growth; their funding of 
university research should improve the long-term competitiveness of Swedish industry. 
The objective should be achieved by investments in long-term research and in training 
of new researchers in strategic technology fields like IT, biotechnology and new 
materials.  
 
The argument for using foundations as the instrument for achieving these goals was that 
foundations supposedly are more flexible in relation to the needs of society. Another 
reason was to protect the funds from political manipulation:  future Governments should 
not be able to liquidate them even if they wanted to. The new research funding model 
meant that the influence of policy on the direction of research decreased. Large-scale, 
offensive and multi-disciplinary research investments in strategic technology fields 
were managed outside the policy domain.  
 
After the mid-1990s the tide turned in Swedish R&D financing and issue was savings 
and budget cuts in public research funding. A reason for the rethinking was the 
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worsening situation of state finances in a period of economic recession. The former 
government's decision to increase public R&D funding substantially were partly 
fuelling increasing budget deficits.  
 
A consequence of the saving measures was a changing relationship between public and 
private research funding. The public resources funnelled through research councils 
concerned investments in the infrastructure of research, while the private funding by 
foundations concerned strategic research investments. This was an unintended 
consequence and led to a “privatisation” of research policy. An issue for the Labour 
Government in the second half of the 1990s was to try to control the research funding of 
foundations and to co-ordinate their funding with other public funding. However, the 
Government never succeeded in controlling the foundations. Co-ordination of research 
funding was to some extent achieved through agreements with the foundations instead. 
Tax concessions 
An area where the Nordic countries diverge from each other is the use of tax reduction 
schemes in order to promote R&D in companies. Such schemes are currently in place in 
Denmark and Norway but not in Iceland, Finland or Sweden.  In 2002 the Danish 
Parliament passed an amendment to the tax legislation making it more attractive for 
companies to invest in research and development. The instrument is a 150 per cent tax 
deduction on expenses incurred in research projects co-financed by Danish public 
research institutions. The arrangement is temporary, being effective in 2002 and 2003.  
 
Norway has also recently introduced a tax deduction scheme (SkatteFUNN), which 
originally was meant for smaller firms with less than 100 employees. From the 
beginning of 2003 the scheme is open to all companies, regardless of size. Still, SMEs 
are eligible for a 2 per cent higher tax reduction of total project costs than are larger 
companies. There is a ceiling, which limits the amount of maximum tax reduction per 
year. Research and development is defined as a limited and goal oriented project that is 
to generate new knowledge, information or experience that will be of use for the 
company in the development of new or improved products, services or methods of 
production.  
 
In the past other countries have also tried out   tax concessions as a way to induce R&D. 
For instance, there was for a while in the late 1980s a tax reduction scheme for R&D in 
Finland. This measure was however  soon abandoned , because the authorities came to 
the conclusion that the benefits of the tax concession were not high enough compared to 
the scheme’s administrative costs and other expenses. In addition, the scheme was seen 
to contradict the Government's goal to simplify taxation by eliminating the number of 
concessions. 
 
Besides the tax reductions for R&D, there are nowadays tax schemes which aim to 
alleviate employers' problems with recruiting key staff members from abroad. A Danish 
scheme introduced in 1992 covers so-called immigrating key staff members -defined as 
persons with monthly income above € 7,000 in 2002 - who can choose to be taxed at 25 
per cent of their gross income during the first three years, and the following years be 
taxed on a normal basis. However, if the person after an additional four years decides to 
stay in Denmark, he will be taxed to neutralise the tax benefit obtained in the first three 
years.  
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Similar kinds of schemes are or have been in place in other Nordic countries as well. In 
Sweden a special time limited tax reduction for visiting scientific experts was 
introduced in January 2001. In Finland a fixed-term tax scheme for key staff members 
immigrating from abroad was in operation in the years 1996-1999, and after one year 
interruption was continued in the period 2001-2003.  
 
Still another tax related solution is tested presently by the Icelandic Government, which 
made a decision to lower general corporate income tax from 30% to 18%. This decision, 
which came into effect in 2002, is supposed to have a positive effect on firms' 
willingness to invest in technology based industrial projects and even in R&D activities. 
Overall, the tax reduction is seen to be an important countermeasure at a time when an 
economic downturn is reducing the availability of and access to private risk capital. The 
tax reduction is also expected to reduce the risk of successful Icelandic high-tech 
companies moving their domestic operations abroad in the future. Furthermore, the 
lowering of corporate income tax to internationally competitive level may attract 
foreign investments in technology based industries. It may also further strengthen the 
interest in R&D and high-tech based spin-offs and growth in companies. 
Venture capital for R&D and innovation activities 
Fine-tuning of taxation is not the only way to increase private investments in R&D and 
innovation. Governments are today increasingly recognising that private investors, 
business angels and venture capital corporations have a key role to play in the near-to-
market phase and commercialisation of innovation. The importance of these actors  goes 
far beyond pure financing of promising innovations - for example, business angels are 
through their business experience and know-how and personal contacts invaluable 
source of advice for start-ups and entrepreneurs.  
 
Until recently the venture capital markets in many countries have, however, been quite 
underdeveloped. The situation has changed markedly in the aftermath of the ITC-boom 
of the late 1990s, during which the number of wealthy individuals and professional 
venture capital organisations increased substantially.  
 
Among the Nordic countries it is Sweden that has experienced the strongest 
development in financial markets. The Swedish venture capital industry is today one of 
the largest in the OECD in relation to population. Growth in the venture capital market 
has been coupled with the development of new markets focusing especially on 
innovative firms. Foreign venture capital investors and corporate finance brokers 
entering Sweden have also improved the financial climate for small, mainly technology 
based firms in early stages of development. Lately, however, the global economic 
down-turn has had an adverse effect on venture capital markets in Sweden as well as in 
other countries, and the amount of seed capital invested has decreased substantially.  
 
The Swedish public sector has actively been involved in the development of financial 
measures targeting companies and entrepreneurs in different phases of businesses. For 
example, a public seed finance scheme was launched by NUTEK in the mid 1970s. This 
long lasting seed finance scheme was replaced by a new arrangement in 2002, when a 
new service was established to offer advice and finance to technology based firms in the 
early stages of development. In the 1990s some new institutions were established in 
Sweden in order to help bring together independent inventors and resources for market 
exploitation.  
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SIC, Stiftelsen InnovationsCentrum, founded in 1994, is a public foundation with the 
objective to foster innovation through grants, loans and advice. It focuses on inventions 
and inventors in the very early stage of development – the pre-seed or seed stage. 
Financing is also given to projects aiming at developing product prototypes. Separate 
from NUTEK and SIC there is a third state-owned actor, the Swedish Industrial 
Development Fund, providing conditional loans for development projects in industry as 
well as new equity through its venture capital branch. A relatively new pension fund 
controlled by the Government - The sixth AP Fund (Sjätte APfonden) - has been formed 
with the mission to engage in venture capital via actors established in the field. 
 
According to a recent study the developments of the venture capital markets in the other 
Nordic countries have followed diverse paths. In Finland the risk financing market has 
developed rapidly and is generally functioning well in quantitative terms. Also public 
initiatives to stimulate the growth of the private market have proven successful. The 
study maintains that "political priorities for stimulating the development of risk capital 
market have been higher than in other Nordic countries". In Finland, the market 
development is based on large allocations of public resources to financial programmes 
and contributions to industrial research. 14 
 
The above mentioned study of developments in Nordic risk financing notes that Danish 
venture and seed capital markets are still relatively small and immature by European 
and Nordic standards, even though there has been a remarkable development in the last 
years. A distinctive feature of the Danish risk capital markets is lower public 
involvement than in other Nordic countries. The volume of public funding to initiatives 
aimed to stimulate new technology based firms’ risk financing is also identified to be 
low in Denmark -according to the study this is partly explained by a lower political 
priority given to these areas than in other countries. Also, the study points to "a Danish 
tradition of limited government involvement in the business sector relative to the other 
Nordic countries". The Innovation Environment programme initiated in 1998 and two 
nation-wide seed capital funds established by the Business Development Finance in 
2000 are lifted up as good examples.  
 
As in the case of Denmark, the venture capital and private equity markets in Norway are 
deemed in the Nordic comparison to be relatively immature. Investors are focusing 
mainly on "later stage investments in traditional industries, implying an emphasis on 
low risk investments in the industry". Characteristic of the Norwegian seed capital 
market is the predominant role of government funding and public initiatives.  
 
However, Norway has recently paid more attention to possibilities to stimulate private 
financing of R&D activities. A commission which considered this question proposed 
that companies that invest in certain types of R&D projects involving universities, 
colleges and certain R&D institutes should get concession of the expenses covered by 
the state. Furthermore, the Norwegian Minister of Education and Research has 
organised an informal meeting for invited industrialists and capitalists in order to 
discuss of the potential to establish private funds for R&D.  
                                                 
14 Seed Capital in the Nordic Countries: Best Practice. A report prepared for the Nordic Industrial Fund  
(2002) 
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Promotion of clustering and networking 
The extension and strengthening of networks of co-operation between innovation actors 
is seen as one of the key questions in the development of science, technology and 
innovation policies in various countries. This also holds true for the Nordic countries. 
The development of connections between companies, research institutions, universities 
and other educational institutions is an explicit objective of various national innovation 
policy instruments. Usually these measures are co-financed by public agencies and 
participating organisations/companies. 
 
The current emphasis on the advancement and encouragement of networking is evident  
in official innovation policy documents and publicly stated intentions of the 
governments. For instance, the Danish Government has recently announced that it in 
2003 will present a coherent action plan to further strengthen co-operation between 
trade and industry and knowledge institutions. The action programme will be focusing 
especially on opportunities and incitements to establish mutual co-operation both among 
and between knowledge institutions and enterprises. Central issues will be the future 
interface between the technological service system, science parks, incubators, and the 
government research institutions on the one hand and trade and industry on the other.  
 
Instruments to strengthen companies’ access to knowledge and competences will also 
be given priority – new and small enterprises are given special mention. The steps 
already taken towards a reform of the entire research, university, and innovation system 
(including the institutional and management reform of universities and the reform of the 
research advisory and funding system) are part of this action plan. The purpose of the 
reforms is to provide for a more transparent and accessible research and innovation 
system together with a strengthening of co-operation across institutions.  
 
All in all, there are a number of Danish initiatives aiming to induce networking and co-
operation between universities, research institutions, companies and technological 
services: ”Innovation Consortiums”, the Centre Contract Scheme, the Approved 
Technological Service Institutes (GTS institutes), the Innovation Post-Doc Scheme and 
Regional Growth Centres.  
 
An interesting example is the Innovation Post Doc programme which focuses on 
younger researchers within all research areas, and facilitates co-operation between 
public research institutions and private companies. The means is a so-called post-doc 
scholarship given to researchers having a maximum of 5 years research seniority or a 
PhD degree. It is a prerequisite that a formalised co-operation with one or more 
companies is established, but the researcher will be employed at a university, a hospital 
or a public research institution. 
 
In Norway there is a wide palette of public policy instruments supporting networking 
between different actors. For instance, the public user-oriented R&D programmes aim 
deliberately at strengthening the collaboration between firms and universities, colleges 
and R&D institutes. Other Norwegian measures pursuing strengthened co-operation 
include the NT-programme, which is to develop networks between companies and 
knowledge institutions in Northern Norway, as well as FORNY (Science and 
technology based innovation), TEFT (Technology Transfer from R&D Institutions to 
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SMEs), and the 'umbrella' programme MOBI (Mobilisation for R&D related 
innovation).  
 
There has been little emphasis on cluster development and networking in Iceland until 
recent days, even if there are two official clusters in the country, one in the area of 
fisheries and the industry serving fisheries, the second in the field of health technology. 
These two clusters have been very successful. The clusters were designed by the 
Federation of Icelandic industries. There are other informal clusters in various forms, 
but they are working in a rather narrow industrial base. 
 
In Finland a number of projects and initiatives have been created to promote cluster 
formation and networking. Recently, there have been two major initiatives to promote 
cross and intra-sector collaboration in particular. The first initiative, the Centre of 
Expertise Programme, is a national measure that aims to enhance regional 
competitiveness by strengthening innovation, renewing the production structure and 
creating new jobs within the expertise areas selected. The second initiative, the Cluster 
Programmes, aims to support R&D activities that strengthen clusters and collaboration 
between industry and public organisations, and company to company co-operation 
including user-opinion. In a recent evaluation, an expert group recommended that 
clusters should be extended to new areas and that the existing clusters need to be more 
focused.  
Impact of research programmes on networking 
Several studies and evaluations have concluded that co-operation and interaction 
between different parts of the national innovation system has developed favourable 
during the last 10-15 years in Finland. Over the years the single most important ongoing 
activity promoting co-operation has perhaps been Tekes’ technology programmes. A 
new programme concept was launched in the mid-1980s and from the beginning the 
new instrument was not only meant to channel public funding but also to draw together 
and strengthen co-operation between universities, government research institutes and 
companies. Also, gaining new technology expertise and product development options in 
the important business areas of the future has been an important aim of the technology 
programmes from the beginning. 
 
The significance of the Tekes programmes as catalysts for co-operation in Finland is 
strengthened by the fact that it is Tekes that controls the by far largest share of public 
funding available for technologically oriented R&D. When evaluating funding 
applications Tekes takes a positive view of projects that involve networking with other 
companies, joint ventures, the contracting of services from Finnish research institutes 
and universities and the promotion of international co-operation. In the case of larger 
companies, one of the criteria for funding through the technology programmes is 
networking and the use of SME subcontractors.  
 
There has also been a significant qualitative change: Earlier the projects funded in 
programmes were more often based on bilateral co-operation, but today multilateral co-
operation is prominent. Co-operation is also integral part of the development of new 
programmes: They have been created with the needs of companies in mind, and have 
been implemented in collaboration with companies. The planning takes place in 
workgroups and seminars involving firms, universities, research organisations and 
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industry associations etc., and the explicit aim of the programmes is the promotion of 
collaboration between these parties.  
 
Comparable programmes are administered by VINNOVA of Sweden, which finances 
and promotes research mainly through programmes and projects that are organised as 
joint efforts between industry, academia and research institutes. However, in contrast to 
many other countries most R&D programmes in Sweden are aiming at increasing the 
competence level in university research and not directly supporting R&D activities of 
companies.  
 
The Swedish Competence Centre Programme is an effort to build bridges between 
science and industry in Sweden by creating excellent academic research environments 
in which industrial companies participate actively and persistently in order to derive 
long-term benefits. The mission is to strengthen the crucial link in the Swedish national 
innovation system between academic research groups and industrial R&D. The overall 
programme goal is to prove that universities are able to become real resources for 
Swedish industry and thus to fulfil the tasks that in many other countries are managed 
by public research laboratories or institutes. 
Programmes focusing on clusters or regions 
Promotion of networking is an integral part of the public programmes and measures 
which focus on cluster development, regional development or both. In many countries 
public measures and initiatives have been created to promote collaboration, transfer and 
utilisation of knowledge within a cluster or a region. Swedish Regional Growth 
Agreements include rather explicit cluster development ambitions, although the 
approaches and degree of concreteness vary considerably between regions. In some 
regions, rather ambitious cluster development activities are underway. Lately, several 
other measures with an explicit cluster approach have been launched.  
 
The Swedish Government has established a national programme for the development of 
innovation systems and clusters. The programme will carry on from 2003 to 2005 and 
the aim is to strengthen and complement already ongoing activities at regional level to 
improve the regional competitiveness.  
 
VINNVÄXT (Regional growth through dynamic innovation systems) is another 
Swedish programme, which ties together innovation promotion and regional 
development. The aim of VINNVÄXT is to stimulate strong innovation systems with 
qualified environments for research and development as well as regional competitive 
and dynamic networks in order to achieve more innovations and lasting growth.  
 
The concept behind the programme is the promotion of effective co-operation between 
companies, research and development organisations and the political system (the triple 
helix) within each region, with the aim of developing dynamic regional innovation 
systems, which will allow the region to be competitive on an international level within 
specific areas of growth.  
 
VINNOVA offers support for process management and competence development in 
these specific areas. Selected regions (5-10) will have the possibility to receive 
financing during ten years but will also be evaluated regularly. The outcome of the 
evaluation decides if the region will have the possibility to receive further financing. 
 26 
Promotion of clustering and networking [Part 1] 
 
In the present research policy debate in Sweden support of existing research clusters is 
considered to be highly important. Even though they have not been developed 
specifically for this purpose, the Regional Technology Programme, the New Liaison 
Functions, Technology Transfer for SMEs –TUFF and Active Industrial Collaboration 
could be considered as potentially conducive to cluster formation. 
 
The Finnish national cluster programmes is another instrument representing a model for 
public support for collaboration between public and private sector partners. The cluster 
programmes have aimed at supporting R&D that strengthens industrial clusters by 
promoting co-operation in certain industrial fields, or around certain themes. The cluster 
programmes are administered by various sector ministries and were originally funded 
through the additional research appropriation programme between 1996 and 1999. The 
focus of cluster programmes has varied and has not always been technology centred.  
 
There is great interest in innovation systems theory and the concept of clusters in the 
Research Council of Norway as well as in several ministries. This has led to the 
establishment of several instruments that are to encourage networking and the 
distribution of knowledge, competence and personnel in various parts of the innovation 
system. This applies to programmes like the NT-programme (The Innovation and 
Technology-programme for Northern Norway), Valuecreation 2010 and the MOBI 
programme.  
 
The latter is an 'umbrella' programme administered by the Research Council of Norway. 
Its main goal is to promote learning, innovation and value creation in companies with 
little experience with R&D. In general this means SMEs. In many of these companies 
there are barriers to innovation, e.g. high risk associated with innovation activities, lack 
of relevant expertise and of knowledge on how to acquire such expertise, and lack of 
capital. MOBI’s ambition is to reduce the number and impact of such barriers. The 
programme also aims at increasing the companies’ R&D based innovation efforts by 
stimulating long term co-operation with other companies, R&D environments and 
actors from innovation policy institutions, particularly on a regional basis. 
Commercialisation of research 
Increased commercialisation of the results of publicly funded research is a central 
strategic goal to all governments in the Nordic countries. During the last two decades 
there have been a lot of efforts to promote commercial utilisation of research carried out 
at universities and other public research institutions. Currently intellectual property 
rights have emerged as a hot topic in all countries examined in this report. The situation 
in different countries will be described more extensively below.  
 
A general trend seems to be that borders between universities, government research 
institutes and companies in knowledge production are becoming more blurred. Together 
with the changing institutional landscape, the activities of different actors are 
overlapping and encouraging the search for new mutual solutions in the organisation of 
knowledge production.  
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Intellectual property rights  
Currently there are mounting pressures on universities and other research institutions to 
increase their efforts in the commercial utilisation of research results. Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that for example intellectual property rights at universities and 
other research institutions has been a relevant topic in national policy discussions lately. 
Governments of the Nordic countries have assigned committees to consider ways of 
developing legislation concerning intellectual property rights. At the EU level an 
agreement to establish the European Patent Organisation was achieved in March 2003 
and there is not yet information available concerning intellectual property rights. At the 
moment, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the European Patent 
Organisation. Iceland will also become a member in the course of 2003.  
 
At the moment Denmark has come furthest in this reform work.In January 2000 a new 
law on patents came into action making it possible for universities, research institutions 
and public hospitals to take over the rights of the inventions of their employees and 
negotiate terms of rights with companies. At the same time the institutions are obliged 
to further the commercial use of inventions. The establishment of new infrastructures at 
universities in support of the Act is believed to have considerable strategic significance 
in coming years. The performance of the present IPR system is currently under 
evaluation. The aim is to find out how the administration of patent applications can be 
improved and how the system can assist in  an optimal diffusion and utilisation of new 
knowledge. A plan for the future IPR system will be presented in the spring of 2003. 
 
Following Denmark, the other Nordic countries are also preparing changes in 
intellectual property rights legislation. In April 2002 the new Norwegian Government 
presented a proposal regarding changes in the law of intellectual property rights to 
Parliament. In its proposal the Government argued that universities and colleges should 
be more involved in the commercialisation of R&D results, especially in the form of 
patents, so that society gets more out of its investments.  
 
The law is to be changed so that universities and colleges may claim the right to exploit 
commercially the inventions made by teachers and researchers. However, in order to 
secure the researchers’ right to diffuse their knowledge, teachers and scientific 
personnel will have the right to publish their findings, even if this may stop the 
institution from commercialising the invention. According to the Norwegian 
government proposal the researchers are however obliged to inform the institution if 
they believe they have made an invention that can be patented. In order to stop the 
institution from taking over the intellectual property right, the researcher must make use 
of his or her right to publish the results within one year after the institution was 
informed. 
 
Current Swedish patent law allows researchers at universities to keep the ownership of 
patents. This constitutes an exception from the general regulation of patents based on 
ideas developed by employees. This feature has been under debate for some years for 
several reasons. The case for passing ownership rights to higher education institutions is 
based on the argument that this would give universities an incentive to become more 
active in promoting commercialisation of research results, and that universities as 
organisations are better equipped than individual professors to look after intellectual 
property rights. 
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Those advocating keeping ownership with individual researchers have noted that there 
is a potential conflict of interest between academic freedom of communication and 
economic efficiency. Here they argue first that professors should not be coerced into 
secrecy agreements etc. against their will, and in the case where a researcher chooses to 
commercialise results, the university should be able to monitor that he or she keeps a 
proper balance between academic values and economic efficiency, rather than the 
university being involved as a party in any transaction. The issue of patent ownership in 
higher education institutions was raised in the Government Research Bill of September 
2000. The current position of the Government is to await evaluations of the Danish 
experience before making changes in Swedish IPR legislation. 
 
In Finland a committee set up by the Ministry of Trade and Industry together with the 
Ministry of Education has examined questions regarding IPR and the new emerging so 
called “third mission” of universities. In May 2002, the committee proposed the reversal 
of the Act of Employees Rights and a reform of the University Act. According to the 
new proposal, the researcher and teacher exception rule should be reversed – i.e. 
university researchers should be in the same position as any employee. If this rule 
comes into operation, universities could take over the rights for inventions in joint 
projects carried out in collaboration between themselves and a third party. The new act 
would not , though, cover the intellectual property rights in free academic research, 
where the inventor has the right to decide the primacy of publishing and utilisation of 
his/her invention. However, the act would be contractual: The regulations would be 
applied if not contracted otherwise by the parties involved. 
 
The committee proposal also includes a clarification of the legal issues that would 
enhance the overall framework for innovative activities and their establishment as a 
third basic mission of the universities along with education and basic research. In the 
proposal, the utilisation of research results is included in the functions of the 
universities.  
 
In promoting the commercialisation of academic research, increased coherence and 
networking between the relevant intermediary organisations - Tekes, Sitra and the 
Academy of Finland - has been identified as an area for further development. The 
planning and costs of commercialisation should be integrated with research projects. In 
parallel with the reform of IPR legislation, competencies about IPR issues should also 
be strengthened among university administration and staff. 
Supporting services for commercialisation 
During the last 10 years, there has in the Nordic countries been established supporting 
structures which assist researchers in intellectual property right questions, as well as in 
the patenting and licensing processes. Many of the services are located either at the 
universities or other research organisations, or at science parks.  
 
In Sweden, supporting services for commercialisation of research are offered for 
example by the University Holding Companies and the Foundations for Technology 
Transfer. Between 1994 and 1995 eleven University Holding Companies 
(Holdingbolag) were established in the country. Their mission is to form project 
companies in order to exploit research from the universities and to develop services for 
such exploitation.  
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They are themselves owned by the universities and are expected to become minority 
owners in firms created jointly with researchers and industrial actors for the exploitation 
of university research. The Foundations for Technology Transfer in co-operation with 
the Holding Companies have, in turn, formed Patent & Licensing Offices 
(Forskarpatent), which actively support researchers’ exploitation efforts. The formation 
of institutions like the Foundations for Technology Transfer and the University Holding 
Companies as well as the Patent & Exploitation Offices is a concrete manifestation of 
the political system’s belief in the commercial potential of licensing academic research. 
 
Besides the newly founded services, the national patent and registration offices are an 
established element in the innovation supporting structures of the Nordic countries. The 
Swedish Patent and Registration Office, PRV, grants patents and registers trademarks, 
industrial designs and names. It also registers limited companies and other forms of 
companies that need registration. The office issues authorisation to publish periodicals, 
and offers a number of commission services and training courses. The more 
comprehensive activities performed by PRV have to be financed fully by the 
users/clients. Similar tasks are carried out by The Norwegian Patent Office, NPO, which 
offers protection for inventions, trademarks and designs as well as information services, 
guidance and training in the area of industrial property rights. 
Entrepreneurs and SMEs in national innovation policies 
Entrepreneurs and small and medium sized companies are alongside universities at the 
centre of R&D and innovation policies both nationally and on the European Union 
level. Policy makers have strong expectations of new technology based firms in 
particular. There are several qualitative factors which make technology based start-ups 
and SMEs a vanguard of “knowledge and innovation based societies” in the global 
economy. The SMEs’ contribution to economic growth is just one reason. Perhaps even 
more important is the fact that SMEs are supposed to be more flexible and innovative, 
less bureaucratic, and quicker to take advantage of new opportunities than larger 
organisations. 
 
In some countries the national industrial structure is a natural explanation for the policy 
makers’ interest in SMEs. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are all countries where the 
industrial structure is characterised by a large number of small and medium sized 
companies. In Sweden and also in Finland large parts of industry have been 
concentrated around larger companies targeting international markets.  
 
In perspective, emphasis on SMEs and entrepreneurs is not a totally novel phenomenon. 
For decades the general orientation of industrial policies in many countries has been 
geared towards large enterprises, but from the 1970s onwards new start-ups and SMEs 
have been an object of increasing attention. Policies and measures emphasising small 
enterprises and entrepreneurs have significantly supplemented the industrial policy 
portfolios. The potential role of SMEs in economic growth and renewal of industries 
was referred to in policy documents of the late 1970s and the 1980s. A Norwegian 
White Paper on SMEs was published in 1978. Around the same time the Swedish 
Government was looking at start-ups and their growth potential with a growing interest. 
The Swedish Industrial Development Fund was created in 1979 with the objective to 
encourage profitable growth and innovation in SMEs.  
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During the following decade policies and measures were designed in Nordic countries 
to support especially research- and technology-based new firms and inventors willing to 
start their own businesses. The creation of new schemes and organisations for 
technology transfer, knowledge diffusion and commercialisation in the 1980s was a 
clear expression of the popularity of this policy approach. The technology parks, 
established in the vicinity of universities, were targeting new spin-off companies 
through incubators and spin-off services. At the same time more intentional policy 
moves were made in order to increase public and private venture capital operations.  
 
Since the early 1990s the number of policy initiatives explicitly geared towards the 
needs of SMEs and start-ups has become manifold. Today the Nordic countries have  
several innovation policy measures which are aiming at supporting entrepreneurs, small 
and medium sized firms and start-upsin their endeavour develop their businesses and 
products and to promote networking with other companies, universities and research 
institutions.  
 
The TUFF programme (Technology Transfer for SMEs) was created in Sweden to 
promote trade in technology services between public R&D technology providers and 
SMEs. The Finnish Technology Clinic initiative strives for the same goal. In the late 
1990s several Business Innovation Centres and Industrial Development Centres were set 
up in Denmark to stimulate development processes and competence and product 
development in technology-oriented SMEs, and to promote entrepreneurship education 
in schools.  
 
An Icelandic example is the Northern Coast Innovation Centre (NCIC), which was 
established in 2001. Among the activities of NCIC is the recruitment of a team of 
experienced executives which is to spread experience in the region and sit in the boards 
of new companies or projects.  
 
An area growing rapidly during the 90s was venture capital market specialisation, 
especially financing of technology based start-ups and fast growing SMEs. In this 
situation different countries found it advisable to develop new policies in order to make 
it easier for start-up companies and technology based small firms to tap the growing 
private and public venture capital markets.  
 
Today the number of measures aiming to link new technology based firms and venture 
capital providers are plentiful. Swedish Invest Forum CapTec is an annual investment 
forum for young technology-based firms and venture capital companies. Also public 
organisations with venture capital operations, such as Sitra or Industry Investment Ltd 
in Finland, were mandated to make equity investments in SMEs as a way to support 
growth. The Finnish public venture capital organisations could be called “funds of 
funds”. They have funnelled their investments in regional, branch or growth-funds and 
in this way stimulated the growth of private venture capital markets.  
 
When we are talking about SMEs it is important to remember that the majority of 
smaller firms do not actively engage in any large-scale R&D activities. This is partly 
explained by sector-specific characteristics.  
 
For example, in many traditional and/mature sectors research and development work 
has been a minor factor in the improvement of companies’ competitive position in the 
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markets. Another reason is the lack of resources and competences needed to carry out 
R&D projects. If policies targeting SMEs are to overcome these obstacles it is essential 
that small firms are supported to upgrade their competence base. Otherwise a large 
amount of the small and medium sized enterprises will not be able to extract and apply 
new technologies and knowledge developed by other actors (companies, universities, 
research institutions etc.). In practice, it would mean that a major part of companies 
would be left outside the research and knowledge-based innovation systems or clusters.  
Integrating innovation into regional policies 
The future of more peripheral areas is causing concern in Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. The reasons for this concern are among others the threat of depopulation of 
rural areas and increasing discrepancies in regional development. Recent development 
trends and research findings hint that dynamic positive trends of growth tend to 
concentrate nationally only in a few (and usually the largest) city regions whereas the 
rest of the country is lagging behind in relative terms. The situation is somewhat 
different in Denmark, which not only differs from the other Nordic countries in 
geographical terms but also has been ranked high in international comparisons when it 
comes to the degree of regional balance.  
 
It is not, however, only because of the above mentioned challenges that policy-makers 
are currently paying more attention to regions. Geographical proximity matters also 
from an innovation theory viewpoint, as Kenneth Arrow pointed out already in 
1962.15Innovation usually takes place within the framework of complex processes as a 
result of a variety of participants learning from and interacting with one another. 
Experience and research show that the innovation system's capacity for producing this 
type of results is a decisive factor in promoting growth. Geographic proximity has the 
potential to create competitive advantages in terms of interaction, learning, access to 
skills and cooperation in development and business. Regions that have recognised this 
can consciously develop their own competitive advantages.  
 
Integration of innovation and regional development brings to the forefront the regional 
impact of universities and other public R&D institutions. In addition to inter-firm co-
operation, entrepreneurship and new technology, the importance of higher educational 
institutions, like universities and other research institutions, for regional growth has 
been recognised in numerous studies. An example of this is the recent Finnish debate, in 
which the regional impact of universities and other higher education institutes is gaining 
more attention. The regional aspects of higher education have been discussed 
thoroughly by policy makers and the Ministry of Education has drawn up an action plan 
for the regional development of higher education  up to 2006. Special emphasis has 
been given to connecting the development to the economic and industrial structure in 
the region.  
 
Besides the significance of local knowledge producing institutions, the current approach 
to regional development emphasises the importance of local strengths and initiative. It is 
widely agreed that public measures supporting regional development should be built 
                                                 
15 Arrow Kenneth (1962) ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,’ in R. 
Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press. 
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upon these factors. The approach is reflected in the Danish Government's strategy for 
regional growth, which was under preparation in 2002. The Government aims to further 
conditions for growth within trade and industry where the individual regions have 
specific competences. Co-operation between local and regional educational institutions, 
research parks and trade and industry has a special role in this plan.  
 
The means are allocated through the Danish Regional Growth Centres scheme, which 
provides the opportunity for the individual regions to develop framework conditions 
tailored to trade areas and technologies in which the regions are specialized and have 
expertise. Also, the Jutlandic-Funen IT-Programme (IT boost for Jutland and Funen) is 
based on existing local strengths: The programme, on-going between 2002 and 2005, 
aims at developing partnerships between research and trade in the expertise areas of 
information technologies in which the local universities have specific competences. The 
programme is co-financed by the central Government and local authorities. 
 
Similar kinds of policy approaches stressing the importance of local strengths are 
applied in Norway. The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs is actively 
involved in the development of policy instruments promoting regional innovation 
activities. Examples include such schemes as MOBI and FORNY and the development 
of local incubators.  
 
SND, the public agency funding industrial and regional development, is also supporting 
innovation activities at the regional level. SND has launched the ARENA programme - 
previously known as the Regional Innovation Pilot initiative - which aims to stimulate 
the development of regional innovation systems and industrial clusters. The programme 
is based on the idea that regional conditions are of great importance to innovation and 
value creation. By promoting regional co-operation between companies, R&D 
environments and innovation policy institutions, the programme is to contribute to 
increased growth and international competitiveness at firm level. The programme will 
generate R&D projects and establish both new arenas for – and new forms of – regional 
co-operation. The programme emphasises communication and inter-active learning 
between the involved parties, and wishes to contribute to the development of innovation 
policy instruments. 
 
In Sweden regional growth agreements have been the principal tool for the 
implementation of the new regional industrial policy. The Swedish Government 
initiated a process for the development of regional growth agreements in 1997, and 
according to the statement of the Government, the agreements were to become the key 
instrument for co-ordinating and adjusting the policies of the various sectors, and also 
for exploring new approaches to the promotion of regional and local industrial 
development. The first regional growth agreements were launched in March 2000, when 
the first generation of such agreements were signed between 21 regions and the Swedish 
Government.  
 
Measures pertaining to innovation policy are major components in the Swedish regions’ 
growth strategies. To a substantial degree they focus on R&D activities, technology 
diffusion institutions and venture capital markets. These regional growth strategies are 
in general geared towards the specific industrial specialisations of the regions. 
Furthermore, VINNOVA has launched a new programme, VINNVÄXT, the objective 
of which is to promote the development of dynamic regional innovation systems 
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allowing regions to be internationally competitive within selected technology and 
business areas. The key idea of the programme is to promote effective co-operation 
between companies, research and development organisations and the political system 
within regions. A limited number of regions (5-10) will receive financing during a ten 
year period, but will be evaluated regularly.  
 
The Swedish Government has also established a new national programme for the 
development of innovation systems and clusters, which is in operation in the period 
2002-2004. The aim is to strengthen and complement already ongoing activities at 
regional level to strengthen the regional competitiveness. The responsibility for 
implementing the programme will be shared by VINNOVA, NUTEK and the Invest in 
Sweden Agency, ISA. 
 
In Finland innovation and regional policy issues are integrated in the national Centre of 
Expertise Programme, which attempts to promote the development of regions through 
promotion of R&D, innovation and networking. The first programme period covered the 
years 1994-1998. The second period of the programme started in 1999 and runs until 
2006. The programme aims to enhance regional competitiveness and increase the 
number of high-tech products, companies and jobs. To achieve this goal, the programme 
will be used to implement projects that reflect the needs of industry, encourage co-
operation between the industry, research and training sectors, ensure the rapid transfer 
of the latest knowledge and know-how to companies and exploit local creativity and 
innovation. Since the beginning of 2003 there are altogether 19 regional Centres of 
Expertise and three nationwide networks.  
Decentralisation of decision-making power 
In the recent past, regional actors have become increasingly important players in 
research and innovation policies. In many countries there is political willingness to 
devolve more decision-making power to the regional level. The Norwegian Government 
has considered means to strengthen the role of the counties in the development of 
innovation policy measures. According to the Government's plan the counties will be 
given larger responsibility for the development of local industry and as regards the 
implementation of innovation policy instruments and funding of innovation activities. 
 
Some earlier changes in Norwegian policies concerning regional development were 
summed up in a White Paper on regional policies published by the previous Labour 
Government in the spring of 2001. It was stated in the paper that there will be a shift as 
regards focus, organisation and measures: From municipalities to regions, from 
individual measures to more coherent needs, from individual companies to a common 
effort for regional development, from sector oriented measures to co-ordinated efforts, 
and from centralised regulations to more regional freedom. An especially strong 
emphasis in the White Paper was put upon the use of public R&D and innovation 
instruments and funding in order to strengthen industry, employment and the size of the 
population in regions and non-urban areas. This is in line with the main regional policy 
objective of Norway, which is to secure a balanced development as regards population 
settlements and industrial growth.  
 
In Sweden the Government presented a bill on regional development in September 
2001, which points to a need to set up new municipal co-operation bodies. Focus of the 
regional policy bill “A Policy for Growth and Viability throughout Sweden” was the 
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establishment of a new policy area - regional development policy. The purpose is to 
establish a well co-ordinated policy for all parts of the country, i.e. to create regions 
with well-functioning and sustainable local labour markets and with good services.  
 
The Government argued for the need of pro-active strategies to reach this objective – 
including efforts within areas where investments are of great importance for regional 
development – and a clear division of responsibility between the Government and the 
municipalities. The latter means that municipal co-operation bodies should be 
established in all counties from the year 2003. These bodies will have the authority to 
make decisions about county plans for regional infrastructure and authority to decide 
about some governmental funds for regional development. One task of these bodies is to 
create programs for the development of the county – regional growth programs. The 
regional growth agreements will develop into regional growth programmes in 2004.  
 
The need for institutional reform in the implementation of Swedish regional policy and 
the further development of the institutional setting and the process concerning Regional 
Growth Agreements was also pointed out by a parliamentary commission in September 
2000. The commission suggested among other things that strategic discussions 
concerning the long-term orientation and specialisation of university colleges should be 
included in the further development of the regional growth agreement process.  
 
In Finland a step towards devolution of decision-making power to the regional level was 
taken in 1994, when the Regional Development Act came into force. The main purpose 
of this Act was to guide the national regional policy. The Regional Development Act 
had significant effects on the structures of regional development and governance. The 
Act increased the importance of local government in regional policy by delegating 
power from the central Government to the regions. Another key effect was the 
establishment of regional governance on an economic-functional basis. Moreover, a 
programme-based regional policy was introduced in order to co-ordinate the actions of 
diverse regional organisations and actors. 
 
Another institutional reform in Finland, which concerned regional level administrative 
structures and the empowering of regional bodies, related to the establishment of new 
regional employment and economic development centres in 1996. The new centres were 
composed by merging the former regional offices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture.  
 
Nowadays also experts of the regional networks of Tekes and the Foundation for 
Finnish Inventions can be found under the same roof of the TE-Centres. The 
Employment and Economic Development Centres have a significant role in the 
implementation and administration of EU structural funds in areas eligible for EU-
funding. A centre contributes to the development of its region by financing its client 
companies' investment and development projects and, more generally, projects aimed at 
enhancing their operational framework and the rate of employment within the private 
sector. 
 
A fresh input consists in regional technology strategy processes, which were carried out 
by local actors in several regions in Finland in 2001-2002. Regional technology 
strategies are intended to be continuous processes, not time-limited projects. The first 
round of strategy processes was implemented concurrently with the updating of the 
 35 
Integrating innovation into regional policies [Part 1] 
national technology strategy, which was led by Tekes. The leading idea behind the 
regional strategy work is to initiate an open and critical discussion between regional 
actors about how to employ technology in regional development in co-operation with 
industry and actors responsible for regional development. The aim is to find a common 
view about the technologies to which investment should be directed regionally. The 
identification of local and regional strengths is in that sense of outmost importance for 
successful strategy processes. 
Challenges in creation of regional innovation policies 
In general, a more active role of regions in innovation related decision making is a 
natural direction of development, a local strengths and development needs are 
supposedly better known at the regional level. At the same time, though, devolution of 
power brings about new questions. Various evaluations and studies analysing impacts of 
regional initiatives and programmes have shown that there are still many obstacles to 
the strengthening of regional innovation policies.  
 
Usually initiatives have succeeded in enhancing the awareness of positive effects of 
R&D and innovation activities for regional competitiveness. Increased co-operation and 
co-ordination between regional actors have also been recorded in the studies. All this 
has had positive impacts on regional development, which has become more systematic. 
Problems remain, however, in relation to the co-ordination of regional activities at the 
national level and between regions. There are often a number of organisations involved 
in the implementation of initiatives and the distribution of duties is not always 
unambiguous or clear. Insufficient co-ordination of activities between administrative 
sectors at the national level has turned out as one of the weaknesses.  
 
Without co-ordination there is a danger of duplication of activities and inefficient use of 
scarce resources. The consequence can be fragmentation so that critical mass cannot be 
acquired by anyone. In the case of small countries like the Nordic ones this threat is 
always around the corner. In terms of population, the regions of the Nordic countries are 
in an international comparison very small. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that 
regional activities in the field of research and innovation are based on clear strategies 
and are concerted both on the national and regional level.  
 
So far, there are in the Nordic countries no such formal arrangements with the task  of 
co-ordinating regional efforts with those taken either national level or by other regions. 
Instead, a recent benchmarking study pointed out that there tend to be a “division of 
labour” between regional and national actors with respect to the areas they are focusing 
on. Regions' efforts focus more on innovation in SMEs, technology transfer and cluster 
development, whereas responsibility for the issues of research policy is typically left to 
the national actors. 
 
Last but not least, the general discussion about regions' role in innovation easily clouds 
the fact that regions differ substantially from country to country in relation to the level 
of authority, scope of action and resources. This becomes clear if we compare sparsely 
populated regions of the Nordic countries with the situation in Central-Europe. With 
regards to the level of authority, we can in the one end of the spectre observe the 
German Länder with their own fiscal authority and large responsibility for education, 
research and innovation, and in the other end find many Nordic regions which are often 
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administrative rather than functional entities, i.e. regional extensions of national 
administration with limited authority and resources.  
Cross-border co-operation 
Cross-border co-operation between neighbouring countries at the regional level is an 
emerging trend, which relates also to innovation policies. The best known example in 
Northern Europe is undoubtedly the co-operation within the Öresund region, which 
includes Eastern Denmark and southern parts of Sweden. A strengthening of this co-
operation is on the regional policy agenda of the Danish and the Swedish governments. 
The Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation and VINNOVA of Sweden 
are responsible for the Öresundskontrakt initiative, which promotes common R&D 
projects between companies, universities and research institutions from both sides of the 
Öresund strait. Northern Sweden and Northern Finland comprises another area where 
cross-border co-operation in promotion of innovation activities is getting more 
importance.  
 
The anticipated enlargement of the EU in May 2004 will create an interesting new 
situation, when all the countries around the Baltic Sea except the Russian Federation 
will be EU members. This development is expected to increase co-operation in the 
Baltic Sea region. Private businesses from Denmark, Finland and Sweden are already 
collaborating intensively with local actors and companies in the Baltic states and 
Poland. In the future, the potential for more developed regional co-operation between 
the Nordic countries and adjoining new EU members cannot be excluded. 
 
An area of cross-border co-operation touches upon collaboration at the level of R&D 
programmes. VINNOVA in Sweden and Tekes in Finland are co-administering an on-
going technology programme called EXSITE (Explorative System-Integrated 
Technologies). Participants are universities and research institutions and there is for 
each Swedish project a corresponding project in Finland. The programme is successor 
to the INWITE (Integrated Technologies Wireless Telecommunication) programme, 
which was financed jointly by Finnish and Swedish agencies and companies. The main 
objective of the INWITE programme was to enhance the long-term competitiveness of 
the Swedish and Finnish companies within the telecom sector. The programme provided 
a framework for sharing resources in pre-competitive projects that are needed to explore 
the possibilities of future technologies. 
 
Conclusions 
The Nordic countries have many features in common. In spite of similarities on the 
surface level there are, however, many distinctive features concerning industrial 
structures, organisation and priorities of research and innovation activities. Large export 
oriented firms have historically played an important role in Finland and Sweden. A 
small number of the largest companies in Finland and Sweden also stands for an 
important share of total research and development expenditures. Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway each has an economy which is characterised by small and medium sized 
companies. In other respects, the industrial structures of these three countries differ 
from each other. Denmark has been successful in nurturing a vivid SME sector, which 
covers firms from more traditional as well as newer industries. In Norway and Iceland 
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the economy is based more on industries utilising opportunities offered by natural 
resources – in Iceland's case fishery and in Norway's oil and gas industries.  
 
Arrangements for the co-ordination of innovation policy making between sector 
ministries as well as between ministries and intermediate agencies dealing with 
innovation policy issues vary from country to country. For example, Finland and 
Iceland have opted for an advisory body system working at the highest possible level. 
The Science and Technology Policy Council led by the Prime Minister bears 
responsibility for the direction of science, technology and innovation policy.  
 
Today all the Nordic countries are looking for institutional arrangements which can help 
to achieve a more integrated approach in research and innovation policy making. 
Traditional administrative boundaries between sectors dealing with research financing, 
industry oriented R&D or innovation funding or more general business development 
needs are increasingly seen as problematic and unsuitable for a more comprehensive 
approach to innovation policy. This quest for new solutions has lately led to significant 
reforms in innovation policy structures in all the Nordic countries except perhaps in 
Finland, where the institutional restructuring process has been more incremental.  
 
So far, the most radical reform concerning innovation policy making and institutional 
structures has been implemented in Denmark. At the policy-making level the most 
important change was the establishment of the new Danish Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation. In addition, an extensive reform of the public research 
system as a whole is under its way, having impact both on intermediaries (research 
funding agencies etc.) and research performers including universities and the research 
institute sector.  
 
Sweden has also implemented a substantial reorganisation of the structures for public 
funding of research and technology development and support to business and regional 
development during the last couple of years. The reorganisation involved some 15 
organisations, but after the reform the number of organisations was reduced to six. The 
new structure is to enable more focused public efforts in areas of strategic importance, 
greater efficiency, and a better adaptation to the needs of target groups. On the research 
and R&D funding side the new Swedish Research Council was established. Another 
feature of the new funding structure is VINNOVA (the Swedish Agency for Innovation 
Systems). Significant changes are taking place also in Norway, where a new holistic 
national innovation policy is under development. As part of the process the Norwegian 
Government has decided to implement an institutional reform among public 
organisations supporting business and regional development. Public measures 
supporting innovation and internationalisation will be gathered together within a single 
organisation.  
 
When reforming national innovation policies transnational policy learning is potentially 
a significant source for new ideas and policy design. In general, it seems that the 
awareness of the need to monitor and learn from other countries is high among Nordic 
innovation policy makers. However, the constraints for policy learning between 
countries are many and the lack of time is not the smallest one.  
 
Over time innovation policy priorities in the Nordic countries have had their peculiar 
national features. At the more general level it is however possible to identify certain 
 38 
Conclusions [Part 1] 
trends which are common for the Nordic countries. For instance, in the 1980's the policy 
of large national research programmes targeting strategic areas were a common 
phenomenon  - as was the case in many OECD countries. At the turn of the 1990s the 
Nordic countries went through a deep economic recession which intensified the search 
for new priorities in national policies. Industrial policies were redefined in different 
countries, and in this context, national needs for activities that are internationally 
competitive also in the longer run were placed at the centre of policy efforts.. This 
meant a shift in focus from 'old' businesses towards new emerging technologies and 
business areas.  
 
It was in the early 1990s that systemic thinking in research and industrial policies 
gradually started to gain ground in the Nordic countries. Finland was among the first to 
adopt terms like “national innovation system” and “cluster policies” into the national 
policy design to a substantial extent, and the country later became a benchmark country 
in relation to the utilisation of a systemic perspective in research and innovation policy 
design. Overall, the 1990s constituted a period when there in many countries was a 
quest for a more systemic approach in the development of policies related to science, 
technology and industrial development. In Norway and Denmark, just as in Sweden and 
a bit later in Iceland, the real breakthrough of innovation systems thinking at the policy-
making level took place in the latter half of the 1990s.  
 
International research and R&D collaboration is one area which has gotten increased 
attention in the Nordic countries during the last few decades. This development is partly 
explained by the fact that international interaction and collaboration is an essential issue 
for small countries like the Nordic ones. Rapid and even drastic changes in the wider 
international environment and economic system have promoted this approach. In the 
field of research and innovation policy global and European developments have opened 
up new horizons, increased cross-border networking and enabled the pooling of 
resources for common goals. The European Union research programmes and structural 
programmes are today important measures complementing national policies.  
Elements of national innovation policies 
Research and innovation funding has developed differently in the Nordic countries 
within the last 10 years or so. In the 1990s financing increased particularly rapidly in 
Finland and Sweden. A major part of this growth was explained by increasing R&D 
expenditures in private companies, and especially in some large companies such as 
Ericsson and Nokia, which were operating in the booming ICT and telecommunications 
sectors. However, also public funding of R&D was increased quite substantially in both 
countries, in Sweden in the early 1990s and in Finland in the late 90s.  
 
In the other Nordic countries trends in the funding of research and innovation were 
more modest. Denmark and Iceland have had quite stable increases over the last 10 
years, whereas in Norway's case, the share of R&D funding to GDP has stayed more on 
the same level. At the turn of the century the need to allocate more public resources 
towards R&D has re-emerged on Norwegian policy agenda.  
 
Since the beginning of 1990s the promotion of private funding of research and 
innovation activities has become a policy issue in Nordic countries. Recently Denmark 
and Norway have adopted tax deduction schemes in order to promote R&D in 
companies. Besides the tax deductions for R&D there are nowadays tax schemes which 
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aim to alleviate employers' problems with recruiting key staff members from abroad. 
These kinds of schemes are in operation for example in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.  
 
Still another tax related solution is presently tested by the Icelandic Government, which 
made a decision to lower the general corporate income tax from 30% to 18%. This 
decision, which came in effect in 2002, is supposed to have a positive effect on firms' 
willingness to invest in technology based industrial projects and even in R&D activities. 
Besides the tax schemes the Nordic countries have designed initiatives which aim to 
promote the development of viable venture capital markets. Governments increasingly 
recognise that private investors, business angels and venture capital corporations have a 
key role to play in the near-to-market phase and commercialisation of innovations. The 
venture capital market is developed furthest in Sweden.  
 
The extension and strengthening of networks of co-operation between innovation actors 
is today one of the main objectives of national innovation policies. Collaboration 
between actors is seen to stimulate the creation of new economically successful 
innovations. A number of innovation policy measures in the Nordic countries aim to 
increase connections between companies, research institutions, universities and other 
educational institutions. For instance, the public R&D programmes either at national or 
the EU level aim deliberately to strengthen the collaboration between firms and 
universities and research institutes. Promotion of networking is also an integral part of 
the public programmes and measures which focus on cluster development, regional 
development or both. Cluster or regional programmes can be found in all the Nordic 
countries. 
 
Apart from networking, innovation policies and designed policy instruments in the 
Nordic countries are today promoting the commercialisation of results of publicly 
funded research, entrepreneurship and development of growth oriented small and 
medium sized companies as well as the birth of new technology based start ups.  
 
During the last two decades there have been many of efforts to promote the commercial 
utilisation of research carried out at universities and other public research institutions. 
Currently intellectual property rights is a hot topic in all countries examined in this 
report and major legislative changes in relation of IPR questions have already taken 
place or will come into force shortly. The Nordic countries have also established 
support structures which assist researchers in intellectual property right questions as 
well as in the patenting and licensing processes. Many of the services are located either 
at the universities or other research organisations or at science parks.  
 
Currently the role of universities and small and medium sized companies is receiving 
increased interest also in the context of regional development. Innovation and regional 
policies have been moving closer to each other in Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. In these countries the future of more peripheral areas are causing concern. In 
this situation promotion and inducement of innovation activities at the regional level is 
seen as a cure against a gradual lagging behind in the regions in Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden.  
 
Integration of innovation and regional development brings to the forefront the regional 
impact of firms, universities and other public R&D institutions. The current approach to 
regional development emphasises the importance of local strengths and initiative. It is 
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widely agreed that public measures supporting regional development should be built on 
these factors. Overall, this attention paid to the regional dimension of innovation is 
leading to a situation where regional actors become increasingly important players in 
research and innovation policy making. At the moment there are in many countries also 
political willingness to devolve more decision-making power to the regional level.  
Policy recommendations  
Economic, social and political assumptions 
Nordic countries are all small, open and high cost countries. That means that their 
economic welfare relies to high extent on import and export of products and services on 
international markets. In practice that means that it is important to take needs and 
demand very much in consideration when policies are formulated. It would be a mistake 
only to look on the problems from the supply side. 
Recommendations regarding industrial learning 
All the Nordic countries have now “on paper” accepted the systemic view of innovation, 
meaning that innovation is understood as the result of complex processes in networks of 
people, companies, organisations and regulatory frameworks. The main focus is on 
learning, i.e. the companies’ ability to find, understand and make use of knowledge.  
The keyword is competence, not information, as information is of no value unless the 
innovators are able to understand and make use of this information in a practical setting. 
 
Even if many politicians and policy makers express support for this complicated – but 
nevertheless common sense – view of innovation, in practical policy they often fall back 
to a more linear, old fashioned view of how innovation takes place.  There is a tendency 
to promote research as the solution to all innovation problems, as if research can solve 
all the problems industry and society are facing. Moreover, there is also a tendency to 
use the words research and innovation interchangeably, as if these two concepts are 
synonymous.  
 
Research and development is important, and there are many good arguments for 
increasing the R&D investments in at least some of the Nordic countries, but this 
promotion of research and development must be integrated into a broader policy that 
also takes into consideration other forms of innovation. 
 
In other words the main objective must not be an isolated increase in national R&D 
expenditure, but the need for an innovative industrial sector that can contribute to the 
development of social welfare. 
 
Many companies – especially in the so-called low-tech industries– do not innovate 
through investments in R&D, but by other means. They focus on incremental 
improvements in products and production techniques, they invest in branding, design 
and marketing and they make active use of new knowledge and new technologies 
developed elsewhere. The technology “developed elsewhere” may indeed be based on 
R&D, which is why a country’s total investments in R&D is of importance, but 
encouraging these companies to do more research will not necessarily lead to more 
innovation. 
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It is possible to develop policy measures that stimulate the learning and innovation 
capabilities of these firms.  These may be instruments that help companies organise 
their own activities in a more sensible way, instruments that encourage networking 
between firms and knowledge institutions or measures that stimulate mobility between 
firms and institutions.  After all, the most valuable form of knowledge are the 
competences embedded in the individual.  
 
There are actually quite a few policy measures of this kind in the Nordic countries, and 
in some areas Nordic countries have played a pioneer role in developing such 
instruments (cf. the use of the Norwegian BUNT model in other countries). Policy 
makers may learn from their neighbours in this respect. However, many of these 
measures are experimental with limited budgets.  
 
There is a tendency in some of the countries to underestimate the need for competence 
and network building programs and instruments. Policy makers often tend to focus on 
the R&D input to the innovation process, neglecting the need to integrate this R&D in 
the learning processes in the firms and the process of bringing the new products, 
processes and services to the market.  
 
Companies do not have access to perfect information. They are restricted by their own 
history, experience, contacts and educational background, and especially SMEs lack the 
resources needed to go on a systematic hunt for new competences.  This leads to 
technological lock-in, i.e. a strong reliance on existing technologies and conventional 
ways of problem solving. This may work well as long as the competitors behave in the 
same way, but as soon as the challengers start innovating, the traditional companies will 
lag behind.   
 
What may bring these companies over the threshold is help from outsiders that have the 
understanding of the innovation system needed to guide them in the right direction, to 
help them find potential private and public partners, and that can help them develop 
relevant competences.  In this way society will get more out of all the investments made 
in education and research. 
 
The civil servants working in research councils and innovation agencies often have the 
competences needed.  They have developed an intimate knowledge of relevant 
industrial sectors and branches through their management of loans, guarantees and 
grants. They may have the bird’s view of the innovation landscape the companies lack. 
Given the proper resources these civil servants may bring the companies in touch with 
relevant contractors, R&D partners, customers and knowledge institutions, thus making 
the completion of this innovation project possible. 
 
It could be argued that the state should not be made responsible for company learning, 
that this is a part of the innovation process the companies should handle themselves, and 
if they are not able to do so they will have to make room for other companies that can.  
This is a valid argument, especially for large companies.   
 
However, if the objective is to develop a broad based industrial sector (næringsliv in 
Scandinavian terms) that is flexible enough to meet unforeseeable changes in 
technologies and social and economic framework conditions, the Nordic governments 
must consider measures that help small and medium sized companies over the first 
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hurdle. Moreover, this is probably the only way to make sure that investments made in 
education and research are used efficiently by industry. Lastly, it should be noted that 
most western countries have included learning and networking in their innovation 
policy instruments. 
 
GoodNIP proposes that national authorities take a close look at their innovation policy 
instrument portfolio and see if the following functions are covered, either in separate 
programs or institutions or as part of others: 
 
Measures aimed at improving the absorptive capacities of firms, i.e. their ability to 
organize their activities in search a way that the necessary learning takes place. 
Measures aimed at broadening the activity base of the firms.  During recessions 
companies have a tendency to focus on their core competences, and avoid investing in 
more risky – but potentially rewarding – projects.  This means that these companies 
may harbour valuable ideas and competences that are not brought to life. The authorities 
may bring about the birth of these innovations by supplying high risk capital and by 
finding potential partners that may help bringing them to the market. 
 
Measures targeting “unborn” industries or technologies.  Current policy instruments are 
normally servicing existing types of firms and technologies, with programme boards 
manned by representatives of traditional industries.  This makes it hard for newcomers 
to get the support they need. Policy makers should develop policy instruments that 
guide radical entrepreneurs to sources of finance, R&D institutions and commercial 
partners. 
Measures aimed at improving the interaction between knowledge institutions and 
industry. In order to make the large public investments in education and research pay 
off, policy makers should look at alternative ways of facilitating knowledge transfer and 
co-operation. This applies to research institutes, universities and colleges as well as 
other educational institutions.  
 
However, one should respect the unique qualities of the relevant types of institutions.  
The strength of the universities are their ability to focus on long term fundamental 
research, a type of research that cannot be supplied by small and medium sized 
enterprises. Hence it would be a grave mistake to turn the universities into servants of 
industry only. Moreover, universities and colleges are nor homogenous institutions; the 
industrial relevance of various institutes, disciplines and cultures will wary a lot, as will 
the research units’ ability to co-operate with companies.  In some areas one should aim 
at a close co-operation between university units and companies (especially as regards 
technologies close to the market), in others one should look at alternative ways of 
technology transfer. 
 
All Nordic countries should implement a university and college IPR policy that 
encourages relevant researchers to patent and commercialise their inventions. Besides, 
assessment of the effects of the existing rules should be implemented.  
 
All Nordic countries should develop policy measures that encourage interaction and co-
operation between companies and relevant university and college units.  However, this 
should not be made an overall objective relevant for all types of companies and 
university disciplines and units.  Small companies will often not have the competence 
base and resources necessary to take part in this kind of co-operation, which means that 
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other forms of technology transfer is needed.  Moreover, the unique role of universities 
as havens for long term fundamental research must be protected. 
General policy advice 
When developing national innovation policies, the national governments must take the 
uniqueness of their own innovation systems into consideration and not blindly adapt 
strategies developed for other industrial structures and different political systems. 
Different types of institutions or companies may fulfil similar functions.   
 
In Norway the large institute sector can function as a bridge between the university and 
college sector and industry.  These are institutions that know the needs of companies 
and that are used to perform applied research and development.  They do not to the 
same extent as university scientists perceive a conflict between commissioned and 
curiosity driven research. 
 
Sweden, on the other hand, lacks a similar institute sector.  This means that the 
universities and colleges must be given the role played by the institutes in Norway. This 
brings basic and applied research closer together, but it may also lead to cultural 
conflicts, as university researchers may find it harder to combine the need for industry 
relevance with academic performance. 
 
The point here is that differences in innovation system structures may lead to the need 
for different policies.  There are no “best practices”. Nor do the Nordic countries 
necessarily have to adapt strategies developed in larger European countries. This 
especially applies to regional policies. These are all small nation states, comparable to 
counties or länder in other countries. One cannot expect Finish or Icelandic counties to 
act in the same way as French departements. 
 
Policy makers should also be careful not to put too much emphasis on statistical 
comparisons between countries. The fact that a country lags behind as regards one or 
two indicators does not necessarily mean that the innovation system is not functioning. 
It could be that deficiencies in one area are compensated by stronger performance in 
others.  
 
For instance: The differences in Nordic R&D investments in R&D are significant, but 
they can partly be explained by dissimilarities in industrial structures and by the fact 
that countries like Finland and Sweden has been dominated by large R&D intensive 
corporations like Ericsson and Nokia. These companies have obviously functioned as 
industrial locomotives, meaning that their R&D efforts have benefited larger parts of the 
industrial sector. The fact that Norway, Denmark and Iceland lack such industrial giants 
does not mean, however, that these countries cannot develop innovative companies; 
they can and they do. 
 
Today, it seems like innovation policies are like a soccer league, where each and every 
country struggle to reach the top of the Premier League, whether the points are 
measured as R&D as a proportion of GDP or entrepreneurial activity. One should keep 
in mind that all the Nordic countries are in the Premier League, meaning that they all 
are wealthy welfare states with strong economies, open markets and well developed 
knowledge bases. The main point cannot be to be the best in class as regards one or two 
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indicators, but to develop a well functioning innovation system that can bring forth the 
innovative companies the economy needs to replenish itself. 
 
GoodNIP will warn against innovation policy reductionism, meaning that innovation 
policy objectives are reduced to reaching a certain number on a particular investment 
scale. We appreciate the fact that policy makers need measurable goals to inspire 
politicians and others to make the investments that are necessary. It is hard to 
communicate the complex needs of an innovation system. Nevertheless, by focusing on 
one type of investment only, e.g. R&D investments, the policy can have unforeseen and 
unwanted consequences.  Given that the majority of Nordic companies are small and in 
industries that do normally not invest much in R&D, an increase in national R&D 
investments will have to be the result of a change in industrial structure, i.e. one will 
need  a large number of new R&D intensive companies. 
 
This has been the strategy followed by Finland.  ICT companies are R&D intensive 
companies, and by investing in ICT the Finns have been able to increase their R&D 
investments substantially.  In the Finnish case, this was probably a very sensible 
approach to a difficult situation in the early 1990s. At that time the country was in 
severe economic crisis and had to find new ways towards prosperity.  This does not 
necessarily mean that Iceland or Norway must develop an equally large ICT industry to 
replace the fisheries. The fisheries and the aquaculture industries are both innovative 
and profitable.  
 
That all these countries need a competent ICT sector is another matter.  All modern 
countries need ICT companies that can find, understand and adapt new technologies to 
local needs. This does not mean, however, that these companies should represent a new 
“wave” that is to replace traditional industries. 
 
If a country decides to keep profitable industries with low R&D densities, the public 
sector must probably take a larger responsibility for the knowledge production in this 
area.  Some of these branches of industry are dominated by very small enterprises that 
find it hard – or even impossible – to invest in R&D.  That does not mean that these 
companies are not in need of R&D based innovation.  They make use of advanced 
technologies that are based on R&D, and their ability to make use of these technologies 
rests on the innovation systems ability to absorb such technologies.  Hence there is a 
need for university research and branch institutes that can contribute to the development 
and adaptation of new knowledge and new technologies for use in services and the low 
R&D-intensive industries. 
A new holistic innovation policy 
Sweden and Norway is in the process of developing new broad based or “holistic” 
innovation policies that take into account the effects of policy areas lying outside the 
core of traditional innovation policies. 
 
Normally industrial innovation policies have been limited to ministries responsible for 
industrial development, the economy, regional development and R&D policies.  Given 
the systemic nature of innovation, however, it is clear that policies developed elsewhere 
may have repercussions on the companies’ ability to learn and innovate. 
 
To give some examples: 
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The general tax level will influence the companies’ ability to invest in innovation and 
R&D activities. The existence of a well developed physical infrastructure (roads, 
railways, airways, broadband) will determine the companies’ ability to export goods to 
other areas and countries in a cost efficient way. The existence of a solid physical 
infrastructure also influences the companies’ ability to recruit competent personnel. Do 
the employees have to move to this location, or can they commute? If they have to 
move, is there a cultural and social environment that makes it attractive for young 
families?  Are there inexpensive kindergartens and good health care? 
 
The point is not to make all policy areas servants of industrial development, but to 
encourage policy makers in these policy areas to take the needs of industry into 
consideration when developing new policies. 
 
The GoodNIP team believes this is a sensible and much needed strategy. As it is well 
meant policies targeting innovation may be hampered due to other policy measures 
developed elsewhere. By developing new holistic innovation policies the Nordic 
governments may find new ways of using the countries’ national and human resources 
in a more efficient manner.   
 
However, such policy development is hard work. It is difficult to map and analyse the 
interaction between various policy areas, and it is difficult to explain such policies in a 
simple manner. Hence it is important that the national governments make the necessary 
investments in personnel, research and collaborative efforts. 
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2. Rationalities and innovation policy learning 
By Per Koch, Johan Hauknes and Rannveig Røste, with contributions from Lennart 
Norgren, Juha Oksanen and Kasper Edwards. 16 
Innovation policy innovation 
In the same way as there is a tendency to oversimplify industrial innovation processes, 
there is also a tendency to regard policy development as straightforward rational 
processes. They are not. Innovation policy is for instance not a simple transformation of 
innovation research into practical policy measures and institutional reform. The 
innovation processes taking place in the innovation policy system are just as complex as 
the ones found in industrial settings. There are intricate social rules, conflicting world 
views, intense power struggles, and uneven levels of competences and funding. 
 
In spite of this, we seldom find innovation policy makers that have explicit strategies for 
policy learning and policy innovation – even if the same persons are acutely aware of 
the need for industrial innovation policies. This is a problem, for politics is about 
making things happen, and if the policy system stops you from implementing much 
needed reforms or hinders the learning processes of the policy makers you will end up 
with policy failure. The innovation policy system will not engender the kind of 
industrial innovation one is looking for, and society will not reach overall objectives for 
economic growth and welfare development. 
 
It has not been the primary task of the GoodNIP project to study the social processes 
behind innovation policy development. Such an endeavour goes beyond what is possible 
within the time and resources allotted to this project.  Based on previous research17, 
analysis of policy documents and the participants’ extensive knowledge of innovation 
policies in the Nordic countries, we have, however, been able to make a preliminary 
analysis of one important part of the social construction of innovation policies, namely 
the rationalities or “mental maps” of Nordic policy makers and the practice of policy 
learning. It should be noted that several of the GoodNIP researchers have a background 
from policy development in Nordic ministries and research and innovation policy 
agencies. 
The role of rationalities 
Innovation policies in the Nordic area have generally been characterized by a political 
consensus. The conflicts exist rather at ministerial level; between departments, between 
different groups and organizations in the ministries and between the different ministries 
and agencies.  
 
These struggles are to a large extent a reflection of conflicts of interest and fights for 
power, prestige and funding. However, if this was all there was to it, one could at least 
presume that the contestants shared a common view of reality, which would – in 
principle – make communication less complicated. If you took away the tactics and saw 
through the rhetoric, it should be easy to establish a common ground for learning. 
                                                 
16 Parts of this paper will also be published as a separate STEP report. 
17 Koch, Per M. & Hauknes, Johan (2000) 
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Although some participants may pretend – or even believe – that this is the case, the 
reality is much more complicated. The conflicts are actually often based on different 
concepts of reality – i.e. different mental structures or “rationalities”. 
 
By rationalities we understand a relatively long lasting understanding of the reality 
shared by members of a culturally and socially defined group. They may be interpreted 
as “genres”, “paradigms” or as ideal models of industry. Rationalities persist, or have 
inertia. They continue to operate after the period during which they originated and are 
embedded in institutional structures and arrangements as well as in policy practices and 
instruments. The rationalities are generally unspoken – they are not explicitly 
formulated in policy processes – but are visible in the construction of concepts and 
attitudes. 
 
For the individual rationality constitutes a mental map of concepts and beliefs in a 
specific area. A rationality can be compared to his or hers “life word” if we use a term 
from hermeneutical philosophy.18 A “life world” is the sum of the individual’s personal 
experiences, his or hers education and cultural environment. In this context an 
innovation policy rationality is a part of this “life world”. Hence an individual may have 
rationalities that delimits his or hers idea of what constitutes industrial innovation, 
learning, or – to use a completely different example – love. There are no clear 
boundaries between such “sub-rationalities”, as what a person believes in one area of 
life will influence his or hers believes in others.  
 
A person is not a separate atom. His or her life world and rationalities is shaped in a 
cultural and historical context, shared by others. Hence, although each person represents 
a unique combination of experiences and beliefs, he or she will be part of various social 
groups that share rationalities.  
 
Moreover, the person will take part in the overall rationality of this particular epoch or 
mentality, a “super-rationality” which is partly based on living beliefs, philosophies, 
ethics, religious beliefs, myths and legends.  According to philosophers like Hans 
Blumenberg this common heritage will result in one particular problem becoming the 
main focus of a specific culture and era (cf. the idea of epochs found in other historians 
of science and mentalities, including Foucault and Kuhn).19 
 
Rationalities are required for any kind of thinking. People need such “pre-judices”, i.e. 
the ability to approach a phenomenon or problem with certain predisposed ideas of what 
this is, in order to understand anything. However, such rationalities also set limits to 
what it is possible to believe and conceptualise.  
 
There are no absolute and clear borders between various rationalities in a social setting.  
However, people tend to drift towards social groups that share their own view of the 
world. Moreover, if they do not share this view in the beginning, they may soon be 
“socialized” or “encultured” into the same context. This is one reason why parties or 
workplace departments often is populated by people who share the same view of reality. 
 
                                                 
18 Ricoeur 1974; Heidegger 1977; Gadamer 1989 
19 Blumenberg 1983; Foucault 1972; Kuhn 1962 
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A written ideology or philosophy – i.e. a systematic and codified rendering of the nature 
of reality – may be based on one or more rationalities, it can even be an attempt to 
conceptualise a rationality. However, there is not necessarily a one to one correlation 
between rationalities and specific ideologies or theoretical schools. We have all seen 
how old ideologies live on in rhetoric and social institutions, although contemporaries 
neither share nor understand these beliefs.  Moreover, policy makers and others may 
make use of ideologies they themselves do not believe in, in order to gain influence. 
 
Political parties and organizations may base their policy development on a clear 
ideological basis, for example classical political ideologies like liberalism and 
socialism. However, in some countries policy conflicts do not follow the dichotomy of 
political ideologies or party lines.  Instead the conflict may be defined by other forms of 
ideologies, or one may find that different rationalities are present in the same political 
party or that one rationality is found in more than one political group. This is becoming 
more evident in a post-modern world where the old dividing lines between socialism, 
liberalism and conservatism are becoming blurred. 
 
In the Nordic countries innovation policy development is based on several conflicting 
rationalities. The dominance of one or more rationality may vary from country to 
country, as may the “rationality mix”.  However, in the context of the GoodNIP project 
we have mapped a few dominant innovation policy rationalities. 
 
There is one rationality based on traditional economics, characterized by a belief in a 
balanced economy plagued by market failure.  There is another rationality based on a 
systemic view of innovation, where the main focus is on networking and the learning 
capabilities of firms.  Then there is a rationality based on a strong belief in the 
importance of university research and basic science, one focused on entrepreneurship, 
and – finally – one “planning rationality”, which presupposed the possibility of far 
reaching public planning. The rationalities will be described in detail below. 
 
These various rationalities are found in many parties.  Still, when one studies the 
conflict between the various ministry departments, one soon find that some rationalities 
dominate some departments and not others, regardless of the political affiliation of the 
relevant minister. In this context it is therefore more interesting to study how 
rationalities rather than political ideologies construct innovation policy.   
 
It is impossible to give a clear cut definition of what constitutes a particular rationality, 
partly because it is shared by many people, who all have developed their personal 
variant of this or that particular belief system, and partly because the rationalities are not 
explicitly formulated in comprehensive theories of what this or that particular 
phenomenon is about.   
 
However, as soon as a policy maker starts fighting for the interests of his or her 
institution or policy area, he or she will make use of theories and “facts” in order to 
convince others.  Hence, if there is a conflict involving different rationalities or ideas of 
how the world really works, the parties involved will have to try to conceptualise their 
ideas.  They often do this by making use of already existing ideologies or theories. 
 
In many European countries one will for instance find that policy makers make use of 
arguments from neoclassical economic theory and evolutional systemic innovation 
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theory when arguing for a particular standpoint (e.g. on the topic of active public 
intervention in enterprise innovation processes). 
 
By mapping these arguments one may gain a certain impression of the rationalities 
behind this use of ideologies and theories. However, one must be very careful when 
doing so.  Policy makers may make use of theories they actually do not believe in, in 
order to convince an opponent that is entrenched in a conflicting rationality. Moreover, 
policy makers may have a weak understanding of the total implication of a specific 
theory or ideology. Hence there may not be a one to one relationship between the 
political rhetoric based on these ideologies or theories and the policy maker’s true 
beliefs. 
Rationalities from sociological and organisational points of 
view 
When interpreting rationalities at group level, one may understand the relation between 
individuals and the social world as Berger and Luckmann20 understands it: as a 
continuously dialectic condition between individual human beings and the relevant 
social systems. Acts that are often repeated in a social situation become 
institutionalised; they fit into a pattern that can be reproduced without particularly 
efforts.  
 
The human beings taking part in these institutionalised systems read these as the 
objective reality of society, partly because these systems have a history starting before 
the individuals’ own life and partly because the individual will find it hard, if not 
impossible, to change the institutionalisation. 
 
National innovation policies develop across several national, local and international 
political and bureaucratic units. These units lay down the framework and establish the 
policy instruments that have an impact on innovation activity. There are, however, 
seldom one single unit at local, national or international level that develop innovation 
policy alone. There are rather a lot of organizations and institutions that can have an 
impact on how the national innovation policy develops and changes over time. 
According to theories following the rational organisation perspective, a study of 
political and bureaucratic units, and how they change over time, will give a clearer 
picture of how national innovation policies are shaped.21.  
 
Organisations are units with highly formalized social structures, aimed at relatively 
specific goals. These formalized social structures define the coordination and 
specialisation of work that must be accomplished by the members in the organisation. 
These are highly specialized roles, independent of the members’ personal and social 
characteristic. What is produced in an organisation may therefore be quite predictable.  
 
However, the formal structures can never succeed in capturing the “non-rational” 
dimensions of organisational behaviour. Organisations are, first and foremost, 
                                                 
20 1966 
21 Scott 1992 
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collectives. Phillip Selznick22 viewed organizational structure as an adaptive organism 
shaped in reaction to the characteristic and commitments of the participants, and by 
influences from the external environment. The organisational system develops means of 
self-defence. Self-maintenance becomes often the superior goal.  
 
Selznick’s research is often categorized under the institutional organizational 
perspective.23 Theories in this area are based on the idea that the formalized structure of 
the organisation cannot overcome the “irrational” human factor in the organisation’s 
behaviour. The individuals have complex needs and interests that are not defined in the 
formalized structure.  
 
What happens is that the formalized structure in the organisation undergoes a process of 
adjustment based on the actual behaviour that take place in the organisation, and that 
this behaviour gradually institutionalises into roots and routines for organisational 
behaviour.  
 
According to this thinking social systems have a limited resonance towards the 
surroundings, as they mostly reproduce themselves without absorbing views from 
outside their own system.24 The surroundings are selectively perceived by means of the 
system’s own categories and criteria for what is relevant. Given this organisational 
“conservatism”, one may wonder what it is that leads to new understanding in a 
particular policy area. 
 
According to the actor network approach25 the study of society, and of innovation, must 
be based on the identification and understanding of “actor-networks”, how they come 
into being and how they persist. Actor-networks are constructions of individuals, 
institutions and technology that come into being through tactical operations where one 
or more actor or groups try to convince others that their understanding of the how the 
future should be.  
 
The actor-networks are normally demarcated by one rationality – i.e. a historically 
conditioned common understanding of how the reality is constructed – and it is this 
common understanding that unites the actor-network. Based on this rationality the actor 
network develops future scenarios, i.e. stories about how the future should be and what 
is to be done to reach that future state of affairs. In this context they may make use of 
various ideologies, i.e. systematic and codified renderings of the nature of reality. 
 
The problem with approaches like this one is that they may underestimate the 
individual’s ability to go beyond the borders of the actor network. Given that each and 
every one of us has a different upbringing and a unique life world, new perspectives 
may enter the arena, especially if this person has the strong will, the social intelligence, 
the communicative skills and the connections needed to convince others, the self-
defence mechanism of the actor network may brake down.   
 
                                                 
22 1948 
23 Cp. Olsen 1988; Egeberg 1989; Powell and DiMaggion 1991; Cyert and March 1992 
24 Luhmann 1995 
25 Callon 1980; Latour and Woolgar 1986 
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Admittedly, these are a lot of “ifs”. Most often individuals like these are not able to 
change the network, unless they get the help for external forces, being that political 
shifts or other shocks to the system.  In the case of innovation policy this can be shifting 
governments, pressure from interest groups, economic and social upheavals that 
necessitates new solutions, new international trends, or the fact that the old generation 
“dies out” and leaves room for people that have grown up in another time characterized 
by other ideas and mentalities. 
 
Rationalities in innovation policies in the Nordic countries 
This set of Nordic rationalities originated in a study made by the Norwegian team, and 
may indeed have a strong Norwegian slant. However, we believe that the cultural 
similarities between these countries, and the fact that we have found many of the same 
conflicts in the other countries, justify an inclusion in this rapport. We consider this a 
first step towards a more extensive mapping the social construction of innovation 
policies in these countries. 
The macroeconomic rationality 
The macroeconomic rationality is based on a traditional macro economic approach to 
economic growth.  Policy makers that operate within this rationality have a tendency to 
focus on financial measures like interest rates, currency rates, trade balances etc. They 
are mostly concerned with the economic framework condition, not with the internal life 
of the companies.   
 
This way of thinking is closely connected to neoclassical economics and this tradition’s 
belief in perfect markets in balance. The relevant milieus often recruit new civil servants 
from university faculties steeped in the neo-classical tradition.  This is for instance the 
case in Norway, where the Finance Ministry finds many of its economists at the 
University of Oslo, well known for its “Oslo school” of social economics. This way of 
thinking is often found in ministries of finance, and – to a certain extent – in 
departments in ministries of industry or economics in all the Nordic countries. 
 
Given this strong neo-classical slant, innovation policy measures are normally 
legitimised with market failure arguments. 
 
One rather extreme example of how this mentality may influence policy documents is 
found in the Norwegian Government’s Long Term Plan of 1997. Although this 
document includes a lot of thoughtful reflections on the complexities of modern society, 
the foundation of what was then called “The Norwegian House” – i.e. Norwegian 
welfare development – was reduced to “low growth in prices and costs, low interest 
rates, orderly state finances and a trade surplus.”26  
                                                 
26 ”Det er lav pris- og kostnadsvekst, lave renter, orden på statsfinansene og overskudd i utenriksøkonomien.” 
St. meld. Nr. 4 (1996-97) Langtidsprogrammet 1998-2001. 
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The science base rationality 
The science base rationality is mostly concerned with research taking place in the 
university sector, and especially basic science.  Policy makers born into this rationality 
have a tendency to use arguments based on the linear model of innovation: The 
university scientists are considered to be the true innovators; industry only transfers 
these innovations to the market.  
 
Today many policy makers belonging to this tradition will agree that the linear model is 
too simplistic. Still, they continue to fight for increased support to basic science, and are 
often not that interested in innovation processes taking place in and between companies. 
 
A clear example of this rationality is found in the Swedish SOU1998:128 Forskning 
2000, which to a large extent reduced innovation policy to policy for basic research.27 It 
has also strong footholds in especially the Norwegian and Swedish ministries of 
Education. 
 
Policy makers belonging to this rationality are often hostile towards the macroeconomic 
tradition, as they feel that proponents of that way of thinking do not truly understand the 
importance of basic science. Nevertheless, these two rationalities are actually in 
harmony in one important respect: they often think of innovation as something that 
takes place outside the economy.  
 
The macroeconomists has placed technological change and innovation within a “black 
box” that is defined as exogenous.  People belonging to the science base rationality 
often consciously or unconsciously equal this black box with university science (or – 
alternatively – university science and basic research done by large industrial 
companies). This is one reason why innovation policy so often is reduced to research 
policy. 
The systemic rationality 
The systemic rationality grew in importance after the publication of the final reports of 
the OECD Technology/Economy Programme in the beginning of the 1990s28.  
 
This rationality is based on a systemic view of reality: innovation is born out of the 
interplay between companies and other institutions in so-called national systems of 
innovation.  Innovation is not primarily a result of science push. Instead the 
technological development is driven by the companies’ need to survive in a harsh 
environment (the market).  Companies that are able to take part in efficient networks 
and develop their learning capabilities are more likely to survive.    
 
Policy makers belonging to this tradition will normally focus on a wider spectre of 
innovation activities, including design, marketing, commercialisation, learning and 
networking.  
 
                                                 
27 http://utbildning.regeringen.se/propositionermm/sou/tidigare.htm 
28 Technology in a changing world, OECD Paris 1991 
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This way of thinking has now become quite influential in the Nordic countries, 
especially in departments for industrial development, research and regional 
development. In Norway this rationality has also been expressed clearly in White Papers 
from the Ministry of Education and Research. 
 
Within the Swedish ministry of industry, employment and communication the systemic 
rationale is for instance gaining ground at the expense of the macroeconomic rationale, 
which has become evident in some of the latest bills. The clearest effect of this rationale 
was the establishment of the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA) in 
2001. The activities of VINNOVA are governed by the systemic rationale. The 
programmes launched address failures in innovation systems; being it national, regional 
or sectorial innovation systems. The VINNVÄXT-programme (Regional Growth 
through Development of Dynamic Innovation Systems) is an example of such a 
programme. 
 
The Finnish Centre of Expertise Programme represents clearly the systemic paradigm. 
The programme is an epitome for current thinking in regional development. First, 
regional development has to be based on local strengths and expertise, which can give a 
competitive edge for the region. Therefore regional and local actors are encouraged to 
take a more strategic view on regional development. Secondly the programme 
emphasises networking (regionally, nationally and internationally) and co-operation as 
important elements in promotion of regional development.  
 
The Icelandic Ministry of Industry and trade has co-organized innovation policy with 
regional policy on the basis of systemic innovation theory. The new Innovation Centre 
at Akureyri has been given a coordination role for innovative activities in regions 
outside the capital.  
 
This rationality has also given birth to a new so-called “third generation”, “holistic” 
innovation policy, where policy makers try to involve other policy areas into the 
innovation policy process.  Traditionally innovation policies have focused on policy 
areas targeting industrial innovation directly, i.e. industry policy, R&D policy and to a 
certain extent regional policy. Now they want to include policy areas that influence the 
innovative capabilities of firms indirectly as well, including transport policy, education 
policy and social and cultural policies. Both the Norwegian and the Swedish 
government have started political processes with this aim.  
The entrepreneurship rationality 
The entrepreneurship rationality is not as distinct as the three previous rationalities, and 
often overlaps with the systemic as well as the macroeconomic tradition.  
 
Policy makers shaped by this rationality stress the need for the establishment of new, 
small, enterprises. This may refer to all kinds of companies, but these policy makers 
often focus on so-called “knowledge-intensive technology-based companies”. 
 
People belonging to this tradition have a tendency to focus on the individual, the 
entrepreneur (gründer), and his or hers ideas. Innovation policy therefore consists of 
instruments aimed at helping entrepreneurs develop their ideas and bringing them out 
into the market. While the systemic rationality is inspired by modern innovation theory, 
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the entrepreneurship rationality makes also use of a separate brand of social science, the 
entrepreneurship studies.29  
 
This way of thinking is becoming increasingly popular among civil servants working on 
industrial innovation and regional development. In Norway one may witness an 
increasing interest in entrepreneurship policy measures in the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade.  SND has clearly noted this, and they are also discussing how to introduce such 
perspectives into their instrument portfolio. 
 
The Swedish Business Development Agency (NUTEK) was established at the same 
time as VINNOVA. Its mission can therefore be connected to the systemic rationale. 
However, in comparison with VINNOVA, it focuses more on the development of 
SMEs, start-ups and clusters. Hence, the entrepreneurship rationale has an influence on 
the measures introduced by NUTEK. 
The planning rationality 
The policy makers belonging to the planning rationality are a dying breed.  According 
to this tradition the state is to take an active, strategic, role in developing large research 
intensive companies, especially within so-called “heavy industries”.  These companies 
are to serve as locomotives for the rest of industry.  
 
The most extreme variant of this rationality was found in the Soviet Union.  However, a 
more moderate version dominated Nordic industrial policies in the 1950’s and 60’s, 
when especially the social democrats used industrial development as a tool in the 
building of the new welfare state. This way of thinking is often combined with 
corporatism, i.e. close collaboration between the state and influential industrial 
organisations. 
 
This tradition has lost its influence partly due to globalisation and the fact that 
international agreements have taken away many of the tools available to policy makers, 
but also because of an increasing scepticism as regards the civil servants’ ability to 
understand the complexity of society, predict the future, and plan and execute large 
policy reforms. Instead there is a tendency to focus on the need for plurality and many 
options.  To mix metaphors: Instead of putting all the eggs in one basket, there is a wish 
to stimulate a large undergrowth of new companies, out of which some may become the 
champions of the future. 
The situation today 
When reading official policy documents one soon gets the impression that the systemic 
approach is the formal basis for innovation policies in all the Nordic countries.  One 
must distinguish between political texts and political realities, however.  If powerful 
people or institutions have not fully understood or accepted this perspective, they will 
inevitable weaken the systemic approach to innovation. 
 
                                                 
29 Entrepreneurship Policy for the Future av Lundström og Stevenson, Swedish Foundation for Small 
Businness Research, Stockholm 2001. 
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On the other hand, one should also be aware of the fact that policy makers that are 
firmly based in the “systemic camp”, may nevertheless use arguments from other 
rationalities, partly because they honestly believe that they are complementary, and 
partly from pragmatic reasons: The arguments work in the political setting. 
 
The latest innovation policy document from the Norwegian government, written by 
people in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, is clearly based on a systemic view of 
innovation.  Nevertheless, the paper presents neoclassical theory side by side with what 
is called “innovation theory”. It goes to argue that 
 
“To a far extent there is unity (sammenfall) between recommendations made by 
innovation theory and neoclassical theory. According to both traditions both 
research and development, coordination and networking, advice and guidance, 
infrastructure and funding in an early phase important focus areas for policy 
measures. 
 
The main difference between the two main branches of theory is found in what 
questions they are trying to answer. While neoclassical theory in particular state 
the reasons for what areas industrial policies should influence, based on an 
understanding of markets, innovation theory has a stronger focus on how policy 
and instruments should be targeted, based on an understanding of what hinders 
and what encourages innovation and competitive abilities in industry 
(næringslivet). 
 
Neoclassical theory focuses more clearly on the individual company, while 
innovation theory is more concerned about interaction and learning in groups 
and environments.  Because of this it should be possible to learn from both 
schools, thus gaining a more coherent theoretical basis for the use of direct 
policy measures.”30 
 
The text reflects a very sophisticated understanding of the theoretical basis for 
innovation policies. The policy makers who have written this text are acutely aware of 
the conflict between the two dominant rationalities.   
 
We may partly disagree with this rather pragmatic and eclectic approach. We believe 
that the macroeconomic understanding of reality is to a much larger degree 
incommensurable with the systemic view. That being said, there are many perspectives 
from neoclassical economics that are valid within a systemic framework. In this 
connection, however, it is interesting to note that the authors have found it useful to 
discuss the two traditions.  One possible reason for this might have been to get the 
Ministry of Finance “on board.” 
Policy learning 
The previous discussion of rationalities may give the impression that the GoodNIP team 
favours a relativistic approach to innovation policies.  It might seem that it does not 
                                                 
30 St. prp. nr. 51 2002-2003, Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv, 
http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/publ/stprp/024001-030016/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
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matter what rationality the policies are based on, as they are all products of the human 
imagination, totally removed from reality in itself.  
 
There is certainly no reason to believe that Nordic policy makers ever will get a totally 
objective view of reality.  Policy makers are, like all of us, shaped by their own 
environment, and they see the world through “the glasses” of their own rationality. That 
being said, all practical experience shows that it is possible to develop a more nuanced, 
multifaceted and realistic view of society – that is “to get closer to the truth”.  
 
To a certain extent these learning processes can take place within a specific rationality, 
i.e. without provoking the self-defence mechanisms of the actor network.  We see these 
learning processes reflected in an endless production of documents combining new 
statistics with well rehearsed arguments.  
 
A continuously changing society requires, however, policy makers that are able to “go 
outside the box”, and make sense of other points of view.  This is a much more 
demanding and time consuming process, which requires wisdom, patience and bravery 
from the policy makers involved. 
 
The following analysis of policy learning is partly based on work done within the EU 
TSER RISE-project,31 which also had partners from Norway and Sweden.  This material 
has been expanded and compared to practices in the other Nordic countries. In general 
the same patterns exist in Denmark and Finland as well.   
Policy learning 
Definition of policy learning 
We define policy learning as the process underlying any changes in the political 
“behaviour” of an agency, its portfolio of policy instruments (institutions, programmes, 
funding schemes, regulatory frameworks etc.), objectives and management for or of 
these, their constitution and the relative weight of instruments in the portfolio. 
 
We broadly regard policy learning as having taken place within a policy agency when 
the agency alters its policy behaviour, i.e. when it 
                                                 
31 RISE Research & technology organisations in the service economy 
http://centrim.bus.brighton.ac.uk/go/rise/index.htm. The following researchers took part: CENTRIM 
(Centre for Research in Innovation Management): Brighton Mike Hales, Jeff Readman; Dialogic 
Innovation & Interaction: Utrecht Pim den Hertog, Erik Brouwer; DIW (Deutsches Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung): Berlin Brigitte Preissl, Ulrich Wurzel, Anja Dresenkamp, Christian Rickert; 
INETI (Instituto Nacional de Engenharia e tecnologia Industrial): Lisbon Margarida Fontes, Muriel 
Hinard de Pýdua, Rui Carvalho Diaz; Istituto di economia dell'impresa e del lavoro, Universita Cattolica 
del Sacro Cuore: Milano Laura Solimene, Claudio Farina; NUTEK (Narings- och 
Teknikutveklingsverket): Stockholm Lennart Norgren, Anna Backlund, Nils Markusson, Anna 
Sandstrom, Anna Nillson, Ingrid Petterson, Helena Haggblad. NUTEK has been reorganised as Vinnova 
(Verket for Innovationssystem); STEP (Studier i teknologi, innovasjon og ekonomisk politikk): Oslo 
Johan Hauknes, Thor Egil Braadland, Carl Drefvelin, Per Koch, Olav Wicken, Svend Otto Remoe, 
Morten Fraas, Nils Henrik Solum, Finn Orstavik; TNO/STB Centre for Technology and Policy Studies: 
Delft Jos Leijten, Jason Whalley, Paul Beije, Sander Kern, Sander Limonard, Imke Limpens 
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 alters specifications and orientations for subsidiary institutions, programmes, or the 
policy legitimisation of these, etc. 
 introduces new or altered policy instruments or 
 new internal and external monitoring or management systems, 
 expands or contracts its main constituencies. 
 
The process underlying these changes is a complex process including various forms of 
learning, types of competences and sources of knowledge. 
 
The focus for our study has been “the policy maker”, meaning any elected person 
(politician) or appointed or employed individual (bureaucrat/civil servant) involved in 
developing and administering policies. 
Models of learning 
An organisation’s ability to develop relevant knowledge-based policies is to a large 
extent based on its ability to develop relevant competences, i.e. it is based on learning. 
We suggest four generic modes of learning: 
 Explicit conceptual delivery and acquisition 
An explicit and direct interaction between the policy making agency and an external 
institution, furnishing new analytical perspectives, presenting and performing 
research to policy makers, contract work to commissions, agencies on specific 
issues or suggestions in new or altered policy initiatives or objectives etc. 
 Learning networks 
Policy agencies are often involved in permanent or long-term networks where a 
primary objective is the sharing of information or other conceptual resources among 
its members. Such networks may include individual experts’ formal and informal 
professional networks, long term institutional networks, dialogue with the members 
of the constituency the relevant policies address, intra- or inter-ministerial networks, 
and international networks (e.g. EU and OECD-based working groups). 
 Benchmarking and other indicator-based or best-practice approaches 
At one end of the spectrum are formalised indicator based reporting systems, at the 
other “one shot” or sporadic assessments, evaluations and analytical studies. 
 Continuous improvement 
Of informal processes, most notable is learning-by doing, which generates 
capabilities and competences that are operational and experience-based.  These 
processes and capabilities are shaped by the impact of an evolving policy “culture”, 
including the ministerial or departmental perception of the organisation's policy 
agenda; the governing, more general, political objectives and how they are 
operationalised, and divisions of labour between ministries and departments. 
Individual and organisational learning 
Some of the RISE case material respondents pointed to the discrepancy between 
individual learning and the learning processes of the whole organisation.  For instance: 
Although the Research Council of Norway employs highly competent policy makers – 
in formal terms – with experience from science as well as industry, the organisation 
seem to lack an overall strategic competence building.  In some respects the 
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competences of the organisation are not much more than the sum of the competences of 
its employees. Respondents from the Norwegian ministries gave the same impression: 
There is a lot of individual “learning by doing”, but the ministries as a whole seem to 
lack long term plans for strategic competence building. 
Individual learning 
A policy maker in a ministry or policy agency is normally set to administer and monitor 
existing policy instruments and to develop new ones. In doing so she will have to take a 
lot of factors into consideration.  Among these are:32 
• the wishes, ideas, rationality and ideology of the political leadership of the ministry, 
or − in the case of subordinate policy organisations − the political signals and 
demands coming from the relevant ministry or ministries 
• the wishes, ideas, world views and ideology of the non-political superiors (civil 
servants), which is often equal to the rationality shared by this specific actor 
network,33 
• public opinion, including social movements and organisations 
• the media 
• regulatory restraints 
• financial restraints 
• scientific expertise 
 
One must also take her own personal and cultural background and interests into 
consideration – the lifeworld of this individual, to use the hermeneutic expression34, 
• personal experience 
• education 
• worldview and ideological background 
• networks and contacts  
 
And finally, there are various sources of information. These are of limited value if the 
individual does not now how to find, understand and use this information.  On the other 
hand, the process of learning becomes much more difficult if relevant information is not 
readily obtainable.  
 
Policy makers tend to use a wide array of information sources: 
• newspapers and magazines 
• newsletters 
• World Wide Web 
                                                 
32 Cp. Arthur Edwards: 'Scientific expertise and policy-making: the intermediary role of the public 
sphere', Science and Public Policy, June 1999. 
33 This does not apply to ministries in countries were large parts of the staff is politically appointed, as in 
the USA. 
34 As used by J. Habermas 
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• specialist databases, including relevant statistics 
• books and periodicals acquired by the policy maker or her department 
• books and periodicals from the library of the institution (if it has one) 
• books and periodicals from public libraries 
• government reports (including white papers and budget documents) 
• reports commissioned by the government (green papers) 
• reports from research institutes and consultants, including evaluations of 
institutions, programmes and other policy instruments 
• in-house memorandums and reports 
• conferences, seminars, national and international organisations and working groups 
 
Although scientific knowledge does play an important role in policy development, any 
“linear” model depicting the policy maker as a person who designs new policy 
instruments purely on the basis of expert advice must be false. Not only is the policy 
maker forced to take other factors into consideration − in a democracy he or she is 
expected to do so. 
 
However, many civil servants have emphasised the need for contacts in policy agencies, 
industrial organisations and research institutes that can assist the policy maker in 
gaining access to relevant competences. Hence researchers often play an important role 
as competence providers also outside the traditional relationship of commissioner/report 
producer. 
The competence need of the policy makers 
Policy makers look for various competences when hiring new employees or asking 
researchers for help. In the RISE interviews policy makers expressed a need for 
• An understanding of the different cultures of industry, universities/university 
colleges and industrial institutes.  Work experience from the respective organisation 
types was mentioned as a major contributor to such competences, 
• Knowledge about relevant science and technology, 
• Factual knowledge about the relevant industrial sector (structure, organisation etc.), 
• Awareness of what is currently going on in research, industry and policy 
development, 
• Knowledge about what it is possible to do and how to do it (available instruments 
and the limitations inherent in the policy area, system or technologies), 
• Experience from large development projects, 
• An inclination to act, even if one have a partial and imperfect understanding of all 
the dimensions of the topic at hand, 
• An insight into the policy development in other countries, 
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• An insight into the present interests of managers on various levels in the relevant 
industries or parts of the system.35 
 
This fits well with the information gained through the GoodNIP study. 
 
As one can see the policy maker has to develop a theoretical and factual insight into the 
nature of the industrial innovation system. This he or she has in common with 
researchers studying industrial innovation.  However, the policy maker must also know 
the workings of the political system and the relevant policy instruments.  Moreover, this 
knowledge must go far beyond an understanding of organisational charts and formal 
procedure. They must develop an intimate knowledge of the cultural aspects of the 
political and administrative environment, and learn what is possible within the present 
administrative structure and political context.  
 
This is why it is important that policy makers understand the roles of rationalities.  If 
there is a gap between world views, it helps to know what this discrepancy is about, so 
that one may make efforts to bridge that gap by the use of various didactic means. 
 
Researchers must also be made aware of these conflicts. Researchers have the duty to 
give their advice on a more independent basis, regardless of whether this advice is 
“politically correct” or politically feasible at the present time.  If they do not, research 
will very easily be reduced to simply a “legitimising” agent of status quo.  
 
The researchers still need to gain a better insight into the political and administrative 
processes in the public sector, however, and into the everyday life of the policy maker. 
They need this knowledge in order to understand the competence needs of the policy 
maker and in order to produce a realistic analysis of the consequences of the various 
findings and suggested policy instruments. 
The learning processes of policy makers 
Our studies of policy learning cover only a few countries, a few institutions and a short 
period of time.  Hence it is impossible to generalise the results, across countries, 
cultures and policy-making institutions. Still, it seems that variations in national 
specificities, going far beyond formal structures of organisation and divisions of labour, 
are extremely important in explaining trans-national variations in operations and 
procedures – including the way social science is used.  
 
Nevertheless, innovation policy makers in Europe all face some of the same challenges, 
a reflection of their shared basic responsibilities and tasks; to design, fund, implement, 
administer, control and evaluate public policies, institutions, programmes and 
regulations. 
Recruitment 
The formal background and previous experience of policy makers are important. Actor 
networks often hire “clones” of the existing staff. To a certain extent this makes sense, 
as it simplifies internal communication and understanding.  Hence it makes policy 
                                                 
35 RISE: Swedish results of interviews on policy learning. 
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learning within the existing rationality much easier.  On the other hand, this tactic also 
stiffens the actor network’s resistance towards change.  It slows down the process of 
policy innovation by excluding alternative perspectives and conflicting views. 
 
Some policy institutions tend to hire predominantly qualified scientists and engineers 
from universities, colleges, research organisations, firms and from other policy 
institutions. This should in and of itself contribute to enhancing the policy systems 
absorption capabilities of scientific and other research, not just as a consequence of the 
competences, but equally as a result of their personal and professional networks. Such 
recruitment requires, however, that the scientists and engineers are able to adapt to a 
different cultural setting with quite different rules of the game. 
 
In some countries salaries of ministerial officials – or civil servants – tend to be lower 
than those of comparable positions in the industry sectors.  Hence it comes as no 
surprise that labour mobility from industry to the policy systems is weak. In institutions 
with closer contact and interaction with industry, salaries tend to be higher and the 
labour flows of experts from industry to the public sector are generally more 
extensive36.  
Networks 
The major source of competence building is day-to-day practice and collaboration with 
colleagues and other people involved in the processes of policy development. Hence 
interviewees mention networks and personal contacts as the most important sources of 
information and knowledge.   
 
From our contacts we gather that this contact building primarily is an individual activity 
with little managerial input, although programme steering committees and budget 
reference groups may be perceived as institutionalised instruments for networking. 
Educational background 
The educational background of policy makers is of importance. Most of them have a 
university or college background, normally at a graduate level.  Many of them consider 
themselves generalists, and claim that the particular disciplines taken are not as 
important as the fact that higher education gives them the ability to take part in the 
political culture and find, understand and utilise relevant literature and research.  
 
In other institutions and departments, the management tends to prefer recruits with a 
specific type of education.  There is, for instance, reason to believe that ministries of 
industry, economics or finance tend to have a larger proportion of economists than 
many other ministries and public institutions. 
International learning in innovation policy37 
International organisations like the OECD and the European Union have paid much 
attention to transnational learning between countries in the innovation policy area. The 
EU Trend Chart on Innovation, for instance, recently arranged a separate workshop for 
                                                 
36 Nås (1998). See also OECD 2001 
37 Additional source: European Trend Chart on innovation. Theme-spesific Country reports on Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden for covering period to March 2002. 
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a discussion of such processes. Learning from other countries is seen as an important 
tool for improving the design and benchmark national policies and programmes.  
 
There is no exact information available of the importance given by Nordic policy 
makers to transnational policy learning. Therefore it is not possible to make any far 
reaching conclusions of the issues of importance in innovation policy making in Nordic 
countries. However, there are some examples, which exemplify the value policy makers 
and civil servants assign to international experience.  
 
In Sweden there has been established a group consisting of representatives from trade 
and industry and Government officials. The group has been evaluating ways to bring 
about a more efficient industrial policy. The group has been using benchmarking as a 
method to evaluate the outcome of the industrial policy in Sweden. The comparison 
with other countries has given an opportunity for them to find areas where Sweden 
needs to intensify its policy efforts.  
 
In Finland international examples as a source of policy learning have had a significant 
effect on R&D and innovation policy making. Over the years a number of innovation 
policy measures have been based on international examples. In this sense Finland has 
followed a catch-up strategy when developing national science, technology and 
innovation policies. Recently this situation has changed, not least because of the rapid 
advancement of the IT and telecommunication sectors. Instead of being a follower 
Finland is increasingly seen as a model country of successful innovation policy. Still, 
Finnish policy makers are keenly looking out for interesting examples from abroad.  
 
Icelandic policy makers have also made use of international models recently. The 
Minister of Education and Science together with a delegation has visited Finland on two 
occasions recently – in order to learn from the structure and function of the Finnish 
science, technology and innovation system. 
 
Knowledge from relevant developments abroad is often rooted in the everyday routines 
of policy makers and other experts working with innovation policy issues. Both policy 
makers and experts of the Nordic countries are actively participating in international 
networks and working groups organised, for example, by the OECD and the European 
Union. These networks are facilitating knowledge flows between participating 
countries. Several Norwegian ministries have established cross-ministerial working 
groups discussing and preparing national participation on OECD committees and 
working groups.  The national working group for the participation in the OECD 
Working party for technology and innovation policy (TIP) has actually functioned as a 
forum for general discussions about innovation theory and policy trends. 
 
Technology attachés at the embassies and similar arrangements provide a well 
established source of information on policy development in their host countries/areas.  
Norway has, for instance, science policy advisers at the embassies in Washington D.C. 
and Brussels, who report on R&D policies. Swedish ITPS has Science & Technology 
Offices situated in Washington, Los Angeles and Tokyo with the aim of analysing the 
development of growth policy at national as well as international level. The Finnish 
Tekes has also offices with technology counsellors in the United States, Belgium and 
Japan. A new Tekes office will be opened in China in Summer 2003. 
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Ad-hoc surveys and missions undertaken by policy makers are another way of studying 
new trends and innovation policy measures. More long-term visits through specific 
exchange programmes for policy makers are rare. Time limited assignments in 
international organisations, such as the EU Commission, OECD or World Bank are 
more typical ways of obtaining longer-term experiences and practical insights.  
 
In general, it seems that the awareness of the need to monitor and learn from other 
countries is growing among Nordic policy makers. However, the constraints limiting 
policy learning between countries are many. The main factor hindering policy learning 
is the lack of time. One solution implemented in the Nordic countries is the 
commissioning of studies from research institutes and universities. This strategy can be 
useful to the extent that the relevant institutes are able to build up their competences in 
the field of innovation policies, but it does not provide the ministry employees with the 
internal learning processes needed. Moreover, evaluations of national innovation policy 
instruments and arrangements offers sometimes an opportunity for international policy 
learning. The fact that foreign experts are used extensively as evaluators or as members 
in evaluation panels in Nordic countries supports this kind of experience sharing. Often, 
though, this possibility is not explored systematically – not least because of time and 
resource constraints. 
 
Anyway, it is important to remember in the context of transnational policy learning that 
models or instruments that have been considered best practice elsewhere cannot always 
be transferred successfully to another national innovation system. Learning from 
experiences from abroad, or even between regions of the same country is always a 
complex and ambiguous process due to the institutional, political, cultural and historical 
differences. 
Researcher/policy maker interaction 
Our studies have shown that one of the most important impediments for an effective 
utilisation of innovation research in policy organisations is time – or, rather, the lack of 
it. The hectic pace of modern ministries and directorates leaves often little time to 
reflection.  This does not mean that there is not room for learning.  Policy makers 
develop their competences through their day-to-day practice, but they often lack the 
time needed to read through long reports or follow theoretical debates in the research 
community. Consequently, learning tend to be dominated by single loop learning – to 
use Argyris’ concepts38 – while opportunities for second loop learning is severely 
constrained and third loop learning is virtually absent. 
 
Moreover, many policy makers say that they need information and advice of direct 
relevance to the development of concrete policy instruments. Their patience often runs 
out when researchers start deliberating what they perceive as “purely theoretical 
aspects” of certain hypotheses or issues.  
 
                                                 
38 For Argyris and Schön earning involves the detection and correction of error. People often look for 
another strategy that will address and work within the governing variables when something goes wrong 
(single-loop learning). Alternatively people may try to alter the governing variables themselves (double-
loop learning), modifying an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives.  This is a more 
rare form for learning. Argyris and Schön (1974). 
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In order to make certain that research is used and understood it is therefore important to 
find other avenues for communication of research results. Several of the policy makers 
contacted reported that they found an active dialogue with researchers very useful. 
Discussions in workshops and seminars seem to be efficient; more so than large 
conferences where participants passively listen to selected speakers.  
Commissioning research – phases 
The most important meeting place for researchers and policy makers seem to be the 
process of commissioning research and evaluations.  Such processes are divided into 
several phases: 
 The preliminary phase, where policy makers try to determine the nature of the 
question that is to be asked.  Informally, policy makers may get in touch with 
researchers that are part of their network of contacts.  Moreover, the issue at hand 
may be caused by questions raised by other reports or evaluations made by 
researchers.  In general, however, researchers are not much involved in this phase. 
 The commissioning phase, where policy makers get in touch with one or more 
research institutions in order to get suggestions on how this research can be carried 
out. This can be an important learning phase for policy makers as well as 
researchers.  The researchers must try to understand the needs of the public 
institution in order to target the research or evaluation process as accurately as 
possible.  The policy maker need the expertise of the researcher to map the status of 
research in this area, to decide what can be done, within a certain period of time, to a 
given price.  By discussing these matters with researchers the policy maker may 
learn more about research in this field. 
 The research phase, when the research is carried out.  The policy makers may 
follow this part of the process through follow up meetings, preliminary reports, 
workshops, seminars, participation in reference groups etc.  The feedback they give 
may teach the researchers more about the needs of the policy makers.  Furthermore, 
as the policy makers often are experts in the field of active innovation policies, they 
may give the researchers useful feedback on the content of the preliminary material, 
and input on how to proceed. 
 The finalising phase, where the research results are delivered, normally in the form 
of printed material, seminars and conferences. Several policy makers have told 
about reports and evaluations that have ended up i a drawer, never to be used in 
policy development. Others felt that the dissemination of results through seminars 
and conferences is more important than the final reports in themselves. One reason 
for this is the lack of time for reading. Some policy makers admitted that they often 
read executive summaries only. However, if the reports are to be used in the 
development of new policies and new policy instruments the results will often be 
included in policy documents written by the policy makers.  If this is the case, the 
chances are that the reports will be thoroughly read by these policy makers. 
 The post-publishing phase, where policy makers may contact researchers in order 
to clarify information given in the reports, where researchers may be asked to 
present the results in meetings with the policy institutions, and where researchers 
may be asked to carry out new research based on the previous mission. Often policy 
organisations have agreements with R&D institutions, where the policy makers are 
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allowed to discuss relevant issues with researchers, without making a new payment 
or signing a new contract. This service is often part of agreements made in 
connection with basic funding or long-term contracts for competence building. 
The fact that an interaction between policy makers and researchers may take place 
during these various phases does not mean that it necessarily does take place. The 
process does show, however, that there are potentially many stages where researchers 
and policy makers may interact and learn from each other. 
 
The GoodNIP project is funded by the Nordic Industrial Fund, an institution that plays 
an important role in engendering innovation policy studies for Nordic policy makers. 
This institution insists that dissemination be an integrated part of the research process.  
The project teams are to establish reference groups, preferably including relevant policy 
makers, and interact with policy makers in seminars, work shops etc. This practice is 
becoming increasingly common in relevant Nordic commissioning institution, as is the 
request for a project Web site, project specific workshops etc. This indicates an 
increasing awareness of the need for more coherent policy making processes. 
Strategic learning 
However, among those we have had contact with in the course of this work and at other 
times, few institutions was able to demonstrate a strategic approach to learning – as a 
way of improving the strategic orientation and the operations of the policy system.  
Policy learning is rather an indirect side effect, recognised but insufficiently focussed.  
 
There are several reasons for this, but nevertheless they point to a rather fundamental 
paradox. Policy makers in the area of industrial and innovation policies have generally 
assimilated the message of the importance of  “learning” – for focussed development of 
techno-economic capabilities and competences – for innovation performance, and hence 
for improving the operations and effectiveness of the firm. It is a paradox that policy 
systems – generally highly knowledge intensive and strong pressures for change – tend 
to deemphasise, or even neglect, the implications of the arguments for their own 
activities. 
Interaction vs. independence 
The role of scientific advice 
Arthur Edwards points out (Edwards 1999) that although the sciences have lost their 
authority based on knowledge and unanimous expertise; this has not led policy-makers 
to reduce their appeal to scientific advice-giving.39 Edwards points to Habermas, who 
gives science a role in the communication between citizens and policy makers in the 
“public sphere”.  
 
Edwards argues, however, that both the appeal of the policy-makers to science and their 
uses of scientific expertise are often tactically motivated and dependent on a variety of 
factors that bear on the “political attention” an issue receives. Hence the potential 
impact of scientific insights on the public sphere is anticipated or used instrumentally by 
policy makers. On the other hand scientists participate in public agenda-setting and 
                                                 
39 Cf. Weingart 1999. 
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make use of media attention in furthering their normative stands on issues as well as 
their own strategic aims. 
The use of policy oriented research 
“Deconstructivist” research within the sociology of knowledge, philosophy and the 
history of ideas have increasingly interpreted the use of science, research or any form of 
communication as tools in struggles for power and influence (Aarnes 1987). However, 
one should be careful reducing all uses of research input into tools of opportunism.  
 
Interviews and workshops organised by GoodNIP institutions do indicate that policy 
makers may commission, select or use results that strengthen their own position and 
arguments.  We have often witnessed policy makers (and scientists from the 
universities!) focusing on indicators that seem to support an analysis of reality that 
strengthens their position in the struggle for R&D funding.  Indicators that point in 
another direction are not discussed with the same enthusiasm. There is reason to believe 
that policy makers commissions evaluations, not solely to gain insight into the present 
state of affairs, but to be able to legitimise reorganisation or political reform.  Hence one 
can clearly argue that policy makers do not always use research results in a balanced, 
fair and “objective” way. 
 
On the other hand, there is no reason not to believe policy makers when they say that 
they commission research in order to gain insight into the workings of the innovation 
system or the effectiveness of various policy instruments.  Not only are many of these 
policy experts genuinely interested in the “academic” aspect of innovation and learning, 
they also need this knowledge in order to develop new, effective policy instruments. 
Their legitimacy as civil servants rests to a certain degree on their ability to produce 
effective policy actions that can strengthen the political credibility of the politicians.  
 
Politicians may also be genuinely concerned about finding solutions that might help 
industry, and even if this is not always the case, their success as politicians rests on their 
ability to be perceived as competent and pro-active. This does not guarantee a realistic 
utilisation of relevant research – like most human beings, politicians may find it useful 
to suppress information that does not strengthen their own cause – but it may also 
stimulate their interest in the topic at hand, making them more receptive to new 
research. 
 
Several of the policy makers contacted are very aware of ethical problems related to the 
use of research in policy development. Their interest is partly grounded in pragmatic 
concerns.  They argue that the credibility of the research and the use of it depend on 
trust.  If any party can raise doubt about the validity of a report or an evaluation, it 
might easily become useless from a policy perspective.  
 
This line of reasoning often brings up the role of public opinion or the public sphere 
mentioned by Edwards. These policy makers argue that the best defence against abuse 
of research or a lack of impartiality on the side of the researcher is an open public 
debate where alternative research bodies may criticise the findings. 
 
Others perceive a possible conflict with more classical ideas of what science and 
research should be.  This is often based on the ideal of the disinterested natural 
scientists. Many researchers hesitate when asked to give concrete policy advice, often 
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on the grounds that it is the task of policy makers to do so – researchers shall only 
supply the factual base for this decision-making.  
The neutrality of the researcher 
There is also the idea that researchers should stay neutral in political matters, and that 
their objectivity may be threatened if they engage in the development of policy 
instruments. This understanding is based on traditional views of the ideal university 
researcher as a person that stands on the outside of society, looking in, giving the 
necessary corrections to ‘manoeuvring politicians’ and ‘predisposed policy makers’.40  
 
The policy makers are presumed to be too immersed in the complexities of social 
leadership to get the overview needed to make unbiased judgements. And interestingly 
enough, when policy makers commission research from researchers, it is often to get an 
independent view and a more refined understanding of the problem at hand. An 
independent review may also give political legitimacy. 
 
There may indeed be a possible conflict between the need for dialogue and 
understanding between policy makers and researchers on the one hand and academic 
independence on the other. This conflict must be taken seriously and should be 
discussed thoroughly.  
Our experience indicate, however, that it is very hard – if not impossible – to uphold the 
ideal of the isolated observer.  Not only are researchers – like all human beings – 
influenced by ideological trends and personal preferences, ambitions and prejudices, 
they also need a close dialogue with the users in order to understand the commission, 
and to produce relevant and useful research.  As we have seen, this dialogue is also 
needed to strengthen the learning processes in the political apparatus.  
 
There is, on the other hand, a danger that researchers may be “held hostage” by policy 
makers that deliberately or unconsciously try to influence results in a way they find 
useful, for instance in order to legitimise a certain policy. Policy makers may also 
interpret results in a certain way in order to achieve political goals.   
 
There may also be instances when the researchers have their own political agenda or 
when they consciously or unconsciously try to please the commissioners in order to get 
more funding. Hence it is essential that applied research of this kind uphold the same 
methodological and ethical standards as other forms of science and research. One must 
make certain that there exist several alternative research institutions or environments 
studying related fields, so that there might be fruitful discussions and scholarly 
criticism. 
 
Several policy makers have argued to us that researchers should be careful suggesting 
one – and only one – policy solution. The complexity of both innovation systems and 
political systems gives reason to believe that there are no optimal solutions to specific 
policy problems. There is rather a wide array of various combinations of possible policy 
instruments and organisational structures. When asked for concrete policy advice, it is 
probably better that researchers map possible avenues of action and give an analysis of 
potential consequences following the various alternatives. It can be useful to give 
                                                 
40 Often called the “Weberian ideal” after the German sociologist Max Weber. 
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examples from other countries, these policy makers argue, although one should always 
discuss the main similarities and differences between the relevant national innovation 
systems.  
 
As there is no single solution that can be objectively characterised as “the best”, it must 
eventually be up to the policy advisers and policy makers to use their experience, 
expertise and faculty of judgement to suggest concrete policy instruments. The 
researcher has the luxury of withholding his or her final judgement arguing that there is 
need for more research. It is the task of the policy maker to make decisions, in spite of a 
lack of knowledge. 
Systemic failures in the policy apparatus 
Even if researchers and policy makers in the field of innovation policy have succeeded 
in developing a common frame of reference and are able to discuss these matters in a 
constructive and useful manner, there remains another stumbling block for the 
development of a modern and flexible innovation policy.  This is the struggle that takes 
place within the policy apparatus. 
 
The political system consists of a large number of institutions, organisations and 
ministries. Each institution is divided into various departments, and each of them may 
have their own culture, ideology and policy, and each of them will normally be 
dominated by one rationality.  Several of the RISE interviewees pointed to the 
importance of the leaders of the relevant departments; their interests, opinions, contacts 
and psychology. In a small organisation one person may to a certain extent shape the 
development of policies within its own field of interest. The researchers often 
communicate with lower or medium level civil servants and policy advisers. Whether 
the managers of these units absorb and make active use of the competences in the 
organisation depends on their ability to communicate with the rest of the staff. 
 
These managers must also be able to explain the policies suggested by this unit to 
managers and politician higher up in the system.  If there is a struggle for influence and 
funding going on inside the organisation, the fate of a policy instrument may rest on the 
manager’s ability to convince the upper echelons of its usefulness. 
 
Policy instruments based on systemic innovation theory often conflict with traditional 
macroeconomic thinking and research policies.  The manager cannot take a common 
frame of reference for granted. The struggle for influence will therefore often become a 
struggle to establish a new worldview and a new vocabulary. From a didactic point of 
view this is a very difficult task, especially as the senior managers and political leaders 
often are older, experienced men and women.  Through a long life they have developed 
their own perspective and their own ways of doing things, and they can find it hard to 
abandon this rationality in favour of new and seemingly radical ideas.   Even if they do 
accept the new way of thinking, they may avoid using arguments based on these 
theories in fear of loosing the struggle for money and influence. 
 
There may also be a conflict with other departments and organisations that are not 
involved in innovation policy formulation.  This is particularly the case in the central 
government.  In the annual budget cabinet meetings, the ministers will have to convince 
his or her colleagues about the wisdom in funding their particular policy instruments. 
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Although it seems that the success of a certain policy to large degree rests on the 
competences of individual managers, their competences are interconnected with the 
competence flows in the policy system. The preliminary studies made by RISE and 
GoodNIP may indicate that there are large differences between organisations as well as 
countries in this respect. It seems, for instance, that the culture of Norwegian, Danish 
and Swedish ministries are characterised by a rather “flat” command structure, meaning 
that junior civil servants and policy advisers can communicate with the managerial level 
in a fairly efficient way. This means that the competences developed in co-operation 
with researchers more easily will reach the political level of the system. 
 
Moreover, innovation policy is not that politically or ideologically charged in these 
countries.  There seems to be a broad consensus as regards the overall policy goals.  
This leaves more room for civil servants to suggest and implement new policy 
measures. Nordic R&D and industry policies are increasingly based on innovation 
systems theory and this development is to a large degree based on bottom up initiatives, 
i.e. the new policy instruments has often been based on suggestions made by the 
bureaucracy, not by the parties or the politicians. 
 
In other countries, like Germany, policy development is to a larger extent characterised 
by a top down culture.  This may restrict the flow of new ideas from research and lower 
level civil servants. On the other hand, politicians may induce the shock embedded 
agent networks need in order to assimilate new rationalities. The Norwegian strategy for 
a new holistic innovation policy is partly based on a top-down initiative, as is the 
establishment of the new Danish super-ministry for research and innovation. 
 
Technopolis and the University of Ottawa have made several interesting observation 
regarding the organisation of innovation policy governance in a recent report.41 Patries 
Boekholt, Erik Arnold and the other researchers note that although integration and co-
ordination are high on the agenda few countries have actually found good governance 
solutions to cross the boundaries between science and innovation policy, between the 
sectoral policy domains and between disciplinary organised funding agencies. They 
note however, that “co-ordination seems easier to achieve when there is extra money, or 
where those involved have other strong incentives to co-operate.” 
 
There are probably several reasons for this.  The supply of additional funding or “fresh 
money” probably makes actor networks less defensive or more experimental. They 
suddenly have the room to be more daring as well as forgiving vis-à-vis their 
“competitors”. As for “strong incentives to co-operate” these may be interpreted as 
shocks to the system, being that an economic crisis followed by an intense search for 
new solutions or a new ambitious minister with a different view of reality.  
 
If high level policy makers and politicians perceive that important institutions have 
grown stale and conservative, they may also induce such a shock by implementing 
institutional reforms.  This was partly the reason for the unification of the Norwegian 
research councils in 1993 – the existing institutions seemed incapable of effective co-
operation – and the present “Quality Reform” of the Norwegian university and college 
sector. The success of such reforms rests on the ability to keep the competences present 
                                                 
41 Boekholt 2002. 
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in the system, while at the same time reshuffle the staff to the extent that the old actor 
networks are broken up.  According to the Technopolis evaluation of the Research 
Council of Norway, the 1993 reform failed in this respect. The old research councils to 
a large extent survived as departments in the new Council.42 
Differences between the Nordic countries 
Although there are great similarities as regards policy learning in the Nordic countries, 
there are also profound differences.  We will point our readers to the historical 
expositions in the GoodNIP reports for more information on this aspect. 
 
Iceland is in a special situation in that the country is so small.  Often one person will 
have to take the responsibility shared by scores or even hundred of persons in other 
countries.  The RANNIS representative in the GoodNIP team is for instance responsible 
for Iceland’s participation in quite a number of international organisations and working 
groups, especially in the OECD and the EU.  These are functions that are divided 
between several civil servants from ministries and agencies in the other Nordic 
countries. 
 
The advantages of having such a small policy system is that cross-department 
communication may become easier.  Given that several functions are literally embodied 
in one person, it is also easier to integrate various policy fields.  On the other hand these 
persons are put under a lot of pressure.  They do not have the time for in depth studies, 
and they often lack the number of colleagues needed for proper discussions. Nor does 
Iceland have the same type of advisory research based institutions as the other countries 
(cf. VINNOVA and STEP). 
 
The Finish case is special in that Finish innovation policies changed drastically at the 
beginning of the 1990’s due to the loss of the markets in the former Soviet Union.  This 
shock to the innovation policy system clearly reduced the resistance of several actor 
networks, and paved the way for an OECD inspired systemic innovation policy. Dr. 
Erkki Ormala, the chairman of the OECD Working Group for Technology and 
Innovation Policy (TIP) did, for instance bring home some of these new perspectives. 
That being said, many of the conflicts presented above, also remains in Finland. 
Moreover, it seems that the ability to change is not so apparent now that the crisis is 
over. 
 
The other Nordic countries have not faced the same crisis as Finland, which means that 
many of the older rationalities have a much stronger position. Moreover, it seems that 
some policy systems are beginning a process of going beyond the most significant 
dichotomy, the one between the macroeconomic rationality and the systemic.  Instead 
the systemic approach – which has now become the established one - is enriched with 
new perspectives, especially from the entrepreneurship tradition. 
 
To give one example: In the late 1990’s Denmark saw a change in rationality within the 
political establishment. The large technology programmes of the 1980’s ended after a 
                                                 
42 Eric Arnold et. al.: A Singular Council, Evaluation of the Research Council of Norway, Technopolis, 
December 2001.  
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few years without a clear sense of direction. Policymakers began to focus on the 
importance of small and new firms and their role in the innovation system. New 
innovative firms were seen as a key factor in the knowledge intensive economy, which 
had to be supported.  
 
Consequently a number of science parks emerged where small innovative firms could 
grow and form networks with other small high-tech firms. This entrepreneurship 
rationality went much further and defined several programmes providing funding for 
start-up companies. The focus of the programmes is to promote new technology by 
providing funding.  
 
The current Danish research and innovation policy has evidence of both the systemic 
and the entrepreneurship rationality. The government focuses on the development of a 
Danish knowledge system consisting of firms, knowledge institutions, and framework 
conditions for entrepreneurs. Moreover, this new integrated way of thinking includes 
the holistic approach we also find in Norway and Sweden. Maybe we are facing a new 
“holistic” rationality where the goal is to use more parts of society to stimulate 
innovation and competitiveness. In this perspective the new rationality actually has 
some resemblance to the planning rationality where a central core  functions as drivers 
for welfare development.  
The world beyond  
Our studies of innovation policy system development have shown us that sound 
innovation policy advice not only depends on a proper understanding of the industrial 
innovation system. The researchers must also gain insight into the nature of the system 
of policymaking, its institutional structure, its culture and social framework. Like 
companies and clusters, this is also an arena for learning and innovation, although the 
policy makers are operating under different ‘market conditions’ than company managers 
and employees. 
 
It should also be said that in one respect this system of policy making is actually part of 
the overall national system of innovation.  This does not only apply to public 
institutions for R&D, financial support and innovation services. It also applies to the 
political and administrative apparatus that design these policy instruments. Their 
understanding and their decisions may have a profound impact on the working 
conditions of firms. 
 
We therefore believe that innovation research should increasingly focus on “innovation 
policy innovation”.  Hopefully, this note can function as a starting point for such 
studies. 
Policy recommendations 
GoodNIP proposes that all relevant ministries and agencies develop strategic plans for 
policy learning, plans that include: 
 
• Concrete measures for life-long learning 
Policy institutions should make active use of workshops, sabbaticals, courses 
and other forms of training. There should be exchanges of employees for a 
limited period of time, so that policy makers may learn to know other 
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institutions more intimately. Furthermore, there should be implemented more 
radical recruitment policies, in order to avoid the clone problem (leaders 
employing people sharing the same rationality only) and in order to get a more 
even distribution as regards age, gender and educational background. 
 
Moreover, policy learning should be made an obligatory part of work 
descriptions and employment contracts, and the institutions should identify the 
resources that are to be allotted to such learning. 
• Strategic use of participation in international organisation like the Nordic 
Council, the OECD and EU, and in international conferences.  
It is important to distribute the participation between more policy makers, so that 
more of them get the benefit from international experience and learning.  
International travels should not be seen as a fringe benefit for senior civil 
servants, but should be used as a tool for the training of new employees. It is 
important that the experience gained by these policy makers is shared with 
others. 
• The establishment of new forms of cross-organisational working groups. 
Informal networks are an important part of policy learning, but they cannot be 
the only form for co-operation across departmental and organisational borders. 
High level forums are important tools for making the necessary policy decisions, 
but will often not give the necessary room for in depth discussions and extended 
policy learning. One way of improving such communication is to establish ad 
hoc or permanent medium to low level working groups given the concrete task 
of producing policy analysis and recommendations.  Not only may such working 
groups lead to policy learning by themselves, they also contribute to lower the 
fences between institutions. 
• The establishment of social arenas. 
It has been said that the most important part of any conference or work shop is 
the coffee breaks. During intermissions and meals delegates learn to know each 
other.  They gain useful information and establish new venues for 
communications. Policy organisations should be encouraged to use this 
phenomenon actively.  One way of doing this is to arrange common conferences 
for several departments or institutions.  One should see to it that the arrangement 
takes place at a distance from the ordinary work place and that there is ample 
time for social interaction. 
• Coherent plans for the commissioning of innovation research and 
evaluations.  
In all the Nordic countries the authorities make active use of evaluations and 
commissioned reports. However, this is often done on an ad hoc basis, without 
taking the needs of other relevant policy institutions into consideration. In some 
areas – but not all – it will therefore make sense to coordinate such commissions 
in a better way. It is also important to systemize the use of already existing 
evaluations and reports and see to it that they are distributed to all relevant 
policy makers. 
• Closer interaction with relevant research institutions. 
Research institutions should not be understood as “report factories” that can 
produce policy advice on a totally independent basis. Innovation policy research 
institutions should indeed uphold the standards of unbiased and critical research, 
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but they cannot gain an understanding of policy development without a close 
interaction with policy makers. Such interaction will also gain policy makers, as 
they are more easily kept up to date on the latest developments in innovation 
theory, methodology and research. 
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3. Nordic Innovation Indicators 
By Rannveig Røste and Per Koch 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of indicators of relevance to 
innovation policy in the Nordic countries. It is important to keep in mind that although 
the five Nordic countries are similar in many respects, there are also historical, 
economical, cultural, political and structural differences. These indicators can therefore 
not be used as a “soccer league table” for picking out winners and losers. A weak 
performance in one indicator, may have a perfectly sensible explanation, and does not 
necessarily imply policy failure. 
 
There are some additional tables in the statistical annex at the end of this report (tables 
marked A). 
Structural and Macroeconomic Indicators 
The Nordic countries consist of five states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden – and three autonomous territories – the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland. 
The Faroe Islands and Greenland are both part of the Kingdom of Denmark, while 
Åland is part of the republic of Finland. In this report we will normally not treat these 
three autonomous territories separately43.  
Population density 
With a population of only 24.4 million distributed at a total area of 3.5 million square 
kilometres, the Nordic countries show one of the lowest population densities in the 
world. The low density is primarily due to the fact that large parts of the Nordic 
countries consist of marginal areas, where natural conditions make extensive 
settlements impractical or extremely expensive.44 
 
Table 1.1: Population in thousands in 1990 and 2000 
Country 1990 2000
Denmark 5135 5330
Faroe Island 47 46
Greenland 56 56
Finland 4998 5181
Åland 25 26
Iceland 256 283
Norway 4233 4478
Sweden 8591 8883
Source: Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
 
                                                 
43 In some of the background statistic in chapter one, distinct data for Farao Island, Greenland and Åland 
are included. In the rest of the statistical report these territories are included in the data for, respectively, 
Denmark and Finland. 
44 Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
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The general low number of inhabitants45 could imply a relatively low production 
capacity compared to more densely populated countries. However, most modern 
economists do not consider this a problem. The present internationalisation and the fact 
that all countries are part of the EEA area, mean that one might just as well consider 
these countries regions in a larger European area. Manpower and business partners are 
available, if one is willing to go beyond national borders.  
 
What’s even more important is that these countries can present a very high educational 
level, and the lack of manpower is therefore partly compensated by the fact that the 
countries have very skilled workers. The generally high income levels and cost of living 
means that many companies will find it hard to compete on prices. On the other hand, 
they may compensate for this by making high quality products with a high “knowledge 
intensity”, but also in more traditional industries. 
Education 
The companies’ ability to innovate rests on their ability to learn.  The companies’ ability 
to develop relevant competences is dependent on the employee’s ability to learn. Their 
ability to learn is again based on a wide variety of factors, including their work 
experience, the cultural setting, work organisation and leadership. One of the most basic 
elements, however, is the presence of relevant education.  What is relevant and what is 
not can be discussed. In a constantly changing economy “learn how to learn” is just as 
important as any factual knowledge. That being said, the presence of good educational 
institutions is of outmost importance in any innovation system. 
 
The OECD and EUROSTAT educational attainment data presented here derive from 
National Labour Force Surveys. The classification used is the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED-97)46. This classification system covers both the 
level and the field of education47. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the educational 
attainment in the Nordic countries, in grouped levels. 
 
In all the Nordic countries comprehensive education is compulsory and local authorities 
finance these schools through general grants from the state. Most young people enter 
some forms of continued training after nine to ten years of compulsory schooling. 
Compared to other OECD countries the number of people taking tertiary level education 
(i.e. the university/college level) is relatively high. 
 
                                                 
45 For statistical use, however, a very low population number as in Iceland can result in statistical errors 
regarding the distribution of the normal curve if the response rate or registered data is low. 
46 For detailed notes see the OECD publication: Classifying Educational Programmes, Manual for 
ISCED-97 Implementation in OECD Countries, Edition 1999. 
47 Levels are numbered 0-6, where level 0 covers pre-primary education, level 1 primary or the first stage 
of basic education and level 2 lower secondary or the second stage of basic education. Level 3 covers 
upper secondary education and typically begins at the end of full-time compulsory education, and level 4 
covers post-secondary non-tertiary education. Level 5 covers tertiary education, and level 6 advanced 
research qualifications at the doctorate level.  
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Figure 1.1: Educational attainment of the population, 200148 
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Source: OECD 2002: Education at a Glance 
 
When comparing the Nordic countries one must take into account the different 
educational systems and the fact that some types of education are difficult to place. 
These factors might account for some of the differences in the share of population 
obtaining a certain level of education.  
 
Level 5 of the ISCED-classification (i.e. tertiary education) is further subdivided into 
tertiary-type A (5A) and tertiary-type B education (5B). The tertiary-type A education is 
largely theory-based and designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to 
advance research programmes and professions with high skill requirements. Tertiary-
type B programmes focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry 
into the labour market, and are shorter than those of tertiary-type A. 
 
For tertiary education type-B in the OECD countries the country mean is 8 per cent, and 
on average 15 per cent of the population has attained education of tertiary type-A or 
level 6 (doctorate level)49. Among the Nordic countries, Denmark has the highest 
educational attainment for tertiary education type-B with 19 per cent and Norway the 
lowest with 3 per cent. However, the picture is reversed for tertiary type-A where 
Norway has the highest on 26 per cent and Denmark the lowest on 8 per cent. 
 
A detailed statistical overview of graduates of the two tertiary types is presented below 
in table 1.2.  
 
                                                 
48 Distribution of the population of 25 to 64 years old, by highest level of education attained, table A.1.1 
in the Statistical Annex. Magnitude for pre-primary and primary education is either negligible or zero for 
Denmark and Finland, and for post secondary non-tertiary education for Finland and Sweden. Data for 
Norway is from 2000. 
49 See table A.1.1 
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Table 1.2: Tertiary graduates, by field of study and level of education, 200050 
field of study type Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden OECD 
Education A 1 8,2 24,8 22,7 18,8 13,2
 B 19,2 0,3 6,4 a 4,9 13
Humanities and arts A 23,6 12,4 13 7,2 5,7 12,6
 B 2,2 4,2 14 5,5 6,3 7,6
Social sciences, business A 44,7 23,5 28,4 22,1 21,6 33,5
and law B 7,9 22,1 47,5 51 14,6 25,8
Services A 0,3 2,6 n 3,3 1 2,5
 B 5,4 16,9 n 5,2 14,3 9
Engineering,manufacturing A 8,9 24 7,1 6,8 20,5 13,2
and construction B 12,4 19,5 n 14,9 23,3 14,7
Agriculture A 3,2 2,3 0,7 1,4 1 2,3
 B 1,1 1,5 n 0,1 7,1 2,4
Health and welfare A 5,5 19,3 15,3 25,3 22,8 11,5
 B 49,2 31,5 n 1 8,9 18,8
Life sciences A 4,2 1,9 4,9 1,2 2,3 3,1
 B n a n n 0,1 n 
Physical sciences A 4,3 2,7 2,1 1,4 2,4 3
 B n a n a 0,1 n 
Mathematics and A 1 1 0,5 0,3 0,6 1,1
statistics B n a n a 0,2 n 
Computing A 1,8 2,2 3,3 3,3 3,1 3,1
 B 2,7 4 32,2 21,6 20,5 6,8
Not known or unspecified A n n a 4,9 n 0,9
 B 0,1 a a 0,7 a 0,9
Source: OECD 2002: Education at a Glance 
 
The table shows a similar distribution pattern of various disciplines and topics in all the 
Nordic countries. In all these countries the highest share of students at the tertiary level 
is in social sciences, business studies and the law. All countries also have a high score in 
health and welfare. In 2000 Sweden and Finland show a high proportion of graduates in 
engineering, manufacturing and construction, while Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 
computing, Denmark, Finland and Iceland in humanities and art and Finland and 
Sweden in services. All the Nordic countries show low scores in physical science plus 
mathematics and statistics. 
 
The low scores in physical science and mathematics may lead to competence deficits in 
some high tech industries, which are why several of the Nordic countries have 
implemented programmes and measures aimed at making young people – and especially 
women – select such studies.  
 
However, for an SME perspective the situation is far from bleak. Competences in the 
fields of social science, law, the humanities, health and welfare are also useful in the 
business sector, partly because these people have a general competence base that may 
be adapted to various purposes, and partly because most SMEs operate outside the high 
tech sector. 
                                                 
50 Annotation a:Data not applicable because the category does not apply, n: magnitude is either negligible 
or zero. 
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Labour market 
The labour market data presented below originate from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). ILO derives the population into three parts: the employed and the 
unemployed constitute the labour force, and the third part is those outside the labour 
force. Those outside the labour force are, in addition to the retired and the disabled, 
young people in the educational system and those engaged in work without 
remuneration.  
 
The employment rates presented in table 1.3 are calculated by the number of people in 
the labour force between the ages of 16 and 64. 
 
 Table 1.3: Employment rates in the labour market in 200151 
Employed, 2001  Unemployed, 2001 
Country in thousands as a percentage in thousands as a percentage 
Denmark 2691 77 136 5 
Finland 2350 68 238 9 
Åland 13 78 0 2 
Island 153 87 4 2 
Norway 2236 78 83 4 
Sweden 4239 75 175 4 
Source: Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
 
Finland had the lowest employment rate and Iceland the highest in the Nordic area in 
2001. Finland has the highest unemployment rate, 9.2 per cent, far above the 
unemployment rate in the other Nordic countries. In all the Nordic countries the 
unemployment rates have dropped since 1995. This also applies to Finland. The only 
exception is Sweden where figures first began to drop in 1998.  
 
At the moment of writing it seems that unemployment rates are on the rise again, partly 
as result of the international economic development. From an innovation policy point of 
view it should be noted, however, that since the late 1990’s the main problem for many 
Nordic companies has not been the high unemployment rate, but the fact that they find it 
hard to find experts with competences in specific areas. This has, in some respects, led 
to higher wages and higher costs for the companies involved.  
 
Although it is hard to predict the future competence needs of industry as well as society, 
this clearly shows that education must be an integrated part of innovation policy 
development. By producing a sufficient number of candidates in particular disciplines 
and technologies, the authorities will help companies developing the competences 
needed for future innovation. 
Industrial structure 
The labour market structures of the Nordic countries have changed considerably over 
the recent decades. There has been a shift away from the agrarian and industrial sectors 
to the service sector and a large public sector. The number of employed in the 
                                                 
51 Data are collected at national statistical institutes; data from Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden are 
all collected as labour force survey data. Finland: annual average, data includes Åland. Åland: 2000 data. 
Sweden: the original data is published in hundreds.  
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agricultural sector is declining, while for all other sectors employment is rising, 
particularly within the sectors of finance, insurance, real estate and business services.52  
 
Table 1.4 shows that this pattern is found in all the Nordic countries. Mining, 
manufacturing, electricity and water, however, still employ a larger part of the labour 
force in the Nordic countries than finance, insurance, real estate and business services. 
At the Faroe Islands agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing are still important 
industries.  
 
Table 1.4: Employed by industry in thousands and in percentage, 200153 
Industry Denmark Farao Is. Finland Åland Iceland Norway Sweden
Total 2668 30 2350 13 153 2278 4239
In percentage of total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing 3 13 6 7 7 4 2
Mining, manufacturing, electricity 
and water 17 17 21 10 16 15 18
Construction 6 5 6 6 7 7 6
Wholesale, retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 18 13 15 13 19 18 15
Transport and communication 7 8 7 19 6 7 7
Finance, insurance, real estate, 
business service  13 12 13 8 13 12 15
Services 35 31 32 32 32 38 37
Unknown 0 1 0 5 0 0 0
Source: Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
 
Moreover, the employment statistics hide the fact that fishery and aquaculture are 
important and profitable industries in the Icelandic and Norwegian economies. The fact 
that the number of employees is relatively low, does not mean that an industry is passé 
or on its way to the dung heap of history. It might just as well mean that the industry has 
succeeded in innovating, thus reducing production cost and the need for manpower. 
 
Hence it is important to avoid oversimplified views of the historical and economical 
development of the Nordic countries. There are, for instance, valid arguments for the 
Finish investments in information and communication technologies, but that does not 
mean that the Finns should stop investing in their forestry industry. Traditional 
industries with a low employment rate, but with high profitability, may lead to the 
development of service industries serving this particular industrial cluster. Moreover, 
the surplus may also lead to thriving local communities with new companies serving the 
needs of the people. 
Access to communication technology 
The Nordic countries are in front as regards the implementation and use of information 
and communication technologies. Computers, the internet and mobile phones have 
                                                 
52 Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
53 Data are collected at national statistical institutes. Finland: labour force survey data, annual average. 
Finnish data includes Åland. Åland: 1999 data. Iceland: labour force survey data. Norway: employed 
includes people aged 16-74, annual average. Sweden: labour force survey data. 
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opened up new channels of communication. In the 1990s information and 
communication technology made its entry into a large share of Nordic homes. 
 
Table 1.5: Access of individuals to communication technology at home in per 
cent in 200254 
Comm.tech. Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Computer 77 63 74 76 75 
Internet 61 53 73 61 68 
Mobile phone 80 94  93 89 
Source: Nordic Information Society Statistics 2002; Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
 
The Nordic countries show, however, some differences regarding the profile of 
individuals’ access to communication technology equipment at home. Finns have a 
lower degree of home access to computers and thereby to the Internet than people in the 
other Nordic countries. Iceland has the highest proportion of the population with 
Internet access at home55.  
 
Data indicates that around 90 per cent of the population in the Nordic countries have 
access to a mobile phone, with the exception of Denmark, where the figure is 80 
percent. The mobile phone has become an expected tool in these countries.56  
 
The high penetration of computers, the Internet and mobile phones is important from an 
innovation policy perspective. The fact that people see computers and mobile phones as 
an obvious part of their lives means that they know how to use this technology. This 
makes it easier for companies in any sector to make use of advanced ICT solutions in 
their production. An ICT savvy population is also a new market a market for Web 
services, Internet shopping, SMS services, ring tones etc. By using their own inhabitants 
as a testing ground, Nordic companies should be able to get a head start in the global 
markets. 
 
Then of course, there is the fact that the Nordic countries have some of the major ICT 
companies in the world, Nokia and Ericsson included. These companies provide jobs 
and revenue in their own right, but also functions as customers and suppliers, thus 
becoming important nodes in the innovation system. 
                                                 
54 Data has been collected as a survey in Denmark, Finland and Sweden in 2002, data from Norway is 
from a media use survey in 2001 and Iceland from an Eurobarometer; Gallup Europe in 2001. Data for 
Iceland on access of individuals to computers is from Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002. There is no 
available data for access of individuals to mobile phones in Iceland. 
55 However, although the table shows that 73 per cent of the Icelandic has access to the Internet, the 
Nordic Statistical Yearbook shows that 67 per cent has access to the Internet. Comparing the data from 
these two sources still indicates a similar pattern: Iceland has a high proportion of the population with 
access to the Internet at home, but Sweden ranks highest in the Nordic Statistical Yearbook.  
56 Compared to the access of a regular phone or computer, it can be argued that “access at home” has a 
different meaning in the case of mobile phones. A mobile phone is a personal communication invention 
implying that other persons in a home do not have access to it in the same way as an access to a home 
phone or computer.  On the other hand the topic of the survey was ‘access to’, and one can also have 
access to mobile phones owned by other members of the households.  
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Quality of life, GDP, income levels and tax burden 
The Nordic countries are among the richest nations in the world. Given that wealth of 
these proportions is dependent on a solid knowledge base, the countries are clearly 
doing something right.  
 
The UN Development Programme publishes a so-called Human Development Index, 
which combines statistics on several indicators – adult literacy, average years of 
schooling, life expectancy and income levels – to give a better indicator of human 
development. It is far from perfect, but enlightening all the same. 
 
Here is the ranking of the Nordic countries, compared to a few comparable nations:57 
 
Rank Country Score 
1 Norway 93.9 
2 Sweden, Australia and Canada 93.6 
5 Belgium 93.5 
6 The US 93.4 
7 Iceland 93.2 
8 Netherlands 93.1 
9 Japan 92.8 
10 Finland 92.5 
11 France, Luxembourg and Switzerland 92.4 
14 United Kingdom 92.3 
15 Denmark, Austria and Germany 92.1 
 
 
The gross domestic product (GDP) is a much used indicator in the comparison of 
capacity and efficiency of countries.  
 
GDP is here presented as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). A comparison of prices 
between countries can never be entirely correct because of the instability in exchange 
rates and differences in purchasing power. PPP is a method that tries to equalize price 
levels across countries. This method also present problems, but will nevertheless give a 
more correct picture of GDP development. In this report national currency data have 
been converted to US$ using PPP. The PPP are those developed by the OECD National 
Accounts Division updated for the most recent years by comparing the growth in prices 
in each country with that in the United States58. 
 
                                                 
57 The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2003, p.28. The index is scaled from 0 to 100. Countries 
scoring over 80 are considered to have high human development. 
58 For further details see sections III and IV of National Accounts of OECD countries, Volume 1, 1989-
2000, OECD 2002 and Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures – 1999 Benchmark Year, 
OECD 2002. 
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Figure 1.2: Gross Domestic Product, GDP in million current PPP$59 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Generally GDP is an unsuitable indicator for comparing nations, because GDP is a 
measure of total production. It does not take regional, social or industrial differences 
into consideration. Additionally, when comparing the Nordic countries it is important to 
bear in mind that the oil and gas revenues lead to a very high GDP in Norway. 
Nevertheless, due to similarities in the social and economic structure of the Nordic 
countries it is possible to use GDP as a background indicator in mapping innovation 
policy at national level60. 
 
The overall picture shows that the Nordic countries have a high GDP compared to other 
OECD countries.  When comparing the Nordic countries there are only small 
differences in disposable income. Sweden, Finland and Denmark show lower disposable 
income level per capita than Iceland and Norway. 
 
Table 1.7: Disposable income per capita at current PPP$s, 200061 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden OECD62 
Disposable income per capita  15468 14951 17120 18728 13851 14590
Source: OECD 2002: Main Economic Indicators 
 
On average Nordic salaries are higher than in many other OECD countries, leading to 
higher costs for companies. However, in general people with higher education have 
relatively lower wages than competing economies, which should give many Nordic 
companies a competitive advantage. If well educated labour is “cheap”, it should be 
easier for these companies to hire the kind of people that can contribute to more 
advanced learning and innovation processes. 
 
The tax burden of the Nordic countries is relatively high. To a certain degree the Nordic 
welfare model, in which many services are financed by general taxes, especially social 
security and welfare services, is reflected in the level of taxes. However, this tax burden 
                                                 
59 See table A.1.2 
60 The statistic presented from OECD in this report uses a GDP deflator from the OECD National 
Accounts database updated for the most recent years by Secretariat projections of changes in the GDP 
deflator, published in OECD Economic Outlook, except in the case of Norway where a deflator excluding 
trends in petroleum prices has been used. 
61 Data for Finland is for 2001 
62 This is not an official OECD average, but an estimate made by the authors. 
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must be compared with the services given to companies, both directly as government 
support to companies (innovation policy measures, grants etc.) and indirectly as social 
services provided to their employees and their local communities. 
 
Figure 1.3: Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP,199963 
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Source: OECD 2002: Trends in Tax Burdens and Tax Structures 
 
Resources for research and development  
Traditionally research and development (R&D) has been considered the most important 
source of innovation. Some even interpret the word “innovation” to mean “R&D”.  As 
noted elsewhere in the GoodNIP reports, R&D is not the only way of innovating. 
Companies innovate by small incremental improvements of products, processes and 
services. They innovate by acquiring and implementing new tools and new machinery, 
and they innovate by gaining new knowledge from suppliers, customers and various 
partners. In many industries R&D is not the major means of innovation, nor should it 
be.  For many companies it makes perfectly sense to focus their efforts on 
organisational change, design, branding or marketing. 
 
That being said, R&D is important. In many industries companies have to invest in 
R&D to survive.  Moreover, they have to perform their own research, not only in order 
to create new inventions, but also because the R&D process is a learning activity.  The 
employees gain important knowledge through the research process, competences that 
can be used beyond the concrete research project itself. 
 
R&D is also important in the innovation system as a whole.  Even companies that do 
not do their own research will make use of R&D based machinery, technology or 
knowledge, and the country needs research environments that are able to find, 
understand and make use of science and technology developed elsewhere. That is: 
Nordic industry need knowledge institutions that can function as bridges to the 
international scene. These knowledge institutions may be large, R&D intensive 
companies, universities and colleges or institutes and laboratories. Hence although 
companies may innovate without investing in R&D, the innovation system as a whole 
cannot. 
 
                                                 
63 See table A.1.3. Data for 1999 are provisional; data for OECD total is from 1998. 
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The investments in research and development (R&D) have increased considerably in all 
OECD-countries during the last decade. The Nordic countries show a quite similar 
R&D tendency, although there are some differences.64  
GERD as a percentage of GDP and per capita 
Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) is the standard expenditure measure 
covering all R&D activities carried out on national territory in the year concerned.  
 
Figure 2.1: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as percentage of 
GDP, 200165 
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Source: NIFU 2003; OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Finland and Sweden show the highest levels of total capital investment in R&D as a 
percentage of GDP, and Norway the lowest. However, it can be argued that the GERD 
as a percentage of GDP is a difficult indicator to use in that it does not take into account 
differences in the sizes of GDP nor the different industrial structure of countries.  
 
As pointed out above Norway has a very high GDP due to oil revenues. This affects the 
GERD as percentage of GDP negatively. Norway does, however, also rate lower than 
the other Nordic countries as regards GERD per capita (see figure 2.2), which clearly 
                                                 
64 The data presented here from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators reports for 2000, 2001 
and 2002 have been collected and presented in line with the standard OECD methodology for R&D 
statistics. See: The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities: Proposed Standard Practice 
for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development – Frascati Manual 1993 (OECD). Most R&D 
data are derived from retrospective surveys of the units actually carrying out or “performing” R&D 
projects. The indicators presented, except for GBAORD and the patent-data, are based on the sum of 
performers’ reports of their R&D expenditure and personnel on national territory (i.e. excluding payments 
to international organisations and other performers abroad).The indicators on GBAORD and patens are 
based on R&D reported by the funding ministry or agency and include payments to international 
organisations and other performers abroad. The specification of these two sets of R&D data varies 
significantly and the two types of data should not be combined. Some detailed national specifications may 
vary, though all OECD countries generally collect and report R&D in line with the “Frascati Manual”. 
These differences are generally too small to affect the general indicators. The Secretariat has made a 
number of estimates to fill gaps and to bring series up to date; by using simple statistical routines or 
information from national publications and observations of trends. Data points where such estimates 
exceed 25 % of the zone total have been suppressed. The zone totals for GBAORD data are however 
essentially arithmetic totals of the available national data, because of the difficulty in forecasting R&D 
budgets. 
65 See table A.2.1 in the Statistical Annex. Finland and Iceland are estimates. Data for OECD is from 
1999 and is a secretariat estimate or projection based on national sources. 
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indicates that Norway does indeed invest less in R&D than Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden.  
 
Figure 2.2: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) per capita in NOK, 
200166 
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Source: NIFU 2003 
 
When comparing expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP from 1991 to 2001 we 
find that the percentages have gradually increased in all the Nordic countries (table 2.1). 
The only exception is Norway where the expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP 
has been stable, and has even declined  as it did from 1999 to 2001.  
 
Table 2.1: GERD as a percentage of GDP 1991-200167 
Country 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Denmark 1,64 1,74 1,84 1,94 2,09 2,43
Finland 2,04 2,17 2,29 2,72 3,22 3,4
Iceland 1,17 1,35 1,56 1,86 2,37 3,01
Norway 1,64 1,82 1,7 1,64 1,65 1,62
Sweden 2,79 3,27 3,46 3,67 3,78 4,28
Source: NIFU 2003 
 
In Iceland and in Sweden, the increase in R&D investments shows significant jumps 
upwards. This may be explained by considerable increases in some few business 
enterprises focus on R&D in 2001; the biotech company deCODE genetics in Iceland 
and Ericsson and ABB in Sweden. Correspondingly, preliminary data for 2002, shows a 
considerably decline in GERD as a percentage of GDP in Sweden by probably as much 
as one percentage point. This is mainly due to reduced R&D investments by these 
particular companies68. This is a clear illustration of the liability of these data. In 
Iceland, Finland and Sweden there are a few high tech companies that alone may 
change the national level of R&D investments. 
 
Countries like Denmark and especially Norway are not to the same extent dependent on 
one or two R&D intensive companies to ensure high R&D investments levels, but then 
again this also means that general R&D expenditure is lower. Especially Norway has an 
                                                 
66 Data is given in Norwegian crowns, 1 EURO=7,8 NOK (exchange rate at 10.04.2003). See table A.2.1 
in the Statistical Annex, where also GERD per capita in PPP$ for 1999 is given. 
67 Estimates for Iceland and Finland for 2001. 
68 Unpublished data from Vinnova. 
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industrial structure dominated by small companies in industries that do not invest much 
in R&D regardless of where they are situated in the world.  
GERD per source of finance and performing sector 
R&D expenditures are normally divided into five sources of finance; industry or 
business enterprises, public government funding, the higher education sector, private 
non-profit institutions and funding from abroad. The funding from the sector for higher 
education and private non-profit institutions is very small and has been combined as 
“other national sources” in figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage of GERD per source of finance, 199969 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
R&D is mainly funded by national sources in the Nordic countries. In Iceland however, 
as much as 14 per cent of R&D is financed by foreign sources.  
 
Industry is the main financial contributor in Sweden, Finland and to a less degree in 
Denmark and Norway. The government is the main source on Iceland. 
 
Domestic R&D measures as expenditure and personnel, is divided into three sectors of 
performance: industry or business enterprises, the sector of higher education and the 
government sector.70   
 
                                                 
69 See table A.2.2 in the Statistical Annex. Denmark: the sum of the breakdown does not add to the total. 
Finland: Private-non profit institutions are included in the Government sector in non-survey years, and 
higher education sector includes central university hospitals. Sweden: funding from the Public Research 
Foundations were classified as funding from the private non-profit sector until 1997, after considered as 
funding from the government sector. OECD: secretariat estimate or projection based on national sources 
and data is not included for percentage of GERD financed abroad. 
70 OECD also operates with a fourth category: private non-profit organisations (i.e. charity and voluntary 
organisations). Percentage of GERD performed by this sector in the Nordic countries is however low, see 
table A.2.3 
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of GERD performed by sector, 200171 
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Source: NIFU 2003; OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
In all the Nordic countries the major sector for R&D performance is the business 
enterprise sector. The higher education sector appears as the second most important 
sector for R&D activities, except in Iceland where the government sector perform a 
more significant part. 
 
It should be noted though, that Norway has a different institutional structure for R&D 
than the other Nordic countries. In Norway the research institute sector performs one 
fourth of the total R&D activities72. “Research Institutes” is a generic term of R&D 
performing institutions primary serving industry, the public sector and non-profit 
associations73.   
Researchers and R&D personnel 
Resources can also be measured in terms of the total numbers of researchers74 and R&D 
personnel devoted to research and development activities (figure 2.5). Personnel data 
are expressed in full-time equivalents (FTE) on R&D, a person working half-time on 
R&D activities is counted as 0.5 person years. 
 
Researchers are traditionally responsible for the knowledge production in the R&D 
process and the exploitation of the results, but other knowledge workers in management, 
production and services are also considered to be of growing importance. If you add the 
researchers and this additional group, you get what statisticians call “total R&D 
personnel”.  
 
However, given that a large number of companies do not perform their own research, 
but innovates all the same, it is clear that counting the number of researchers of R&D 
personnel give you only part of the innovation policy picture.75 
                                                 
71 See table A.2.3 in the Statistical Annex. Norway: R&D performed by research institutes directed 
against the industry is involved in the business enterprise sector. Sweden: private non-profit institutions 
included in the Government sector. OECD: data is from 1999 and is a secretariat estimate or projection 
based on national sources, data originally includes private-non-profit sector. 
72 Norges forskningsråd 2001 
73 For further reading: Wiig og Mathisen 1994; Brofoss 1996; Norges forskningsråd 2001 
74 Research scientists and engineers include the occupational groups ISCO-2 (Professional Occupations) 
and ISCO-1237 (Research and Development Department Managers). See the Frascati Manual (OECD 
1993). 
75 European Commission 2002: Towards a European Research Area. Science, technology and innovation, 
Key Figures 2002. 
 90 
Resources for research and development [Part 3] 
 
Figure 2.5: Researchers and R&D personnel per thousand total employment, 
199976 
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Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
The total numbers of researchers in all the Nordic countries are around 10 FTE per 
thousand employees, except for Denmark, which reports six researchers per thousand 
totally employed, equalling the OECD average. Finland shows a high proportion of 
higher education researchers as a percentage of national total, and Iceland a high 
proportion of government R&D personnel.  
 
Figure 2.6: Researchers distributed at the Business Enterprise, Higher 
Education and Government sector, as a percentage of national total, 199977 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
The numbers of business enterprise R&D personnel as a percentage of national totals 
are, quite high for all the Nordic countries. One interpretation is therefore that the 
business enterprise sector is the main employer for R&D personnel in the Nordic 
countries. The numbers indicate that this is particularly so in Sweden, and to a lesser 
degree in Iceland. This fits the numbers for performing sectors above. 
 
                                                 
76 See table A.2.4 in the Statistical Annex. Sweden: the national totals of R&D personnel and researchers 
are underestimated as data for the private non-profit sector are missing. OECD: secretariat estimate or 
projection based on national sources, data not available for R&D personnel. 
77 See table A.2.5 in the Statistical Annex. Data for Norway on government researchers includes other 
classes: R&D performed by private non-profit institutions. 
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Table 2.2: R&D personnel in Business Enterprise, Higher Education and 
Government, 199978 
Countr
y 
Business 
Enterprise 
R&D 
personnel 
(FTE) 
Business 
Enterprise R & 
D personnel 
as a 
percentage of 
national total 
Business 
Enterprise R & 
D per 
thousand 
employment 
in industry 
Higher 
Education 
R&D 
personnel 
(FTE)  
Government 
R&D 
personnel 
(FTE)  
Denmar 21022 59 12 8017 6236
Finland 27818 55 17 14840 7454
Iceland 961 40  712 645
Norway 13308 52 10 7313 4779
Sweden 44171 66 18 19175 3195
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
HERD 
The Higher Education Sector has had an increasing importance for the R&D in the 
Nordic countries in the 1990s.79 The Higher Education Sector performed one fifth of 
GERD in the Nordic countries in 1999 (see figure 2.4).    
 
The share of total Higher Education R&D (HERD) carried out in 1999 still amount to a 
small percentage of GDP in all the Nordic countries (figure 2.7).  
 
Figure 2.7: Higher Education Expenditure on R&D, HERD, as a percentage 
of GDP, 1999 80 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
However, all the Nordic countries are above the average in OECD. Among the Nordic 
countries there are small differences in HERD as a percentage of GDP. Denmark, 
Iceland and Norway have an almost equal proportion, Finland somewhat higher, while 
the percentage of Sweden is by far the highest.  
 
                                                 
78 Data is not included for business enterprise R&D personnel per thousand employed in industry in 
Iceland, data for Norway on government R&D personnel includes R&D performed by private non-profit 
institutions. 
79 OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators; Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
80 See table A.2.6 in the Statistical Annex. The data is underestimated as all R&D carried out in hospital 
departments at the university-hospitals is included in the Government sector. Data for total OECD is 
secretariat estimate or projection based on national sources 
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Calculated in million current PPP$, the spending on HERD is almost equal in Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. Sweden shows the highest spending also here. 
 
Figure 2.8: Higher Education Expenditure on R&D, HERD, in million current 
PPP$ 199981 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators  
 
As shown in figure 2.3 a very small amount of GERD is financed by the Higher 
Education sector in the Nordic countries. Industry and government are the main 
financial sources of R&D in the Nordic countries.  
 
In 1999 industry financed only a small part of HERD in the Nordic countries. 
Government remains the main supplier of R&D funds in this sector. 
 
Table 2.3: Percentage of HERD financed by industry, 199982 
Country 1999
Denmark 2,1
Finland 4,7
Iceland 9,2
Norway 5,1
Sweden 3,9
OECD 6,1
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
However, between the Nordic countries there are noticeable differences as to whether 
industry finances HERD. In Iceland 9.2 percentage of HERD is financed by industry, 
while in Denmark only 2.1. According to the OECD average, industry finance less 
HERD in the Nordic countries than what is the average in the OECD area. 
 
Public expenditure on education 
There is no available data on how the expenditure on R&D is distributed in the Higher 
Education Sector in the Nordic countries. Total public expenditures on education in the 
Nordic countries are presented in table 5.1. These numbers give some indication as 
regards the Governments’ role in the education sector as a whole. 
 
                                                 
81 See table A.2.6 in the Statistical Annex and methodological comments under footnote 39. 
82 Data for Denmark: the sum of the breakdown does not add to the total. OECD: secretariat estimate or 
projection based on national sources. 
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Table 2.4: Total public expenditure on education, 199983 
 
Public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of total public 
expenditure 
Public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
Primary, 
secondary 
and post-
secondary 
non-
tertiary 
education 
Tertiary 
education 
All levels of 
education 
combined 
Primary, 
secondary 
and post-
secondary 
non-tertiary 
education  
Tertiary 
education 
All levels of 
education 
combined 
Denmark 8,7 4,3 14,9 4,8 2,4 8,1
Finland 7,6 4,2 12,5 3,8 2,1 6,2
Norway 9 4,2 15,6 4,3 2 7,4
Sweden 8,9 3,7 13,6 5,1 2,1 7,7
OECD 8,7 2,8 12,7 3,5 1,2     5,25,2
OECD 2002: Education at a Glance 
 
Regarding all levels of education combined, the Nordic countries have a quite similar 
public expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure on education and as a 
percentage of GDP. Finland shows, however, some lower score than the other countries. 
There are almost no differences between the Nordic countries’ public expenditure on 
primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education as well as tertiary 
education. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden all show a higher proportion of 
public expenditure on primary, secondary and post-secondary education than tertiary 
education. 
 
The Nordic countries have invested heavily in education, and especially higher 
education. Needless to say, these investments will have effect on the innovative 
capabilities of firms, basically because innovation is based on learning, and the 
companies’ ability to learn rests on the “absorptive capacity” of their employees. 
Although “learning by doing” – i.e. practical work experience – is the most targeted 
form of learning in industry, the educational foundation is nonetheless very important.  
At school and in universities and colleges students learn the basic tenets of their trade, 
fundamental scientific and technological principles as well as relevant “facts”.  
Moreover, they learn the tools of the trade; they learn how to learn, for instance by 
doing their own research. 
 
The research performed at the universities must be understood within this framework. 
University and college research has two objectives: To lay the foundation for advanced 
student learning and to contribute to the general advancement of knowledge in society. 
Both are important from an innovation policy view. 
                                                 
83 The education system is classified after ISCED (see chapter 1). The Public expenditure presented in 
this table includes public subsidies to households for living cost – which include subsidies for living costs 
and other private entities – as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total public expenditure, by 
level of education and year. Data is not available for Iceland. 
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GBAORD or government investments in R&D 
Government budget appropriations or outlays for R&D (GBAORD) is one way of 
measuring government support to R&D activities – indicating how much priority 
Governments give to publicly funding R&D activities. 
 
The data on Government budget outlays on R&D are collected by national authorities 
using budgets statistics. This essentially involves identifying all the budget items 
involving R&D and measuring or estimating their R&D content. The estimates are 
based on reports by the funding ministry, generally covering federal or central 
government only. These data are therefore less accurate than “performer-reported” data. 
On the other hand, as they are derived from the budget they can be linked back to policy 
issues by a classification of “objectives” or “goals”.  
 
The classification used is one specially developed at OECD for R&D analysis, and is 
compatible with similar classifications used by the EC and by the Nordic countries.84  
 
Figure 2.9: Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D 
(GBAORD) as a percentage of GDP, 199985 
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Source: Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
 
Calculated as a percentage of GDP the government in Sweden spent most on R&D in 
the Nordic countries in 1999, the government in Norway spent the least. 
 
However, total government budget appropriations or outlay on R&D shows that Norway 
spent almost as much as Denmark in 1999 and 2001, and that the country is not too far 
behind as regards government support to R&D as the GBAORD as a percentage of GDP 
figures indicate. On the other hand, from 1999 to 2001 there was a decline in both 
Norway and Iceland. 
 
                                                 
84 The assembling of budget items result in an allocation of socio-economic objectives on the basis of 
intentions at the time the funds are committed and not the actual content of the projects concerned. These 
breakdowns reflect policies at a given moment in time. For further details see: Main Science and 
Technology Indicators OECD 2002 
85 See table A.2.7 in the Statistical Annex. 
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Table 2.5: Total Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D 
(GBAORD) in million current PPP$86 
Country  1999 2001 
Denmark  1067 1143 
Finland  1280 1342 
Iceland  101 85 
Norway  980 950 
Sweden  1576 2018 
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Given that all the Nordic countries aim at increasing their total R&D investments, all 
these governments encourage industry to invest more in R&D.  This certainly makes 
sense, as industrial R&D investments not only affect the companies directly involved, 
but also other companies by various spill-over mechanisms. A product invented by one 
company may, for instance, lead to increased productivity among its customers.  The 
competences developed by one company may enrich others by means of technology co-
operation, human mobility etc. As a matter of fact, market near R&D of this kind can 
also benefit university research, which may make use of technology or methods 
invented in the private sector. 
 
However, one should be careful not to think of R&D as one unified concept. Company 
R&D cannot normally replace university research.  They are of different kinds. 
Company R&D is often short term and market oriented. University research is on the 
other hand supposed to have a more long term horizon. Terms like “researcher driven” 
or “curiosity driven” have been used. An important objective for this research is to 
interact with the educational responsibilities of these institutions. Students need a broad 
basic training that go beyond the immediate market-driven needs of a company, partly 
because of the need to acquire a fundamental understanding of scientific and 
technological principles, and partly because the technological reality may have changed 
by the time the students reach “the real world”. 
 
This is important, because a more superfluous reading of these statistics may imply that 
a country that invests relatively much in R&D need not worry about national R&D 
investments. Actually, there could be a serious systematic instability if these 
investments are dominated by one form of R&D, whether this form is defined by a 
discipline, branch of industry or institutional type.  
 
The Finns have invested heavily in R&D in the field of information- and 
communication technologies. This may indeed have been a sensible choice, given the 
country’s need for new industries and new markets after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and no one can argue with success.  However, Finland’s “knowledge economy” has also 
become very vulnerable.  If Nokia experiences the same fate as Ericsson the Finish 
                                                 
86 Data for Denmark in 2000 and 2001 are a break in series with previous year for which data is available 
because the method of assessing GBAORD changed; in 2000 GBAORD was changed to include 
provincial funding of R&D in hospitals and funds from the Danish National Research Foundation and the 
VaekstFonden. Finland: funding from external sources of the State research institutes are excluded from 
Government appropriations, data covers central university hospitals. Data for Iceland in 2000 and 2001 
and for Norway in 2001 are provisional. Funding from the Public Research Foundations is excluded from 
the GBAORD data. 
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R&D adventure will suffer a momentous backlash. Hence it makes sense for them to 
diversify. 
 
The Swedes have focused their public R&D activities in their university/college sector. 
This also makes sense, as it easier to integrate basic and applied research in this way. 
There is a problem, though. The universities have overreaching objectives that go 
beyond industrial development. This is reflected in a culture that has to reward scholarly 
achievements more than on-time innovation and market orientation. This makes it 
difficult for at least some of these milieus to co-operate with companies, and especially 
SMEs. This strong focus on university research and technological development also 
means that Sweden may underestimate the need for other forms of innovation. 
 
The Norwegians have, on the other hand, developed a large sector of market oriented 
institutes for applied research, institutes that more easily can function as bridges 
between basic science and industry. These institutions may also more easily understand 
how to integrate R&D activities into other forms for innovation. The fact that such a 
sector exists, means that the Norwegian authorities need not to the same extent as other 
countries encourage university/industry relationships. By making the universities more 
like the institutes, Norway may actually risk weakening the unique quality of the 
universities, while at the same time undermining the competitiveness of the institute 
sector. 
 
One general observation is that the innovation system must be understood as a whole. In 
many branches of industry companies actually do not have to perform their own R&D 
or invest in R&D in order to innovate. However, they must have access to companies 
and institutions that know where to find, understand and make use of new R&D based 
technologies. In some areas large R&D intensive companies may become such 
“competence-nodes” in the systems, serving smaller companies through supplier-
customer relationships. This observation can be used as an argument for support of not 
only small and medium sized companies, but also larger companies, if needed. 
 
In other areas public institutions will have to take this role. If an economy lacks R&D 
intensive industries and companies, it would make sense for the government to 
compensate for this lack of R&D investments. However, this must primarily be research 
of direct relevance to the companies in questions.  
 
Norway, and to a certain extent also Iceland and Denmark, lack the large industrial 
locomotives of the Swedes and the Finns. This can be used as an argument for 
increasing the public investments in R&D significantly. However, if the main objective 
of this expenditure is to compensate for small industrial investments, this research must 
be of direct relevance to the companies in question.  
 
Another way of increasing the total expenditure on R&D in these countries is to develop 
a policy aiming at changing the overall industrial structure, i.e. replacing low tech with 
high tech R&D intensive industries. However, by doing this one risks making R&D the 
overall policy objective and not sustainable development or increased welfare. As long 
as industries are profitable and provide work and taxes, we see no reason for 
transferring these resources to new types of enterprises, provided, of course, that 
government take care to support the general development of competences in the 
country. 
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Innovation in industry 
Information on R&D performed in the Business Enterprise sector covers private and 
public enterprises R&D activity, and R&D related activity purchased from institutes 
performing such activity.  
BERD, business enterprise investments in R&D 
Figure 3.1 presents the total Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP 
in the Nordic countries. 
 
Figure 3.1: Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D, BERD, as a percentage 
of GDP, 199987 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Sweden shows the highest BERD as a percentage of GDP of the Nordic countries, and 
has as Finland also a higher BERD as a percentage of GDP than the OECD average. 
Denmark is found right under the OECD average, while Iceland and Norway has a quite 
low BERD as a percentage of GDP. The pattern is repeated when BERD is calculated as 
a percentage of value added in industry (figure 3.2). 
 
                                                 
87 See table A.3.1 in the Statistical Annex. Data for Sweden is underestimated or based on underestimated 
data; full coverage of SMEs might add about seven percentage points to BERD. OECD: secretariat 
estimate or projection based on national sources and data is missing for BERD as a percentage of value 
added in industry. 
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Figure 3.2: Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D, BERD, as a percentage 
of value added in industry, 199988 
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
4,50
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
 
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
As noted above, these differences are mainly caused by the fact that Sweden and 
Finland have more large, high tech companies, i.e. companies that by definition invest 
much in R&D. Iceland, Norway and to a certain extent Denmark have economies 
dominated by branches of industry that are less inclined to invest in R&D. 
 
In the Nordic countries R&D in the Business Enterprise sector is mainly financed by 
Industry itself (figure 3.3). In Sweden the Government finance 8 per cent of Business 
Enterprise R&D, in Norway 10 per cent and in Iceland only 2 per cent. In Iceland, 
however, as much as 21 per cent is financed from abroad, while in Finland and Sweden 
almost no R&D is financed from abroad. 
 
The Higher Education sector and Private Non-profit institutions are not financing R&D 
in the Business sector in the Nordic countries. 
 
Figure 3.3: Percentage of BERD per source of finance, 199989 
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Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
Number of innovators 
Eurostat90 indicate that relatively few enterprises in the European Union are able to 
build on innovative products, services and processes in order to remain competitive, 
gain new market shares and become major actors in the marketplace.  
                                                 
88 See table A.3.1 in the Statistical Annex, and methodological comments under footnote 26. 
89 See table A.3.2 in the Statistical Annex. 
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It should be noted that Eurostat has registered the number of innovative enterprises and 
not the number of innovations. Innovative enterprises are here those enterprises that 
have successfully implemented a new product, process or service new to the firm, but 
not necessarily new to the enterprise’s market, the country or the world.  
 
The very act that defines an enterprise as an innovator is therefore the launch of a 
product or service that is different from those previously offered by the enterprise, or 
the introduction of a new or modified production process.  
 
It can be argued that these statistics show innovation activity based on a traditionally 
view of innovation as a linear process; from an idea originating in specialized R&D 
departments carried through commercial exploitation, production, marketing and sales. 
Innovation is rather a complex activity involving all parts of firms and other actors in 
society in a reciprocal interaction, i.e. as a systemic process. However, this complexity 
generates a general problem in measuring innovation.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
90 Eurostat (2001): Statistics on Innovation in Europe. Data 1996-1997. Data are collected through the 
second Community Innovation Survey (CIS2). CIS is a coordinated action of the European Commission, 
the OECD and EEA Member States designed to obtain information on technological innovation. The first 
CIS were developed between 1991 and 1993, and was jointly initiated and implemented by Eurostat and 
the Innovation Programme (now under Enterprise DG). The survey aims at facilitating the accurate 
measurement of innovation activities at the enterprise level. Based on the experience gained during the 
first CIS, Eurostat, Enterprise DG and EEA Member States decided to launch a second round: CIS2 in 
1997-1998. All the participants agreed on a common set of methodology on a pan-European scale; based 
on a revised version of the Eurostat/OECD Proposed guidelines for collecting and interpreting 
technological innovation data: the ‘Oslo manual’. The statistical unit in CIS2 is the enterprise. The 
breakdowns between different economic activities are following the structure of European nomenclature 
of economic activities (NACE). Data for Iceland are not included in the Eurostat statistic, but are included 
from Statistic Island in the research report Science and Technology Indicators for the Nordic countries. 
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Table 3.1: Number of innovative enterprises in percentage, 1994-1996 
  Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden CIS2 
 Manufacturing sector 71 36 34 48 54 51
NACE Manufacturing sector, classified by line of business    
15-16 Food, beverages and tobacco 73 25 29 47 38 50
17-19 Textile and leather 55 37 25 45 45 35
20-22 
Wood, pulp and paper, 
publishing and printing 70 30 26 36 45 45
23-24 
Coke, nuclear fuel, chemicals 
and man-made fibres 93 61 40 76 61 70
25-26 
Rubber and plastics, other 
non-metallic mineral products 63 44 50 54 57 51
27-28 
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 58 31 35 43 41 48
29-          Machinery and equipment 80 41 83 64 73 68
30-33 
Electrical and optical  
equipment 88 51 66 65 75 69
34-35 Transport equipment 85 36 30 44 58 56
36-37 Manufacturing etc. 60 22 33 51 59 48
40-41 Electricity, gas, water supply 48 19 50 24 23 35
 Service sector 30 24 38 22 32 40
NACE Service sector, classified by line of business   
51- 
Wholesale, trade and 
commission trade 27 15 28 18 29 34
60-62 Transport 13 16 13 5 19 24
642- Telecommunications 100 79 100 56 51 65
65-67 Financial intermediation 48 28 56 44 56 54
72- 
Computer and related 
activities 89 63 69 50 55 68
742- Engineering services 36 31 56 38 47 55
Source: TemaNord 2001 
 
The CIS-results are based on answers from more than 37 000 enterprises (Icelandic 
results not included). The response rates vary from 24% to over 90%. The Danish 
response rate is very low, only 28%, and the Danish estimates are therefore very 
uncertain. Conclusions concerning the Danish figures should therefore be drawn with 
caution. 
 
According to table 3.1 Denmark has a much larger share of innovating enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector than the other Nordic countries (although this may be due to a 
statistical fluke). Finland and Iceland have the lowest share, while Norway and Sweden 
is on the CIS average. In all the Nordic countries the numbers of innovators are lower in 
the service sector than in the manufacturing industry. In Denmark and in Norway the 
proportion is more than two times higher in the manufacturing sector than in the service 
sector. 
 
However, as also Eurostat91 comments, it would be misleading to conclude that the 
service sector is not innovative. In general, there are problems in measuring innovative 
                                                 
91 Statistics on Innovation in Europe, data 1996-1997, Eurostat theme 9 Science and Technology. 
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activity in firms in the service sector, because innovative activity are most often not 
singled out in separate R&D divisions. Rather, innovation takes place in many different 
parts of the organization, developing product, process, organization and market 
innovations either incrementally or by recombination. Innovative activities are in fact to 
a large extent conducted in these parts, but the term “R&D” is not normally used for 
these activities. Innovation in the service sector is therefore underreported.92 
 
All the Nordic countries show innovation activity in the category covering coke, nuclear 
fuel, chemicals and man-made fibres, the category containing machinery and 
equipment, the class containing electrical and optical equipment, the telecommunication 
category as well as in computers and related activities.  
 
The table also shows variations between the Nordic countries. In Denmark, and to a 
lesser degree in Sweden, the share of innovating enterprises is high in all industries. In 
Finland only coke and chemicals is distinguished noticeably from the other industries. 
In Iceland the machinery and equipment sector and in Norway the firms categorized 
under “coke, nuclear fuel, chemicals and man-made fibres” are particularly innovative. 
 
The number of innovators (i.e. innovative companies) is a basic indicator of the 
innovation activity in a sector. This statistic provides a general idea of the propensity to 
innovate, but fails to measure the complexity of the innovation process. The question 
“how many have been innovating” is answered unsatisfactory, because the statistic does 
not say anything about the intensity or the quality of the innovations. Particularly, it 
does not indicate whether the innovations are minor adjustments, substantial 
improvements or completely new revolutionary products. Especially, this is a problem 
in measuring innovative activity in the service sector. Services are not that standardized 
as manufacturing products. It is therefore more difficult to judge whether the service 
product is new or just an adaptation to fit the need of one customer.  
 
In addition, the innovative enterprises can either introduce a new or substantially 
improved product or process on the market. Table 3.2 shows number of product and 
process innovators as a percentage of enterprises in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Table 3.2: Number of product or process innovators as a percentage of 
enterprises in manufacturing sector, 199693 
Country All innovators 
Product 
innovator
Process 
innovator
Product 
innovator only 
Process 
innovator only
Denmark 71 58 51 19 13
Finland 36 30 25 11 7
Norway 48 35 40 8 13
Sweden 54 48 38 17 6
Source: Eurostat 2001, Statistics on Innovation in Europe. 
 
The two types; product and process innovations, are often interrelated. But the data 
available, however, do not permit an analysis of any relation between product and 
process in the innovation studied. Therefore, an enterprise may have introduced a new 
                                                 
92 See i.a. Hauknes 1998; Broch 1999 
93 Data are not available for the service sector. Data for Iceland is not included. See methodological 
comment to table 3.1 and under footnote 29. 
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product and developed a new process without any connection to the specific product. 
The finding implies, however, that the majority of enterprises that innovates on products 
also tend to innovate on process. 
 
The tendency is that pure product innovations outnumber pure process innovators in the 
Nordic countries, yet not in Norway, where there is a higher proportion on pure process 
innovators. This is due to the fact that Norwegian industry is dominated by companies 
that focus on the development of processes used by others. In Denmark the numbers are 
relatively high for both types, while Sweden has a quite high proportion of pure product 
innovations. 
 
The industrial structure is also reflected in the size of the innovative companies. In 
Finland and Sweden, for example, over 70 per cent of the innovation activity is carried 
out in enterprises with 500 or more employees, while in Iceland only 5 per cent. 
R&D and differences in industrial structure 
The propensity to innovate is higher in large firms than in small firms (figure 3.4), 
except for Iceland where the pattern is the totally opposite. In Norway the proportion is 
almost 50/50, while in Sweden the proportion of large firms that reported they were 
innovative were almost twice as high as for small firms. 
 
Figure 3.4: Total business R&D broken down by size classes of firms as a 
percentage of million PPP$, 199994 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Den Fin Ice Nor Swe
500 or more
Fewer than 500
 
Source: OECD 2001: Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
 
A comparison of the Nordic countries must take into account that the industry sectors 
dominating the national R&D expenditures is not the same for all countries, and that the 
countries industry structures differ in size (see table 1.3 employed by industry in 
thousands and in percentage). 
 
Table 3.3 shows R&D intensity at industry level for each country in 1997. R&D 
intensity is here defined as BERD as a percentage of value added.  
                                                 
94 See table 3.3. in the Statistical Annex. Data are based on a mini-questionnaire launched in 1997. The 
data were subsequently updated for the Meeting of the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy 
(CSTP) at Ministerial level held in June 1999 and again in May 2001 for the publication OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2001. Data for Denmark is from 1998, excludes institutes and the 
lower cut-off point is 6 employees, data for Norway is from 1995 and excludes institutes and total 
manufacturing and mining only, while data for Sweden has a lower cut-off point on 50 to 99 employees. 
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The classification of BERD indicates that there are pronounced differences in R&D 
intensity, both between the Nordic countries and inward across industries.  
 
There are however some similarities between the Nordic countries. The R&D intensity 
is very high in pharmaceuticals and electro equipments and relatively high for office 
accounting and computing machinery as well as for instruments. 
 
The differences between R&D intensity across industries in each country can give the 
result that a country appear as R&D intensive, even if the intensity is limited to one or 
two particularly industries. 
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Table 3.3: R&D intensity at industry level, BERD as a percentage of value 
added, 199795 
  Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Nordic 
countries
 Total industries 1,9 2,66 1,2 1,34 4,35 2,73
NACE Industry       
1-5+10-
14 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and mining 0,03 0,29 0,7 0,32 3,04 0,42
15-16 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 1,53 2,05 2,08 1,09 1,76 1,58
17-19 Textile, fur and leather 0,3 1,82 2,31 1,94 1,09 1,2
20- Wood and cork 0,3 0,69 0 0,63 0,54 0,57
21-22 Paper, printing, publishing 0,21 1,58 0 1,09 3,08 1,89
23-24 
Coke, ref. petrol and 
chemicals 6,01 7,15 5,69 4,98 4,27 5,48
244- Pharmaceuticals 33,13 19,32  41,74 52,55 41,82
25- 
Rubber and plastic 
production 2,31 6,2 2,11 3,78 4,31 4,09
26- 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 0,76 2,18 0,92 1,78 3,08 1,89
27- Basic metals 0,99 2,32 0,82 5,29 3,19 3,17
28- Fabricated metals 0,41 2,69  1,11 1,78 1,56
293- 
Machinery for farming and 
forestry  5,31 14,14 0 5,24 15,45 10,23
29- Other machinery, nec 7,57 6,79  7,75 9,72 8,33
30- 
Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 13,58 15,02  16,75 19,38 16,8
31- Electrical machinery 3,2 12,78  4,99 6,48 7,2
32- 
Electro equipment (radio, 
TV and communication 23,35 31,83  55,83 39,61 35,92
33- Instruments 12,32 12,34 0 8,1 19,54 15,48
34-35 
Ships, aerospace, other 
transport  1,41 5,68 1 2,78 25,71 15,95
36-37 Other manufacturing 5,29 2,52 0,72 0,47 0,94 2,79
40-41 Electricity, gas and water 0,31 1,57 0,07 0,15 0,93 0,73
45- Construction 0,05 0,36 0,08 0,16 0,52 0,28
5,6,7,8,9 Services, other industries 1,17 0,5 1,37 0,98 0,86 0,89
Source: TemaNord 2001 
 
Patent Data and Bibliometric Indicators 
Patent data 
A patent is a document determining intellectual property right relating to an invention in 
the technical field. This must be a novel technical invention, involving an inventive step 
and that is capable of industrial application.  
 
                                                 
95 Data based on ANBERD 2000, MSTI No. 1 2000, National Account Statistics and computations made 
by the Danish Institute for Studies in Research and Research Policy. 1 means here that Iceland is not 
included because of lack of data at a sufficiently detailed level. 
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Patents have two fundamental functions: to publish the content of an innovation and to 
give the inventor the sole rights to the development and commercializing. A patent may 
be granted to a firm, an individual or a public body by a national patent office, and is 
valid for a limited period – generally 20 years.  
 
Patent data are widely used as statistical indicators. This is caused by the close 
relationship between patenting and innovative output, and because patents are rich 
sources of information. Patent data are also readily available at marginal costs at the 
national and regional patent offices.  
 
There are however certain drawbacks with the use of patent data as an indicator of 
innovation. Many inventions are not patented because the propensity to patent and the 
patent regulations differ across industries and countries. Changes in patent laws over 
time also make it difficult to analyse trends over time. Patents are also used to prevent 
competitors’ access to the invention. Besides, the inventions that are patented hold no 
information on the differences in value-contribution to the society.  
 
The lack of information about the heterogeneity is however a general problem with 
statistical data. A more distinctive problem is that there is no standard method of 
calculating indicators from patent data, with the result that the analytical and policy 
lessons that can be drawn from patent statistics diverge widely.96 
 
In table 4.1 total patent applications on national territory in the Nordic countries in 1997 
are presented. The figures distinguish between applications by residents of the country 
concerned and applications from non-residents.  
 
Table 4.1: Patent applications, 1997 
Country 
National patent 
applications 
Resident patent 
applications 
Non-resident 
applications 
Denmark 84335 1339 82996 
Finland 83944 2390 81554 
Iceland 26298 22 26276 
Norway 30165 1210 28955 
Sweden 88537 4192 84345 
Source: OECD 2000/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Applications from non-residents dominate the patent applications statistic in all the 
Nordic countries. The majority of these are continuations of patent applications 
originally applied for in other countries97.  
 
Iceland and Norway have a relatively lower number of non-resident applications. This is 
partly because of a different industrial structure and market, and because of differences 
in patent laws. In resident patent applications it is only Sweden that shows a 
considerable higher number than the other countries in resident patent application.  
 
                                                 
96 Norges Forskningsråd 2001; OECD 2002: Science Technology Industry Review No. 27. 
97 Norges Forskningsråd 2001 
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The European Patent Organisation (EPO) examines patent applications for 19 European 
countries. When granting a patent, the rights of the inventions are protected in those 
European countries assigned in the application. The EPO data therefore indicates how 
many applicants want to protect their invention in more than one member country.  
 
In comparing the Nordic countries it is important to be aware of that Iceland and 
Norway are not members of the EPO, and the numbers are not representative for the 
total number of patens in these two countries. Patent data from EPO are nevertheless 
presented here to compare the distribution in the three other countries. 
 
The numbers of patent applications to EPO in the information technology (ICT) sector 
and in the biotechnology sector are given in figure 4.1 and 4.2.98 The propensity to 
patent inventions in these high-technology industries is considered more probable than 
in lower technology industries.  
 
Figure 4.1: Number of patents in the ICT sector, applications to the EPO, 
199799 
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Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of patents in the biotechnology sector, applications to the 
EPO, 1997100 
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Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
                                                 
98 reference year is year of filing 
99 See table 4.1 in the Statistical Annex. 
100 See table 4.2 in the Statistical Annex. 
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These figures indicate that Finland and Sweden has a much higher number of patens in 
the ICT sector than the other countries (which is to be expected, given the presence of 
Nokia and Ericsson), and that Denmark, and to a less degree Sweden, have a higher 
number of patents in the biotechnology sector – even though the number in total is not 
very high.  
 
Using patent data as an indicator on innovation, a complete picture should be given of 
the patent activity classified by country of origin, industry and time. In order to illustrate 
this, we present patent applications in Norway according to country of origin and 
industry in 1993-2000. 
 
Table 4.2: Patent applications in Norway according to country of origin and 
industry, 1993-2000 
Country Electrical 
Instru-
ments 
Chemicals, 
Pharma-
ceutics 
Process 
industry 
Mechanical 
industry 
Consumer 
goods 
Construction 
and building Total 
Total
in 
per 
cent 
Denmark 52 95 375 93 156 29 76 880 2
Finland 557 87 184 158 193 100 109 1393 3
France 279 325 1331 326 340 69 192 2886 6
Japan 306 108 913 116 148 28 27 1668 4
Netherlands 95 167 516 143 156 27 193 1306 3
Norway 1069 1126 794 858 3347 1097 1508 9824 21
Britain 311 264 1108 281 375 55 240 2653 6
Switzerland 117 179 861 172 401 64 85 1892 4
Sweden 735 332 530 425 517 127 257 2931 6
USA 949 1629 5791 1223 1062 251 1353 12357 26
Other 
countries 855 760 3881 1091 1348 334 616 8959 19
Total patent 
applicants 5325 5072 16284 4886 8043 2181 4656 46749 100
Source: Research Council of Norway 2001 
 
As the table shows there are more patent applications in total numbers from USA in 
Norway than patents with Norwegian origin. This is because of an extremely high 
number of patent applications from enterprises in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry in the USA. Other unspecified countries also have a high number of 
applications in this industrial category. Of the patent applications with Norwegian origin 
most of them are in the mechanical industry. In comparing the Nordic countries, Finland 
and Sweden have relatively high numbers of patent applications in the electrical 
industry, and Denmark in chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  
 
Except from giving a close view of the Norwegian patent data, the contribution of this 
table is that it illustrates that it is difficult to use patent data as an innovation indicator in 
comparing the Nordic countries – because of differences in industrial structure, 
corporate strategies, institutional practice, patent laws etc. 
Bibliometric Indicators 
Bibliometrics is a set of analytical concepts and methods for measuring the regularities, 
the structure, the dynamics, the performance and the institutional setting of written 
knowledge production in the research system. Bibliometrics is also a tool for situating 
the research efforts of a country in relation to the world, the research of an institution in 
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relation to other institutions and the research of scientific groups in relation to their own 
communities.101 
 
The basic information unit in bibliometrics is the scientific paper. Scientific papers are 
registered and catalogued in international databases which can be used for bibliometric 
purposes.  
 
Data presented here derives from Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). ISI holds 
aggregated publishing- and citation numbers classified by special fields. 
 
There are distinctive differences in scientific production between countries. In the 
period from 1981 to 2000 USA had about 30 per cent of the scientific production in the 
world, while Britain, Germany and Japan had between 7 and 8 per cent of the 
production102. Figure 4.3 shows the development of scientific papers as a share of the 
scientific production in the world in four Nordic countries, counting number of 
scientific papers in each country according to the sum of scientific papers.  
 
Figure 4.3 Scientific papers as a share of the scientific production in the world, 
1981-2000103 
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Source: Norges Forskningsråd 2001 
 
Among the Nordic countries Sweden appear as the most research-intensive one. The 
research intensity in Sweden, Denmark and Norway has however been quite stable 
during the period from 1987 to 2000. Finland shows an increase in the number of 
scientific papers as a share of the scientific production in the world.  
 
Many scientific papers are written by more than one author. The consequence is 
therefore that the number of scientific papers becomes higher in the bibliometric data 
than the real number of scientific papers. 
 
Another way to estimate the number of publications is the number of scientific papers 
per thousand inhabitants. Figure 4.3 shows scientific papers per thousand inhabitants in 
the Nordic countries in the period 1981 to 1985 and from 1996 to 2000.  
 
                                                 
101 Okubo 1997 
102 Norges Forsningsråd 2001 
103 See table A.4.3 in the Statistical Annex 
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Figure 4.4 Scientific papers per thousand inhabitants, 1981-85 and 1996-
2000104   
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Source: Norges Forskningsråd 2001 
 
The scientific production in scientific papers per thousand inhabitants have increased 
considerable in all the Nordic countries in the period 1996 to 2000 compared to the 
period from 1981 to 1985. The number of periodicals included in the database is, 
however, extended in 1996 to 2000.   
 
Sweden has the highest number of scientific papers per thousand inhabitants, and 
stands, together with Finland, for a significant increase in production of scientific papers 
from 1981 to 2000. Despite the fact that Iceland has the highest increase. Iceland shows 
however still the lowest number of scientific paper per thousand inhabitants, and is on 
the level with Norway. 
 
In analysing bibliometric data it is important to be aware of that publishing pattern 
varies between different fields. Physics, chemistry, biology and clinical surgery have the 
highest publishing numbers, while social science and humanistic science have low 
publishing numbers. Disciplines like geology, a Norwegian favourite, are 
underrepresented, as are non-English publications. In comparing countries it is also 
important to be aware of differences in industrial structure and differences in R&D 
intensity, as in the use of pattern data.  
 
A general observation can be that bibliometrics as well as patent data should be used 
with the outmost care when measuring the temperature of a knowledge economy. Again 
it is important to remember that these indicators measure research output, not 
innovation output in the broad sense.  
Entrepreneurial activity 
Another indicator measuring the innovation activity in a country is the total 
entrepreneurial activity (TEA). The TEA index presents the per cent of the labour force 
that is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the owner or manager of a 
business less than 42 months old. 
 
                                                 
104 See table A.4.4 in the Statistical Annex 
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Table 5.2 Entrepreneurial Activity as a percent of the labour force, 2002105 
Country Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
GEM 
average 
TEA Index 6,5 4,6 11,3 8,7 4 8 
Percentage of national total divided on: 
Necessity based activities 6 8 10 5 17 61 
Opportunity based and 
other reasons 94 92 90 95 83 37 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002, Danish National Report 
 
Individuals participate in entrepreneurial activities for two major reasons: (a) they 
choose to start a business as one of several possible career options (“opportunity 
based”) or (b) they feel compelled to start their own business because all other options 
for work are either absent or unsatisfactory (“necessity based”).  
 
The entrepreneurial activity in the Nordic countries is almost solely opportunity based, 
while the average across the nations involved in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2002 indicate a much higher level of necessity-based entrepreneurial activity. To put 
this in perspective: In countries like Mexico or India we are more likely to find 
entrepreneurs starting a grocery store or a carpet shop due to lack of employment than 
in the Nordic countries. 
 
The TEA index indicates some differences in the entrepreneurial activity in the Nordic 
countries. The percent of the labour force involved in entrepreneurial activity in Finland 
and Sweden is much lower than in Iceland, and these countries are also together with 
Denmark below the average across the nations involved in the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2002106. The TEA rate varies from 2 percent in Japan to 19 percent in Thailand.  
 
However, the unemployment rates in the Nordic countries are relatively low, and 
welfare support is well developed.  Few, if any, are therefore forced to establish a new 
enterprise out of pure need. The opportunity based index gives therefore a more relevant 
indicator for the entrepreneurial spirit in the Nordic countries.  This indicator is also 
more interesting from an innovation policy point of view, as it is in this category we are 
more likely to find innovative companies.107 
 
                                                 
105 TEA is based on responses of a sample of adults in the countries and from personal interviews 
conducted with national experts in the countries. An individual may be considered a “nascent 
entrepreneur” under three conditions: first, if he or she has done something – taken some action – to 
create a new business in the past year, second, if he or she expects to share ownership of the new firm; 
and third, if the firm has not yet paid salaries or wages for more than three months. In cases where the 
firm has paid salaries and wages for more than three months but for less than 42 months, it is classified as 
a “new business”. Those 5 percent who qualify as both a “nascent entrepreneur” and a “new business” are 
counted only once. For further detail see: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2002 Executive Report.   
106 37 countries was involved in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002, see Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor, 2002 Executive Report for information. 
107 One can argue that establishing a company is in itself an innovation, i.e. a change of behaviour for the 
ones involved. Indeed it is, and such companies may contribute a lot to the development of the business 
sector.  However, in this connection we focus on companies that are able to contribute with new or 
improved products, processes or services on the market. 
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This figure is taken from The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002 Summary Report, 
November 2002 (Paul D. Reynolds, William D. Bygrave, Erkko Autio, Michael Hay). It 
orders the countries according to the propensity to the establishment of new opportunity 
based companies. The lines delineate the limit for pure statistical noise.  
 
According to this figure you will find Iceland and Norway among the most 
“entrepreneurial” countries in the world, more or less on the same level as the United 
States. Denmark is somewhere around the middle, while Finland and Sweden lag 
behind. 
 
This is interesting, as it shows a reversal of the figures documenting R&D investments. 
Finland and Sweden have some of the most R&D intensive economies in the world, but 
these heavy R&D investments do not lead to a high level of opportunity based 
entrepreneurship. The GoodNIP team has not final the answer to why this is so, but we 
can raise some possible explanations. 
 
The high R&D investments in Sweden and Finland are mainly caused by a few high 
tech companies.  A high tech company is by definition a company that invest much in 
R&D, so this does not say much about the “knowledge intensity” of the private sector in 
these countries. As noted elsewhere, a company may perfectly well be knowledge 
intensive – in that it makes use of advanced technologies – as well as innovative and 
profitable, without investing money in R&D.  
 
It could be that Finland and Sweden have invested in high tech industries (ICT) that do 
not easily lend themselves to widespread entrepreneurial activity. They may be too 
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complex or too knowledge intensive. Admittedly, ICT is an important ingredient in all 
industries these days, but apparently it is not harder for Norwegian and Danish 
entrepreneurs to make use of this technology than for the Swedes and the Finns. 
 
This reminds us of the figures on the number of innovators as a percentage of 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector above, where the numbers for the Nordic 
countries were 71% for Denmark, 36% for Finland, 48% percent for Norway and 54% 
for Sweden. (The high number for Denmark may be caused by a statistical aberration).  
Hence Norway, with the weakest R&D investments, can actually compete with Sweden 
as regards industrial innovative capabilities. Moreover, it performs better than Sweden 
in opportunity based entrepreneurship. 
 
What this tells us is not that R&D does not matter.  It does. These figures do emphasize, 
however, the need to develop a more nuanced view of innovation processes. R&D will 
help, but not if the innovation is unable to bridge the gap between research and the 
market in an efficient way.  Moreover, there is much more to innovation than research, 
something the policy makers must take into consideration.  Especially Sweden must 
look into its own innovation system and find out why the large investments in R&D are 
not followed by an even larger increase in entrepreneurship and innovative capabilities. 
 
Some more figures have been included in the statistical annex on page 209. 
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4. What can innovation research tell about 
innovation policy priorities? 
 
By Johan Hauknes 
 
Twenty years of innovation research has dramatically expanded our understanding of 
innovation as a driver for national and regional economic growth, for structural change, 
and welfare and social development. The expanded basis for understanding 
economically motivated innovative behaviour of firms and its implications at industrial 
and macro-economic level is closely linked to the analytical perspective of innovation 
as interactive – with substantial systemic elements – and that innovation, or new techno-
economic behaviour by firms, finds its rationality in the market orientation and 
competition structure they face.  
 
To tackle the challenge of understanding innovation as a driver for economic and social 
change, three inter-related insights were required, 
• Firstly – and related to the market context where innovation activities enfold – there 
is a close integration between a price-based competition – with prices as carriers of 
economic information – based on firms doing ‘the same things’ as their competitors, 
and a ‘technological’, or non-pecuniary, competition – based on doing things 
differently than competitors. It is in this integrated competition, and the profit 
incentives and related expectations it gives rise to, that innovation has its origin and 
motivation. Innovation is – and must be understood in market context. 
• Secondly, firms’ innovation activities are shaped by their structured economic 
environments, and the techno-economic relations and interactions with the various 
parts of it. A firm’s choice of innovation strategies and behaviour reflects these 
structures and relations with what it regards as important or relevant institutions and 
organisations – irrespective of the sign of this relation. The firm’s options for 
potential new behaviour and its choices are moulded by the interaction in which it 
participates – a core characteristic of innovation as an economic activity is that it is 
interactive in a basic sense. 
• Lastly, and beyond its traditional role as an information bridge or carrier between 
supply and demand, the market has a key role as a generator of new information, as 
a sorting and selection mechanism. In the dynamic interaction of the supply and 
demand sides some innovations – some patterns of behaviour – are selected at the 
expense of others. The selection criteria of this market mechanism are not given, but 
change dynamically as a response to the variety of behaviours of the supply side, the 
accommodation of these on the demand side, laying new foundations of future 
demand and selection criteria. 
Even if this research still is in its early phases, its understanding of the relation between 
interactive learning of innovation capabilities and resources, variety generation and 
selection has had substantial impact and a wide relevance in many areas. This applies to 
the basic questions of requirements for a sustained welfare and economic development, 
to explaining important regional and sectorial differences, and so on.  
innovation policy priorities 
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Not the least, this research has contributed to renewing the basis for formulation of 
public innovation and regional policies – through providing a better understanding of 
what characterises economic growth and welfare development in advanced economies 
as the Nordic ones. 
 
In this research a core challenge has been to map, describe, and theorise the real shape 
of innovation and innovation based competition across the regional, national and 
international economies. The identification of essentially micro-level drivers and major 
characteristics of innovation and the linking of these with meso- and macro-level 
structures and impacts has, as expected, proven a considerable challenge, a challenge 
we still are in the early stages of analysing.  
 
Hence, this challenge still involves a wide range of unresolved questions, some of 
which are addressed in this programme of research. 
 
Innovation research is a problem-oriented, multi-disciplinary research field which 
explores the nature, sources, creation, spread and impacts of technological and 
organizational change. Its growth dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
since then researchers have explored many aspects of knowledge creation, from a wide 
variety of disciplinary backgrounds.  
 
Much of this research has been empirical in character – it has consisted of quite basic 
research into the real characteristics of innovation, using case studies and statistical 
analyses. The latter have been aided, especially in the 1990s, by new data resources 
(especially economy-wide surveys on innovation activity and outputs), as well as 
enhanced R&D data, much-improved patent data, and databases on scientific 
publication.  
 
The basis of the research field is the widely recognised fact that innovation and 
technological change are central aspects of social and economic development. Yet the 
driving forces of such change still remain poorly understood. Innovation studies is 
therefore a field which takes up the intellectual challenge of explaining the dynamics of 
economic, technological and organizational change.  
 
The key insight that allows this opportunity is that innovation – and related socio-
technical change – to a substantial degree is driven by economic and commercial 
considerations of economic agents, addressing characteristics of the market and wider 
economic context of these agents – innovation and technical change is an integrated part 
of the economic environment, and not something that is implanted into the economic 
system from the outside. This implies immediately that this field is part of the social 
sciences. This social focus of innovation studies rests on three aspects of technology and 
innovation: 
• Firstly, innovation involves learning and the creation, development and management 
of productive or economic competences (see e.g. Hauknes 2000, 2003). Such 
learning always takes place in organizational and social contexts, and such contexts 
are thus an important focus of study 
• Secondly, innovation involves organisation: this include the management and 
cooperation systems through which production takes place, but also systems of 
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public administration and agencies which regulate economic and technological 
change.  
• Thirdly, technology and innovation take place within broader society. On the basis 
of cultural and political value, society makes economic and political choices which 
influence the development and spread of innovations.  
As a field of research it is of great importance at this time: the problems it addresses are 
not simply an intellectual challenge, but are of great relevance to the formation and 
implementation of public policy in such areas as research policy, education policy, and 
industrial policy. Above all, innovation studies is a field of central importance to the 
ability of society as a whole to shape and respond to the challenges of new technologies 
and to reap the potential benefits of these in a socially efficient way. 
 
So what can this area of research and analysis provide for policy? In this note we will 
briefly address such issues at two different levels, 
• does contemporary innovation research provide a rationale or set of rationales for 
industrial and innovation policies that are different from the ones that have 
dominated policy analysis and formulation over the last decades? To what extent 
have these alternative rationales been integrated into the policy framework? 
• what insights and inputs does innovation research provide for formulation of 
innovation policy objectives, design of support schemes and instruments, their 
implementation and assessment of their impacts? 
The interaction of research and policy – what is the task of 
socio-economic research? 
Innovation research has provided a solid argument for the highly intertwined dynamics 
of innovation and technical change on the one hand, and the generation of generic 
technological and other functional knowledge on the other. A well acknowledged part 
of this is the interaction between scientific and industrial research and innovation 
capabilities and performance at firm level and at aggregate levels. Though often 
formulated in terms of the demise of a so-called ‘linear model’ of technological 
innovation, it clearly goes far beyond this.  
 
The dynamics of the relation between socio-economic research on the one hand and the 
use of a research-based basis in formulation of strategies and initiatives, whether at firm 
or at policy level, is clearly at least as complex as that of the industrial innovation 
dynamics (see chapter on rationalities and policy learning below). This has similar 
implications for any implicit or explicit attempt to base this interaction on a model of 
‘linear’ dynamics - of models implying a socio-economic determinacy of policy 
formulation. 
 
A consequence of this is that we raise the question of how we should conceive of the 
role of innovation research towards innovation research. The basic tenet of this is that of 
the importance of the critical role, in contrast to the mandatory giving or decision 
making role of the researcher. At its best, the role of innovation research vis-avis 
innovation policy analysis and formulation is to provide the critical questions and 
challenges that the policy makers must relate to in his or her formulation and 
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implementation of political objectives and initiatives –challenges that need to be 
addressed in the policy maker’s execution of the political judgement. 
 
This innocuous formulation has consequences beyond what we may address here, 
raising issues as  
• the crucial role of informed consent between the analyst and policy maker and their 
relevant constituencies. This has implications in terms of formulation of syntheses 
and for the way uncertainty is addressed, 
• openness and democratic decision making, 
• the importance of interactive processed of consensus making. 
This is not to deny the relevance of the researcher or analyst giving policy 
recommendations or prescriptions if it is required and the necessary conditions are in 
place. But then it becomes the policy maker’s responsibility and task to relate critically 
to these recommendations and to the analytical and political conditions for them. 
Included in this is the task of critically assessing the research and political judgement 
that has been used in the formulation of these recommendations. 
 
On the other hand, it is the researcher/analyst’s obvious responsibility and duty to 
openly describe and explain the assumptions and assessment underpinning the 
recommendations, their importance for the formulation of these and the executed 
judgement. This comes on top of the duty to express and clarify the analytical and 
empirical basis for the recommendations and the interpretation of these. 
 
On innovation and competition
 
108 
Bounded rationality, a core concept in the analysis of innovation capabilities of firms, 
immediately implies heterogeneity, or variety. The ‘satisficing’ decision making is not 
strong enough to ensure ‘representative’ decision making, let alone optimal decision 
making. Furthermore bounded rationality implies that outcomes of learning processes, 
contingent on knowledge and information processing abilities, will be far from uniform; 
firms will learn different things. Secondly, non-optimal behaviour of individual agents 
cannot ensure an aggregate optimal structure, at least without resort to a rapid selection 
mechanism. 
 
Learning abilities and learning processes will show considerable variety as a 
consequence of bounded rationality. Generating a variety of capabilities to participate in 
the technological competition, this has two consequences.  
 
First of all, it implies a variety in the technological efforts, generating a technological 
variety in the economic system. Secondly, it might enforce the effects of the selection 
mechanism, weeding out the inefficient firms more rapidly. But, as the system consists 
of boundedly rational actors, this again widens the scope for coexisting variety, 
                                                 
108 This and the following sections is based on Hauknes (work in progress) which will give a more 
thorough discussion and references to the relevant literature. For a preliminary version see 
Hauknes 2002. 
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permitting firms with different ways of behaviour to exist side by side. This has the 
effect of slowing down the selection mechanism, rather than speeding it up. Unless 
resort is made to a position of strong technological determinism, arguments of the as-if 
kind or representative agents, cannot have any place. 
 
Both of the well-known analytical frameworks for analysing economic change, the 
neoclassical and the evolutionary and institutional economics framework (see next 
chapter), posit a selection mechanism with decisive effects on the outcomes of 
economic processes. Whereas the neoclassical framework requires a rapid selection 
mechanism, the assumptions of the evolutionary framework lead to a slowing down of 
the selection process. Combining variety generation and slowing down of the selection 
mechanism with the dynamic effects of a rapid technological change, evolutionary 
framework opens up for qualitative new dynamics in the economic system. 
 
As the sharper neoclassical knife of selection is replaced with a blunter evolutionary 
selection mechanism, the firms are allowed to learn, adapt and change. In the 
neoclassical selection mechanism they are selected on the basis of given capabilities 
with little time to adapt.  
 
The selection mechanism in an evolutionary framework must clearly based on some 
notion of ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’, of learned behaviours (Nelson & 
Winter 1982 note, “our theory is unabashedly Lamarckian: it contemplates both the 
‘inheritance’ of acquired characteristics and the timely appearance of variation under 
the stimulus of adversity”). An evolutionary selection mechanism is fed by preexisting 
variety generation, again feeding new variety. 
 
Hence, what evolutionary approaches bring in is the potential of a boot-strapping 
process of economic growth – of endogenous growth. Moreover, out-of-equilibrium 
processes are what generate the sustained growth that enables higher levels of social 
benefits, albeit non-optimally distributed. Furthermore this non-optimal distribution is 
essential for the sustainability of the process of generating further variety; market 
failures are essential for creating the incentives for generating technological variety.  
 
An important task of public policy is thus to generate a trade-off between the generation 
of incentive structures, non-optimal distributions and the basis for future growth on the 
one hand, and enforcing mechanisms that ensure reasonable social welfare distributions 
on the other. In general, policies intended to affect welfare distribution fall dominantly 
outside the scope of research policies. Put bluntly, the underlying motive of 
economically motivated basic research policy is to enable processes that increase 
overall welfare for all, through creating conditions that depend on and further develop 
non-optimal distributions of economic welfare.  
 
What should the characteristics of public strategies then be? Ideally there should be a 
complementary relation between public and private strategies, with the complementarity 
being based on the difference in the objectives of the two sectors. The general approach 
of private actors will be to attempt to reduce technological and economic uncertainty. 
An essential task for public policies is on the other hand, to enhance diversity and thus 
increase uncertainty. 
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Dynamic implications of competition 
As seen the evolutionary approaches to economic dynamics is based on a perception of 
two core inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing dimensions to competition – viz. a 
price competition of (economically) homogenous, or nearly homogenous, products and 
a technological competition based on the introduction of alternative economic 
characteristics.  
 
Broadly we argue that market based dynamics may be seen as shaped by a neoclassical 
selection mechanism, with agents taking techno-economic characteristics more or less 
as given, and by a selection mechanism operating directly on these techno-economic 
characteristics of economic goods. In the traditional picture new behaviour is introduced 
by some entrepreneurial function or entity and diffuses throughout the market, 
establishing the new production regime.  
 
In a sense, new information – and hence new expectations – is more or less 
automatically transformed to new behaviour. Successful behaviour is rapidly identified 
and diffused through the market place. With the other competition form, the selection is 
blunt in the sense that there is ex ante uncertainty about how the market will select new 
behaviour. The selection mechanism slows down, relatively speaking, as the market 
needs time to generate or reveal information as a basis for expectation formation.  
 
Furthermore evolutionary arguments also should include at its core an argument that the 
transformation of knowledge and information about technology, whether at a generic or 
specific level, into behavioural characteristics is resource demanding and time 
consuming. This is not solely a consequence of the denial of the ‘linear model’ 
argument, but equally because the uncertainty about market selection rolls back to 
uncertainty about intra-firm selection or prioritisation of behaviour. 
 
With the first dimension dominating, agents will predominantly try to imitate 
competitors, while if competition is characterised more strongly along the technological 
dimension, agents will seek variant behaviour as the main mode of market adaptation. 
As argued above the eventual economic dynamics and impacts of this competition is 
characterised by the ratio of the characteristic rates of diffusion and change in main 
behavioural characteristics of these forms of competition.  
With this ratio we may identify three broad areas; 
i) ‘price related’ behavioural patterns change faster than ‘technologically related’ 
patterns, 
ii) ‘price related’ diffusion rates are of the same order as ‘technologically related’ 
diffusion rates, 
iii) ‘price related’ behavioural change is slower than ‘technologically related’ 
diffusion. 
In the table below this is depicted as a four-way table where the two diagonal cells may 
be seen as the same situation, situation ii) above. The table is an indicative illustration 
of some broad types of dynamics, and should not be taken as realistic description of 
capitalist dynamics. In particular the complex, fractal-like structure of technology opens 
up for differentiated attitudes of firms towards technology, towards standardisation and 
adaptation in terms of aggregate technological features and differentiation towards more 
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disaggregated features. This clearly opens up for a much more complex landscape of 
market dynamics than what may be captured in this simple table. 
 
Technological 
  Rapid Slow 
Rapid 
Highly interdependent techno-
economic dynamics 
“Critical system” 
Punctuated change 
“Schumpeterian gales” 
Pr
ic
e 
re
la
te
d 
Slow 
Innovation led competition 
with co-existing varieties 
“Innovation economy” 
Highly interdependent 
dynamics 
“Critical system” 
 
The welfare impact of variety 
The classification suggested above is a positive classification, in the traditional sense of 
the distinction between positive and normative economics. The normative dimensions 
of such a classification emerge from the role variety generation and market based 
selection plays.  
 
Due to the bootstrapping process that follows from endogenous technical change, the 
long-term social benefits in an evolutionary perspective follow from the welfare 
enhancements generated by the boot-strapping. In this perspective there is a trade off 
between the traditional regard for efficiency, or ‘optimality’, of contemporary welfare 
distribution and the inefficiencies that allow the bootstrapping process to work.  
 
The major difference between neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to economic 
systems is related to the implications of variety on the market place. That is, of 
differentiated economic behaviour by economic agents. These implications have direct 
and different consequences for the objectives of innovation policies and for the welfare 
impact and goals of economic policies. 
 
As we have seen, in both circumstances the core role of the market and the selection 
mechanism it embodies is to reduce variety – to select certain technological 
characteristics of economic behaviour at the expenditure of others. However, whereas 
the neoclassical market is constituted so that the selected behaviour may in principle be 
identified ex ante, evolutionary constituted markets do not allow for this. 
 
In a neoclassical market system, the existence of variety is reflected in the loss of 
efficiency109. The outcome of a well-behaved competition is to restore efficiency by 
reducing this inefficiency. Failures in market incentives opens up for policy 
intervention, intervention that attempts to re-establish this variety reducing mechanism.  
 
In an evolutionary framework the existence of variety plays a much more fundamental 
role. The distinguishing feature of evolutionary approaches to economic dynamics is the 
                                                 
109  Note that variety refers to variety in techno-economic characteristics. Variety that has no 
relevance to market incentives facing the agents is irrelevant for the economic dynamics, and is 
not included here. 
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feedback between variety generation and subsequent market selection; that the 
introduction of variety alters the incentive structures to firms furnished by the market 
environment (note that these incentives are necessarily wider than the incentive 
structures facing ‘neoclassical’ firms).  
 
The existence of this feedback loop implies that a core part of the incentive structure 
facing entrepreneurial firms is that it may reward not just reactive responses to these 
incentives (achieving ‘state of the art’). It generates proactive strategies and responses, 
systematic attempts by entrepreneurs to alter the market environment – to alter the 
incentive structures itself. Modelling of this feedback loop has been based on the 
replicator argument – with the use of simple replicator models. In these models the 
environmental selection is shaped by the overall, in some sense average, quality or 
‘goodness’ of individual agents. Though valuable, the utility of these models are limited 
by the fact that  
• the nature of the underlying replicators (in neo-Darwinian parlance; the ‘gene’ or 
perhaps, as hypothesised by Dawkins for social and cultural development, the 
meme) remains unidentified, 
• most of our understanding based on replicator models is based on static landscape of 
quality dimensions – whether one- or many-dimensional. In economic dynamics the 
interaction between the ‘supply side’ and the ‘demand side’ of the market is a vital 
part of the overall bootstrapping process – implying a continual reshaping of the 
selection mechanism, and hence of the topology of the selection space, 
• the lack of understanding of the ontogeny/phylogeny linkage, that is between 
replicator and agent. In economic terms the replicator – the ‘atoms’ of behaviour – 
maybe something along the line of Nelson and Winter’s routines and skills, does not 
map realistically onto the structure of deliberate agents – onto entrepreneuring firms. 
The basic outcome of this is that in contrast to the neoclassical approach, the structure 
and richness of variety is related firstly to selection efficiency and then through 
bootstrapping to social benefits. As noted above, we can depict this as a welfare trade 
off between present economic welfare and benefits accrued in the future as a 
consequence of the bootstrapping process110. 
 
A core implication of this for evolutionary analysis is the well acknowledged necessity 
of including the shaping and structures of ‘technological opportunities’ into the analysis. 
However, I would claim more importantly, it also implies a crucial role for the ‘demand 
side’, for the formation and expression of demand of economic goods. Somewhat 
surprisingly, this aspect has been almost completely neglected in evolutionary analysis 
during the first decade of its history. 
 
At the technology side, it should be kept in mind that what is essential is not ‘objective’, 
technological or real characteristics of economic goods. In a certain sense these 
                                                 
110  As a simple metaphor to illustrate the point, we bake a smaller cake today than is actually 
feasible (i.e. allow inefficiencies) and accept inequities in income distribution, to be able to bake 
a larger cake tomorrow. In the final analysis, this of course raises the difficult question of 
discounting. 
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characteristics are irrelevant to economic dynamics. What is central are economic 
characteristics of these technological products, processes, organisations etc.  
 
Basically, analysis of economic dynamics is concerned with economic behaviour – with 
what economic agents do. Learning, i.e. capability and skill formation and evolution, 
whether on a daily experiential basis, or on the basis of systematic and deliberate use of 
resources to acquire new capabilities, is important for economic analysis only as far as it 
is inter-related to behavioural characteristics. These behavioural characteristics are 
based on the existing expectations and perceptions of the firm or agent on the incentive 
structures facing the firm and the future development of these. 
 
The capabilities, awareness etc. shaped by what we are now accustomed to call 
‘learning’ (in a very wide sense of the word), is feeding expectation formation, shaping 
actions and behaviour. The information generated as a consequence of these behaviours 
– whether expectations are confirmed or invalidated – completes the experiential 
‘learning’ loop. What constitutes this open loop is the perceived economic – or if you 
will techno-economic – characteristics of economic goods.  
 
To illustrate: if a producer manages to convince its business environment that its good is 
a different specie from existing variants on the market – even though the difference may 
just come down to ‘subjective’, i.e. perceived, characteristics – it is, in the economic 
sense a different specie. The structures and apprehensions of the market environment 
are not ‘objective’ or technological, the structuring basis of the perceived economic 
‘world’ is malleable. 
Rationales for industrial and innovation policies 
Any discussion of analytical rationales for industrial and innovation policies must start 
from the basis that essentially innovation policies are welfare policies, being a part of 
the complex of more general economic policies, with core economic welfare objectives 
of these policies. To make this clear; an analytical rationale for industrial innovation 
policies is a welfare rationale. The metaphor of cakes alluded to above illustrates some 
aspects of what these rationales must accommodate, but these ideas are still not 
developed to provide this. 
 
A core aim of innovation research has been to ‘endogenize innovation’, i.e. to formulate 
and analyse innovation by firms as a phenomenon that is closely inter-linked with and 
co-determined with the business environment of the innovating firms. Attempts to 
establish a set of principles for understanding endogenous dynamic change in economic 
systems in innovation research, has now been under way for more than two decades.  
 
Its inception and development as a research field has been strongly motivated by policy 
interests, maybe even to the extent of having been shaped by policy motivations and 
interests. Thus it is somewhat of a paradox that few attempts have been made to elicit 
wider welfare implications of evolutionary theorizing and the implications of this for 
policy challenges and implications in a systematic way.  
 
Innovation research must stand up to this challenge. The common sense arguments 
often raised against welfare theory principles, based on evolutionary theorizing of 
innovation-led economic change, is generally based on the pervasive presence of 
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uncertainty in economic action – and hence on formation of economic agents’ 
expectations of future development of their business environment.  
 
The economic future is in a sense co-created with the selection in the market on the 
basis of explorative introduction of behavioral variety by economic agents. First of all 
this implies the non-existence of an optimal schedule. It also implies inequitable 
distribution in the form of temporary innovation rents, ultimately destroyed by the 
diffusion of successful behavioural strategies.  
 
Innovation rents are intimately linked to the growth generating process as these are 
essential parts of the market incentives for innovation based competition. Hence there is 
an implicit regard for a welfare trade off between contemporary inequities in the form of 
rents and increased future income levels. 
 
Arguments like these are taken as implying the non-viability of a welfare theory based 
on evolutionary principles. This conclusion is un-warranted. Rather, what it implies is 
that an evolutionary welfare theory must be fundamentally different from the standard 
welfare theory. Rather, some elements of an evolutionary welfare theory have already 
been introduced in the literature, various welfare arguments have been made on the 
basis of concepts like technological lock-ins and other so-called systems failures. The 
concept of systems failures was introduced as a way of extending the vocabulary of 
standard welfare theory. 
 
To understand more clearly what these rationales may be, it helps to discuss more in 
detail the rationale for innovation policies that has formed the backbone of innovation 
policy formulation in most of the post-war period. 
The post-war economic rationale for innovation policies – the Arrow-
Nelson rationale 
The basic economic justification for science and technology policies in the post-war 
period (in addition to the fulfilment of government and public needs such as defence, 
health and environment) has been a market failure argument. Markets may fail to 
operate efficiently for a variety of reasons including externalities, asymmetric 
information, economies of scale and scope, indivisibilities, barriers to entry etc.  
 
As such it comes out as a direct consequence of the standard and well corroborated 
economic welfare theory and the related theory of social choice that was developed 
during the 1950s. Due to the economic characteristics of ‘technological knowledge’ 
there are associated failures in the construction and functioning of markets providing 
these economic goods. This implies that market based provision of such knowledge will 
not attain a socially efficient level – there is a positive or negative gap between social 
and private profits in the production of technological knowledge. 
 
This is the essential basis of the so-called Arrow-Nelson rationale for innovation 
policies. Innovation - the attainment of a competitive advantage over competitors - is 
basically about generating and using knowledge of what to produce and how to produce 
it. The question is then: Are there sufficiently efficient markets for such technical 
knowledge?  
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Arrow (1962), see also Nelson (1959), gave the answer to this question: no, there are 
not such markets! Generation of such knowledge (the prime model being through R&D) 
by the market system is insufficient to achieve optimality. There are three basic factors 
that limit the attainment of a social optimum through private profit optimisation: 
 
• Outcomes of knowledge generating processes are uncertain. 
• Knowledge is a (quasi-) public good, implying inappropriability.  
• There are substantial indivisibilities in knowledge generation. 
 
The Arrow-Nelson argument, which grew out of US policy debate in the 1950s on the 
role of federal S&T policies, has been widely used and further corroborated in the 
international S&T policy debate since then. The argument grew out of a debate that 
primarily questioned the role of the federal basic science enterprise (see Nelson (1959)), 
and was particularly attuned to strengthen the basis for an idea of a 'social contract' that 
arose in the aftermath of the Vannevar Bush report.  
 
A requisite for the argument for public intervention to hold, is an acceptance of science-
based knowledge as being more or less directly productive, requiring not more than 
routinised transformation/interpretation from its generic, usually codified forms to the 
specific, mostly tacit, forms that are directly 'applicable' in productive activities. As a 
consequence there is no need for distinguishing between a science infrastructure, i.e. a 
science-based knowledge stock, and a stock of productive intangible assets comprising 
the industrial technology/competence/knowledge base. 
 
Underlying this interpretation is the microeconomic theory of the firm. This theory 
implies a particular interpretation of technical information and knowledge: such 
knowledge is generic, codified, immediately accessible and directly productive. Hence 
there is no difference between capabilities, knowledge and information. Technological 
knowledge and technological competences are in essence just the possesion of technical 
information. These properties are necessary conditions to attain optimality – allowing 
rational optimising behaviour by firms – and for a very simple reason. Any restrictions 
of these would violate the conditions for competitive behaviour.  
 
Here lies the first limitation of the rationale. By equating productive capabilities and 
information its foundation is at most limited to 'technological clubs', and then to applied 
rather than basic research - whereas the latter is what the rationale originally was 
developed for. For a discussion of this see Hauknes 1998b. 
 
The market failure rationale is in principle a strong rationale. It provides: 
• A general rationale (optimisation of social benefits);  
• A guide to policy action (a framework for assessing links between benefits 
and policy inputs including funding); and  
• A guide for determining optimal use of government expenditure (where; how 
much). 
This is a strong and important rationale. The policy recommendation that follows from 
the Arrow-Nelson rationale implies that such socially beneficial knowledge generation 
(read R&D) should be publicly provided or subsidised. The implications of this classical 
market-failure rationale can best be summarised as follows.  
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Create favourable framework conditions to facilitate the smooth and dynamic 
functioning of markets, e.g. through vigorous competition policy, smooth 
macroeconomic policy or regulatory reform and through enabling new markets for S&T 
products (as through patent regulation. Then correct essential market failures by public 
provision or subsidising private production of the S&T products. This proved a strong 
argument for public R&D policies from the late 1950s onwards. Its strength was 
achieved not the least as it complemented three trends and views in this period: 
 
• A 'production line' interpretation of R&D and innovation - the so-called linear 
model;  
• Economic growth and technical change were regarded as dominantly capital 
embodied - sophisticated capital equipment codifying productive knowledge; 
and  
• Advanced manufacturing and new industrial (techno-)structures were vanguard 
sectors - 'technology push'. 
Systemic innovation – a basis for innovation policy rationales 
Why is the Arrow-Nelson rational not viable? The simple answer is that it is misrepresents the basic 
characteristics and determinants underlying economic dynamics, and the process of innovation of firms. 
What is often termed a resource based, evolutionary theory of the firm – or a theory of the innovating firm – 
must include 
• non-price, or ‘technological’  competition and its integration with price competition, 
• the development and mobilisation of productive, or techno-economic, capabilities 
in the firm, and the complex interactions of this sticky and localised capability base 
with external repositories of knowledge and information, 
• the boundedness of capabilities and rationalities in the firm, and understanding 
innovation primarily as a business activity, 
• as a consequence firms show what is non-optimising (satisficing) behaviour, 
• with associated innovation regimes and trajectories. 
• Adapting to and attempting to alter markets’ selection dynamics and criteria is a 
main part of the evaluation process inside the firms. 
The role and importance of variety generation, selection on the market and adaptation is a key 
driver of economic change – a core element of the dynamics in capitalist systems. In a sense 
the process is driven by market failure, with incessant change being the essential feature of 
capitalism. 
The need for new rationales 
The strength of the neoclassical market-failure argument is its clarity. It suggests a 
simple criterion for judging when government intervention is appropriate. However it 
has limitations in capturing the key elements of technological progress and thus has 
limits as a rationale and guide for technology policy making (OECD, 1998). Limitations 
of market failure analysis in regard to technological progress and innovation have been 
analysed in the 80s and 90s. The complexity of the process makes it difficult to identify 
and even to define market failure. Firstly it ignores the broader institutional framework 
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that defines how markets work. Secondly it implicitly assumes that the market 
mechanisms have a competitive advantage over other mechanisms in all industrial 
technological and interface activities relevant for policy purposes. Lastly it may fail in 
providing direction and focus to policies when externalities are pervasive (Teubal, 
1998). Absence of markets may rather be a strong signal that other coordinating 
mechanisms are more effective in terms of resource allocation, viz. networks, 
associations, communities a.o. (Nelson, 1987). 
 
Neoclassic economic analysis has not ignored the subject of technology. Rather an 
explicit examination of technology and of knowledge about technology has simply been 
suppressed by introducing certain assumptions into the theory of the firm. Central have 
been the assumptions of a given set of tastes and some given stock of technological 
knowledge. Given this knowledge of tastes and technology the firm determines its 
optimal behaviour including the choice of technique through the explicit consideration 
of factor prices (Rosenberg, 1994).  
 
Is the Arrow-Nelson or market failure rationale sufficient as a basis for innovation 
policies? It is not. It involves a misrepresentation of what underlies the dynamics of 
advanced economies. Learning is active, interactive, collaborative and ongoing. 
Innovation is multi-organisational, multi-functional and systemic. These insights lead to 
the need of rethinking the basic arguments for the use of innovation policies and their 
objectives. 
 
Though still rudimentary, the understanding of systemic innovation has emphasised the 
importance of a resource based, evolutionary theory of the firm. Such models of the 
firm have as main aspects the role of non-price competition on markets, that firms rely 
in their activities on a wide range of techno-economic capabilities that must be 
essentially learned, the boundedness of the capabilities and rationalities that shape firm 
behaviour, leading to satisficing behaviour, a non-optimising form of behaviour. Such 
arguments lead on to the role of evolution and selection in shaping economic change, 
and to structures innovation patterns, to innovation regimes and trajectories. 
 
With this approach to economic change, capitalist systems are economic systems where 
variety generation and adaptation are basic ingredients, and where innovation on the one 
hand and diffusion on the other – are complementary processes. The diffusion process is 
in itself a process of continual adoption, adaptation and reorientation by firms, of 
innovation; innovation and diffusion turns a Janus face towards us.  
 
The processes of change in economic systems are processes that are crucially linked to 
heterogeneity, to 'bootstrapping' of economic growth and to structural change. In 
contrast to the market failure framework that allows use of the welfare theorems, the 
inefficiency related to knowledge generation is not limited to separated markets, it is a 
feature affecting all markets. In a sense the situation may be characterised by saying that 
all is market failure.  
 
That relations between actors and hence co-ordination of production activities in any 
economic system involve two dual and concomitant processes, flows of economic 
resources in transaction and production processes and transformation and transmittal of 
information that shape co-ordination and behaviour, is an integral part of our 
understanding of economic systems.  
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The last decades have shown increased attention to the complexity and important role of 
the latter process in shaping economic development. Though our understanding of the 
why's and how's of these processes and their relations are still lacking, our 
understanding of them is substantially improved. The notion of information as public 
good has increasingly been turned around by the realisation that the functionalities of 
bridging between the two, which necessarily involves interpretation of externally 
acquired information, indeed gives information properties of (at least partial) 
excludability and rivalry.  
 
In evolutionary economic theories technology change and innovation is the most 
important factor behind economic evolution. The study of how technology advances and 
its driving forces and consequences is at the centre of evolutionary analysis. 
Technological change is presented as a two-stage process: one stage for generating 
variety in technology (innovations) and one stage for selecting across that variety to 
produce patterns of change (diffusion of innovations). There is also a third stage, 
namely feedback from the selection process to the development of further variation.  
 
If an evolutionary perspective is applied to the traditional sources of market failure, the 
analysis changes in subtle but important ways. Far from constituting failures, 
asymmetric information is essential if the competitive process is to work in an 
evolutionary fashion. Without asymmetry there can be neither novelty nor variety. 
Spillovers only make sense in a world where firms are fundamentally differentiated with 
respect to what they know (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998). 
Technological advance and innovation is characterised by constant interplay and mutual 
learning between different types of knowledge and actors. Technological change can be 
seen as a learning process, which is gradual and cumulative in character and leads to a 
relatively ordered pattern of innovations (technology trajectories). Firms build upon 
their existing knowledge base when they search for new innovation opportunities, but 
they also use external sources of knowledge in this search (Metcalfe 1997, Metcalfe and 
Georghiou, 1998, Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).  
 
Overall performance is thus not only dependent on how specific actors perform but also 
on how they interact with each other as elements of an innovation system. This division 
of labour in the generation of innovations means that no firm can be self-sufficient in 
regard to knowledge and thus gains from linkages with other knowledge generating 
organisations. Through their innovative activities firms establish relations with other 
organisations such as other firms, universities and R&D-institutes. If these market and 
non-market organisations interact poorly, technology change may be slowed.  
 
Mismatches between elements in an innovation system are by OECD defined as 
systemic failures. If systemic failure exists then there is a rationale for policy 
intervention aiming at accelerating the rate of technological advance and innovation 
(OECD, 1998). 
 
It is however right to say that the improvement in understanding of innovation in market 
systems has not been paralleled by development of the basic rationales of policy 
formulation and intervention. There have, however, over the last years been some 
attempts to raise issues and formulate some of the questions involved.  
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The aim of what follows is not to give a review of these developments but to raise some 
aspects that are shared by these and conclusions as to the policy making process. The 
prime shared aspect of these approaches, that is in fact shared by all known approaches 
to innovation analysis, is the acceptance of the significance of beneficial externalities of 
technical knowledge, and the importance of innovation as a determinant of economic 
growth and welfare development. As phrased by Bengt-Åke Lundvall recently, 
“Innovation is at the core of the competitiveness of firms, regions and nations” 
(Lundvall 1998).  
 
The recognition of innovation as a process involving many actors and taking place in a 
complex institutional system is the basis of system failure rationales for policy; a policy 
that focuses on promoting the generation of innovations. The innovation processes are 
influenced not only by market forces but also by the character of the entire innovation 
system. Thus system rationales give justification for going beyond remedying market 
failures (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). According to these rationales policies should 
try to alter the structural conditions under which technology advance and innovations 
occurs rather than just as in the market failure rationale altering the cost and pay off 
associated with R&D. 
System-based welfare arguments for innovation policy 
So where does this leave us? A long range of system perspectives and arguments have 
been used in analysing economic change. In fact it may be claimed that system 
arguments have always been at the core of the explanations of economic evolution and 
change – with roots back to the 18th century French physiocrats understanding of the 
economic system. Similarly Adam Smith’s analytical distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour was a reflection of a system view on analysing economic 
phenomena. Though clearly system-based, these and other similar approaches were not 
using the system perspective tp provide a dynamic understanding of economic 
evolution. More recently, system arguments have proliferated and with stronger 
dynamic perspectives, such as  
• the theory of industrial districts developed first by Alfred Marshall,  
• with links to localisation and other agglomeration theories and analysis of 
production systems, esp in the field of economic geography, 
• Bain’s now somewhat outdated Structure, Conduct, Performance paradigm on 
industrial development, 
• the analysis of historicity in technology systems by Thomas Hughes, 
• the outline of filières and their structures by Francois Perroux, 
• various industrial cluster approaches, as Erik Dahmen’s development blocks, 
Michael Porter’s clusters, etc., 
• the French Règulation school, with Richard Boyer and others, 
• actor-network theories and the concept of techno-economic network, from 
Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, and others 
• analysis of technological systems by Bo Carlsson, primarily in the context of the 
swedish STS-programme, 
• the concept of sectoral systems, originating with Franco Malerba, 
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• a long range of ideas and concepts related to Nelson and Winter’s 1977 ideas of 
structures of technological development, as technological paradigms (Giovanni 
Dosi), guideposts, landscapes or regimes (Sahal), etc. 
• institutional and neocorporatist approaches to economic development has a long 
history starting with Torstein Veblen,  
• networks and social embeddedness (Jan Johanson, Richard Smelzer). 
 
Broadly, we may distinguish system arguments concerning four arenas of economic 
dynamics, from where they have their focus, 
♦ the development and deployment of technical knowledge, i.e. primarily based on 
systematic dependencies in technology inputs and resources, 
♦ systematic interactions and dependencies in the provision and utilisation of 
economic resources, as factor inputs, other inputs and so on. Here the concern is 
basically at the operations of the economic production system, 
♦ market interactions and relations. Here a core concern would be the primary 
interaction of variety generation and selection at the market place, with the 
interlinkage of suppply and demand factors, 
♦ lastly, several approaches have their main focus at the core institutional set-up of 
the economic or wider socio-economic system. This is where the market is 
constituted through regulation of f.i. private property, and where the institutional 
arrangement for financial provision and distribution is formed. 
 
It is readily seen that all these are relevant and important, and that the long range of 
system approaches provide valuable insights.  
 
As is emphasised throughout this note, we do not yet have a welfare oriented and 
system based rationale for industrial and wider economic policies – with the immediate 
difficulties it implies to present discussions of e.g. competition policies as to the 
operationalisation of the concept of ‘dynamic efficiency’ criteria. Similarly the 
formulation of overall objectives and priorities for innovation policies are complicated. 
 
What the literature suggests is that the welfare and dynamic efficiency improvements 
are related to the structure of the competition along both of the noted axes, and that 
market based and co-determined economic viability has a relation to economic welfare. 
This implies that in some sense economic viability relates to the concept of system 
‘fitness’ in evolutionary theories.  
 
With robustness of selected varieties towards changes in the economic environment 
being a probable vital element of this welfare concept, this immediately suggests that 
one core aim of innovation policies is to intensify the technologically oriented 
innovation competition. So as with traditional arguments pertaining to the price 
competition and the attainment of ‘static efficiency’, there is a core message concerning 
the structure of the competition. 
 
However – and this is another point of divergence – the integrated ‘techno-pecuniary’ 
competition is based on an interplay of variety generation and intra-variety competition. 
The consequence of this is that the integration of market, economic and technological 
system characteristics. Along the technological dimension, there is clearly a task for 
public policies to assure efficient production of technology and the capabilities to 
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transform this into productive competences at the firm level. In the case of sub-efficient 
levels of competition on the market, it may be a task for public policy to ensure 
additional actors become technologically able to participate in the competition. Along 
the economic dimension structural inadequacies may for similar reasons provide a 
rationale for the support of specific groups of firms, f.i. SMEs or firms localised in 
specific areas. 
What we are seeing here is essentially innovation policies seen as a combination of 
initiatives towards 
− the efficiency of capability and competence development, 
− the efficiency of economic production and production systems, 
− the structure and characteristics of competition. 
The overall rationale must address each of this in part and in integration111.  Whatever 
such a welfare based rationale for industrial and innovation policies may look like in the 
end, its development should be a core concern in the future, for innovation research as 
well as for the innovation policy system. 
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Appendix: Innovation Policy Trends in the 
Nordic Countries, historical reviews 
 
In this appendix we survey historical trends in innovation policies in the respective 
Nordic countries, with emphasis on the last two decades. Both breaks and continuities in 
the formulation and implementation of policies of importance to innovation – including 
science and technology policies, educational policies, etc. – are identified, and discussed 
in a broader economic and political context.  
 
The survey is not an attempt to make rigid periodizations of innovation policies in the 
Nordic countries, but rather to improve our understanding of this policy area by 
outlining and comparing central developments over time. 
Denmark 
By Jørgen Lindgaard Pedersen, Søren Jensen and Kasper Edwards 
 
In this paper there will be given an overview of Danish technology policy after the 
Second World War with emphasis on continuity and breaks. The main problem is not to 
list up all events and initiatives. The challenge is to draw lines and identify patterns. In 
these years we can find lots of interest in technology policy in Denmark from 
politicians, Government, administration, business and universities. To understand the 
present debate and politics it can be useful to take a look at the longer historical lines 
and the more comprehensive connections. 
 
A problem is that there is very little scientific work to draw on. One of the most worked 
through publications is Peter Munk Christiansen’s “Teknologi mellem stat og marked. 
Dansk teknologipolitik 1970 – 1987.”112 In this work, which is based on the author’s 
Ph.D. thesis we are given 361 pages historical and analytical description and analysis. 
The landscape is seen from a political science perspective which means that an initiative 
will be mentioned and discussed if it is initiated by the political system with the 
intention to influence technology. Niels Christian Sidenius has worked with more or 
less the same topics, but has used the term ‘industrial policy.’113 Finally, we can find 
some relevant information inside the black box called ‘research policy’. 
 
Even though there is very little work done which covers the whole field of technology 
policy we can find more literature about policies with the intention to influence specific 
technologies. Historically important technology specific policies have been made in 
respect to construction technology, energy technology, information technology, 
biotechnology, material technology, food technology and some other technologies. In 
several of these cases there have been made scientific analyses and assessments. But it 
shall be mentioned that a good part of these initiatives have not been called technology 
policy but rather housing policy, energy policy, etc.    
                                                 
112 Munk Christiansen,  Peter, Teknologi mellem stat og marked. Dansk teknologipolitik 1970 – 1987, 
Århus: Forlaget Politica, 1988 
113 Niels Chr. Sidenius in different publications mentioned in Peter Munk Christiansen op. cit. pp. 350-
351.  
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Important sources for further work to understand technology policy are materials from 
relevant ministries, research councils and committees.  
Technology policy as one dimension of the general policy – from 
Marshall Help to oil crisis in the 1970s 
The most productive way to describe technology policy and its development will be to 
conceptualize it as one dimension of the general policy. Even if engineering, industrial 
and bureaucratic pressure groups always work for political decisions including public 
funds for technological development, there shall be specific and strong arguments for 
political initiatives in these fields. There are so many competing interests in society and 
some of them are of much more direct importance for politicians, e.g. because they 
represent voters which can change their vote in the next parliamentary election. 
 
After the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold War from 
1946 the U.S. policy vis-à-vis Western Europe was characterized by a welfare 
dimension to keep people’s minds from communist sympathies, as well as a warfare 
dimension to protect capitalism or the market economic system in this part of the world. 
 
The welfare dimension was sought achieved by a combination of a massive transfer of 
resources from the U.S., especially productive resources, and a gradual opening up of 
the economies for movements of goods and capital. The Marshall Help was the 
organizational form during the period 1948-1952 for this transfer of resources from U.S. 
to Western Europe. The military dimension was NATO, which was founded in 1949 
with the receivers of Marshall Help and some other countries as members. 
 
In post war Denmark it was clear for most politicians and experts in universities and 
administration that agriculture could not continue to be the dominant balance of 
payment trade as it had been from the last decades of the 19th century. In a small and 
very open economy like the Danish the necessary transformation could only take place 
if other balance of payment trades could be expanded in the course of a relatively short 
period of time. It was assessed that industry was the sector with sufficiently volume, 
with minor supplements from shipping and international trade. 
 
The transformation presupposed the direction of investments and transfer of labor into 
industry. However, resources locked up in agriculture could not immediately be used in 
industry. Other competencies were needed in industry than those present in agriculture. 
Also, housing had to be concentrated closer to workplaces. In order to recruit female 
labor into industry, child care and other types of welfare work would have to be 
rationalized. And finally, transport infrastructure had to be adjusted to the changed 
demand for transport services.  
 
If we begin with the extraordinary initiatives introduced, we can make the following 
list: 
• The Marshall Help, which was not in itself a support measure for research and 
development in new technology but grants and loans to Western European 
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governments including the Danish, gave 13 billions USD (88 billions 1997-
USD) to these governments. Denmark got 273 million DKK114. The funds were 
used for import of oil, vehicles, tractors and agricultural machinery, as well as 
machinery for industry. In Denmark the Ministry of Commerce, which had the 
responsibility for industry, established a so-called Committee of Productivity. 
The Committee worked actively for the transfer of knowledge of modern (read: 
American) technology in industry and agriculture. These activities were also 
supported by consultancies which helped to diffuse new technology including 
new organizational forms and incentives.  
• One especially important activity, which was more or less contemporary with 
the Marshall Help, was the modernization of construction technology and 
buildings (especially dwellings) in Denmark. This modernization consisted first 
of all in a standardization of all dimensions of components with the decimeter as 
standard unit. Secondly, there was a demand that the use of direct labor in 
construction work should be less than 85 % of the use in traditional construction. 
This demand should be fulfilled as a precondition for getting state loans with a 
favorable rate of interest. In 1947, Institut for Byggeforskning (Institute for 
Construction Research) was established. The institute was later renamed Statens 
Byggeforskningsinstitut, and again Bo og Byg Statens Byggeforskningsinstitut.  
• In the 1950ies Forsøgsanlæg Risø was founded. Its main purpose was to conduct 
research and development in the field of non-military applications of nuclear 
power. During the first 10-15 years, this objective was in focus. When nuclear 
power became excluded as an energy source in Denmark during the 1960ies 
however, other fields of research were introduced. Breeding of agricultural 
plants, alternative energy sources and new materials are only a few examples. 
When the industry for the production of windmills for electricity production 
experienced a take-off from the end of 1970ies, Risø became host of 
Prøvestationen for Vindmøller (Test station for windmills).      
• The so-called Godkendte Teknologiske Serviceinstitutter, GTS - which are 
private consultant firms approved by the relevant ministry – had been founded in 
1937. In the immediate post war period, the GTS institutes received a reasonable 
part of public money for private technology development. 
• The first oil crisis in 1973-74 hit the public and politicians in Denmark very 
hard, primarily because the country at that time did not have oil and natural gas 
of any magnitude compared with the Danish need for energy. Nuclear power 
was no alternative, first of all because it was politically impossible, and 
secondly, because it would take about ten years to construct a nuclear power 
plant before any electricity would be ready for use in society. Thus, it was 
technologically, economically and politically an urgent need to find other 
solutions. Programs for the development of alternative energy were established, 
especially in wind energy. Also programs for energy saving, e.g. insulation, 
improvements of windows and support for energy saving in industrial 
production processes, were introduced. These initiatives were combined with 
duties on energy consumption. 
                                                 
114 Agro-Nyt, Vol 9, No 6, June 1997, pp. 1-2 
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High technology policies 
In 1982 Denmark changed government from a Social Democratic to a Conservative - 
Liberal. Because the former Social Democratic Government in fact had squeezed the 
traditional instruments in the fiscal, monetary and income policies to the maximum of 
their efficiency, the new Government assessed that new instruments were needed. The 
giving up of the price-wage indexation just after the new Government had taken seat, 
marked the end of the traditional political instruments. In this situation, the vision of 
massive resources to high tech development came as sent from heaven. It was not an 
original governmental initiative but a diffused idea from the international scene in the 
OECD and the EU. 
 
Thus, Denmark entered a phase with high tech programs. The next then years were 
dominated by such programs, in the field of IT, biotechnology, materials and food 
technology. The most interesting feature of these programs was the relatively large 
amounts of money they received every year in time spans of 6-10 years, even if the 
programs formally had a duration of 3-4 years. 
 
Two interesting observations can be made on the economic development during the 
1980ies. First, it is interesting to see that during the mid-eighties (1984-1987, both years 
included) Danish industry showed negative rates of growth in labor productivity, in 
average 2 % per year. 115 Secondly, the wages as percentage of national income, 
corrected for changes in trade structure, grew during the same period - from 65, 2 to 66, 
7.116 A reasonable interpretation of these two tendencies is that the labor force was not 
qualified to handle all the new technology, especially not IT. Subsequently the wage 
quote rose, partly because of the up-come of bottlenecks in more specialized labor 
markets, and partly because the general level of unemployment fell from 10, 9 to 7, 9 
during the period.117 
 
After these dramatic first years of the High Tech Program Period, different government 
initiatives were taken. The IT -Program was not prolonged with a program number two, 
and in fact not all money in the program was given to applications. Also, the programs 
in biotechnology and new materials, and some not so high tech oriented programs e.g. 
in food industry, were spread over a longer period than the case was in the IT-Program.  
The normal period between Marshall Help and high tech programs 
If we shall get an impression of what happened in Danish technology policy during the 
second half of the 20th century, we cannot be content with only discussing the dramatic 
initiatives representing breaks with the development trends. These trends are 
characterized by stable rates of growth in funds allocated to different technologies for 
their inventive and innovative development and diffusion. During most of the period we 
have only small changes in the internal distribution of governmental resources between 
different technologies. Furthermore, we have a more or less constant organizational 
structure for handling allocation of resources.  
 
                                                 
115 ’Statistisk Tiårsoversigt 1994’, Danmarks Statistik, København, 1994, p. 106 
116 Op cit p. 49.  
117 Op cit p. 49. 
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One out of several possible explanations for this phenomenon can be found in the fact 
that most of the public resources dedicated to day-to-day activities in technological 
development are distributed by committees that are dominated by persons from 
institutions which are potential applicants of these funds. In such a system we can argue 
that the relative distribution of funds will be more or less stable. The distribution of 
applications will be stable in the short run because the number of persons working with 
different technologies can be expected to be more or less stable. And it is not politically 
correct from Ministers or Ministries to appoint people as a hidden way of changing the 
allocation of funds in a radical way.  
 
Trend shifts in public resources allocated to technological purposes can be explained by 
changes in relative distribution between public and private funds, or by growth in total 
resources to technological purposes with a constant distribution between public and 
private sources. A further dimension is of course the fact that the number of Danish 
researchers will influence the size of funds. On the other hand, the same number will 
also affect the amount of funds applied for.   
 
Seen from the perspective of organizational and political decision making processes, 
however, we can say that under certain circumstances coalitions of strong actors in 
business, trade unions, administration and political life are formed which are able to 
push through decisions for extra money for wanted purposes. The first example of this 
in the post war period can be identified around the time of the Marshall Help from the 
end of 1940ies. The second example can be found during the ten-year period following 
1983.  
Institutions and structure  
From our perspective, there are three types of institutions that have a more permanent 
existence: 
1. Universities 
2. Sector research institutions 
3. GTS-institutes 
 
In the transformation periods we can find ad hoc organizations such as: 
1. Program committees  
2. Centers with a semi-permanent existence 
 
1. Universities 
Until 1928 Denmark had only one university, the University of Copenhagen which was 
established in 1479. In 1928 the University of Århus was founded as a full university. In 
1965, 1971 and 1973 respectively, another three new universities were established - in 
Odense, Roskilde and Aalborg. 
 
It should be noticed, however, that business schools and institutions for academic 
technical research and teaching were not called universities until the middle of 1990ies, 
even if they during the whole post war period in fact were universities – if not full 
universities in the sense that they covered all scientific subjects. The forerunner of what 
today is called the Technical University of Denmark was in fact established in 1829, 
and in 1851 the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University was founded.  The latter 
is the only agricultural university in Denmark. 
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2. Sector research institutions 
Sector research institutions were founded as institutions which were to serve Ministries 
in specific subjects where research was a prerequisite for qualified advices and/or 
production.  
 
3. GTS-institutes 
A third important pillar in the Danish technology policy system is the so called 
Advanced Technology Group - in Danish Godkendt Teknologisk Service system, GTS - 
which consists of ten institutes. The institutes are private institutions but they are 
subsidized from public funds with basic resources. Today the public funds represent 11 
% of turnover.      
 
4. Program committees 
In the different ad hoc programs - such as the Marshall Help in the 1950ies, the IT-
program in the 1980ies, the Biotechnology programs from the beginning of the 1980ies, 
and the later programs on food technology and material technology - relatively large 
resources were allocated during short periods, typically five to ten years. 
 
5. Centers with a semi-permanent existence  
One way to manage funds connected to large programs has been to create centers which 
traditionally have been coalitions between different smaller units and designed for a 
time span longer than a project period but shorter than a permanent institute.    
Ideologies in technology policy 
In principle we cannot find one single clear formulation of Danish technology policy: 
The aims, the instruments or the optimal sums of funds. There are of course some 
general formulations for universities and other institutions and programs saying 
something about the importance of transforming new results from natural sciences into 
technology of utility in Danish companies. But it seems that in general the basic idea is 
that in normal times Government and Parliament will not decide which specific 
technologies shall be preferred. These decisions are delegated to committees with 
representatives from business, science and Ministries. But when technology policies are 
becoming hot political issues, Government and Parliament are directly involved in 
decisions about technology. Maybe the politicians are reluctant to take part in decisions 
on concrete applications, but not on types of wanted projects.  
 
One important trend which can be identified from the period, and especially from the 
1990ies, is the more and more explicitly articulated claim for the utility of science to 
business. Naturally everybody wants society, including business, to make use of results 
from science. However, the issue is more complex. From the first European universities 
were founded in Late Middle Ages they had to fight for their independence from Church 
and/or King. Today they have to fight for independence from Business. In practice the 
most serious problem is perhaps not Business, but politicians thinking they can help 
Business by giving their representatives power in governing universities and research 
institutions. 
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New government – new organization, new priorities and no more 
resources 
In November 2001 Denmark got a new right wing Government with its parliamentary 
majority based on the Danish People’s Party. What generally has happened of relevance 
for innovation and technology policy is first of all increased focus on the importance of 
knowledge and new technology. More importantly, perhaps, is the introduction of new 
institutions, e.g. a new Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation which has been 
proclaimed as an instrument to make universities more business friendly and to promote 
activities with the intention of making it more interesting for universities to take part in 
transforming research into commercial activities. One important thing in this connection 
is a proposed change in the act governing universities, implying that a board appointed 
from the Ministry with a majority of representatives from private business will select 
Principals. Institutional innovations have also been made in the regional support system. 
 
What will happen in the long run remains to be seen – we can observe different trends 
in different countries, including the Nordic countries. One expected development is that 
universities will become more elitist. Also, research institutes as centres of basic 
research and the existing universities will probably become institutions for the 
production of candidates without research based teaching.  
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Finland 
By Juha Oksanen 
 
During the last years the development of national technology policies in Finland has 
been dealt with in several research papers and publications. The official expression of 
and explanation for Finnish science and technology policy has been announced by the 
Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland, which every third year publishes a 
review summarising main trends and presenting targets for future developments.  
 
Also, Finnish researchers have found the development and theoretical underpinnings of 
the national technology policy an interesting research theme. Tarmo Lemola has studied 
‘the long wave’ of Finnish technology policy in several articles and reports (e.g. 2001a, 
2001b, 2001c). Mikko Rask (2001) has analysed values underlying technology policy 
from a conceptual and systemic point of view. Riikka Eela’s study (2001) focuses on 
the ideas that have shaped science and technology policy in Finland. She bases her 
analysis on the reviews published by the Science and Technology Policy Council 
between 1973 and 2000.  
 
Key concepts of Finnish science and technology policy in the 1990s – national 
innovation systems and clusters - and their use in policy-making have been analysed 
thoroughly recently. In his dissertation, Jääskeläinen (2001) studied the import of 
diamond and cluster models into Finland, the dissemination of these models and the 
reasons for their widespread acceptance. Miettinen (2002) has analysed in depth the 
development of the concept of national innovation system and its rhetorical use in 
technology policy-making in Finland. 
 
This overview of trends in Finnish innovation policies proceeds chronologically from 
the past to the present. The focus is on the development of Finnish technology policy 
from the 1970s onwards. However, the post-war period preceding 1970 is also covered 
to some extent in order to set more recent development into a wider historical 
perspective.  
From World War II to the 1970s - groundwork for national 
technology policy 
The history of Finnish science and technology policy can be divided into three main 
lines, which have been developing parallel to each other. First, there is scientific 
research and its development; secondly, the development of university education and its 
administration; and thirdly, the connection between industry and the previously 
mentioned factors. (Lönnqvist & Nykänen, 1999, 4) 
 
The scientific and political systems approached each other gradually in the 1930s and 
1940s. Debate on the development of university and technical education increased in 
Finland in the 1940s. At the same time more attention was paid to the significance of 
research work in certain industrial field. The debate became more focused after the 
establishment of the Technical Research Centre of Finland (later known also as VTT) in 
1942. The public debate was however still sporadic and rested mainly on opinions of 
individual researchers or persons with technical background. (Lönnqvist & Nykänen, 
1999, 7) 
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The State started to develop scientific-technical research more intentionally from the 
1940s and the 1950s. An important signpost in the development of science and research 
policy was the establishment of the Academy of Finland at the turn of the 1950s. Before 
the 1960s Finland had no industrial policy in its modern sense, as Jääskeläinen (2001, 
16-19) notes. Public industrial policy support for firms was minor at best. For example, 
between World War I and II the Government did not give any direct support for 
industry but focused its efforts on the development of an operational environment for 
industry. The policy of that time was in line with negative stances among Finnish trade 
and industry circles towards public intervention in business life. Even the term 
‘industrial policy’ was not used. At that time government policy concerning operational 
preconditions for industry focused on the creation of basic structures of science, 
education and technology. Also, the creation of state-owned companies demanded the 
Government’s attention.  
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s role in industrial policy-making became more 
explicit only in the latter part of the 1950s. The history of industrial policy is however 
longer if we understand it as public activity which has economic, scientific and 
educational aspects. In the beginning of the 1950s a political discussion had started 
about the geographical concentration of industry and the problems the weaker regions 
were facing because of this development. The Ministry of Trade and Industry presented 
its first financing instruments for industrial policy needs in 1956 in forms of two loan 
schemes: pienteollisuuslaina (‘loan for small enterprises’) and vientimaksulaina (‘loan 
for export fee). (Jääskeläinen, 2001, 17-18) 
 
In the 1950s the foreign trade was opened up step by step, something which gradually 
caused new competitive challenges for Finnish industry. More intense international 
trade relations also gave impetus for new needs concerning competencies and 
technologies. Still, industry regarded with a certain suspicion the idea that industrial 
policy issues would be dealt by a strong public body. Therefore the matters linked to 
industrial policy were taken care of by the Ministry of Finance and the commercial 
policy department of the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s role 
was not strengthened until the end of the 1950s. (Jääskeläinen, 2001, 17) 
Birth of science and technology policy 
Lönnqvist and Nykänen have identified the birth of Finnish technology policy in the 
period from 1956 to 1968. During that period views about the economic importance of 
natural and technical sciences became more clarified. After the mid-1950s, a wider 
debate on the development of research work and technical education took place. 
Themes which raised attention were linking considerations and the needs of industry 
and production for a reform of science, research and university policy. Especially 
commentators from the University of Technology and the National Technical Research 
Centre, VTT voiced these issues in the public debate.  
 
Lemola dates the institutionalisation of science and technology policy to the early 
1960s. At that time a number of changes took place that were favourable for the 
formation of the new policy area. These factors included positive economic 
development and changes in political power structures. Generally, the 1960s opened up 
a lot of opportunities for collective and private initiatives, and created new procedures 
for cooperation and competition. According to Lemola, actors and interest groups 
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concerned with science and technology were particularly well prepared to make use of 
these new opportunities. Thus, in a short period science and technology policy became a 
significant and widely accepted part of the Finnish ‘modernisation project’. (Lemola, 
2001b) 
 
The report of the Industry Advisory Board in 1959 defined public policy’s role in a way 
that has strong resemblance with ideas pronounced 40 years later. The advisory board 
viewed with certain reservation the Government’s possibilities to intervene in industry 
development by means of a coherent industrial policy. The advisory board saw it 
advisable that the Government would focus its attention on the creation of general 
preconditions for industrialisation so that this activity could take place in the most 
profitable way possible, also with respect to the total benefit for the national economy. 
According to the report, the creation of these preconditions depended decisively on state 
finances. Education, public procurement, activities of state-owned firms, export 
guarantees and loans, as well as the strengthening of firm’s financing and other non-
public financing were defined as the most important means of industrial policy. 
(Jääskeläinen, 2001, 18-19) 
 
During the 1960s higher education and science policy were coupled closer with 
industrial and regional policies - e.g. science policy was strengthened by the 
establishment of new universities in different regions of the country. Industrial policy as 
a term became established in the late 1960s and it was also accepted more widely by 
various stakeholders. (Jääskeläinen, 2002, 59) 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry launched a new instrument for the funding of 
research and development in 1966. At the same time the right to deduct research 
expenditures from taxation was strengthened. Later, the introduction of these new 
instruments supporting firms’ R&D activities has been interpreted as one of the first 
signs of an emerging technology policy. Sitra, the Finnish National Fund for Research 
and Development was founded in 1967. The new organisation’s tasks consisted in 
accelerating the country’s economic growth, optimising the location of industry, and 
increasing the efficiency of public investments. In the 1970s the application of new 
technologies and supporting innovation was emphasised as parts of Sitra’s tasks. 
(Michelsen, 1993) 
 
The development and geographical decentralisation of higher education played a 
significant role in the development of Finnish science and technology policy during the 
1950s and the 1960s. Decentralisation of higher education outside of the capital area 
was an issue already in the early 1950s, when a committee was appointed to consider 
development of higher education. The issue was brought up again at the turn of the 
1960s by President Kekkonen, who demanded a planned science policy and an 
extension of university sector. The demands, preparation and legislative work resulted 
in the founding of new higher educational institutions around the country and the 
growth of research and education in natural sciences, technical sciences and social 
sciences. (Jääskeläinen, 2001, 20) 
 
At the end of the 1960s, the government appointed KTM-68 committee reformed and 
strengthened industrial policy substantially. The committee established the term 
industrial policy in the discussion: The committee called for a systematic industrial 
policy and the establishment of necessary planning apparatus. The committee also 
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recommended that industrial policy and technology policy should be disentangled from 
each other, that a policy promoting industrial R&D should be created and that funding 
for goal oriented research should be increased. In the committee’s opinion active 
industrial policy belonged to the tasks of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, contrary to 
the earlier view that ‘Government’s appropriate role is to be a night-watch’. The broad 
definition of industrial policy was seen to include different policy sectors from 
financing, research and development, and still further, education and energy policies. 
All these policy areas should be moulded into a solid and even industrial policy.  
 
The KTM-68 committee proposed that the administration dealing with industrial matters 
should create a development policy for industrial R&D, which would focus on 
development of new and modified products and production processes. It was 
recommended that project based, goal oriented research funding should be increased in 
order to ensure economic growth. The committee also recommended reforming the 
organisation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, so that a separate industrial policy 
line and a technology office were established within the Ministry. (Jääskeläinen, 2001, 
21) 
Role of international good practices 
In views of some experts, the decisions concerning development of science and 
technology policy in Finland have not been particularly unique in an international 
perspective. For example, Lemola (2001, 31) reminds us that organisational solutions 
and policy instruments have been copied in many instances from more advanced 
countries of the time. In first decades after World War II the Swedish example had an 
especially strong influence on Finnish decisions on the organisation of science and 
technology policy. From the mid-1960s onwards OECD also became an important and 
highly valued ‘trend-setter’ for Finnish decision-makers. Still today OECD is one of the 
international actors whose opinions are listened carefully to by science and technology 
policy-makers in Finland. 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s international examples of the development of technical-
scientific activity were sought from Scandinavia, Central-Europe and Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The OECD countries were an especially important source for statistical 
reviews of technical research. At the end of the 1950s the newly created assignments of 
technical attachés in Finnish embassies constituted a channel for information about 
development abroad. The technical attachés were reporting about technical development 
and research in their host countries. The role of the technical attachés was in focus in 
the beginning of the 1960s. Especially Sweden served as an example when the 
development of the tasks of the attachés was considered.  (Lönnqvist & Nykänen, 1999, 
25) 
 
International examples also played an important role when the Science Council of 
Finland was founded in 1963. The administrative and scientific model for the Council 
was found in Sweden, where a body called Forskningsberedningen was carrying out 
similar tasks. The establishment of a similar kinds of science councils and committees 
for the co-ordination of plans concerning science and higher educational policies was an 
European wide phenomenon. (Lönnqvist & Nykänen, 1999, 26) 
 
The tasks of the Science Council included general coordination of the plans and actions 
concerning the promotion of research. The Council should also control important 
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research related plans and appropriation proposals and make statements to the 
Government when needed. In addition, the Council’s assignment encompassed a 
number of other issues: Participation in international research co-operation, allocation 
of research resources between ministries, legislation concerning research and 
development work, as well as the establishment and reform of research institutes. 
Administratively the Science Council was subordinate to the Ministry of Education. 
1968-1975 - realisation of earlier policy decisions 
In the 1960s the development of science and technology policy was characterized by 
continuation: Principles and questions brought forth in the previous decade were now 
matters of administration and concrete decision-making. This development resulted in 
the institutionalisation of science and technology policy by the end of the 1960s. As a 
result, definitions of policy were ready made when the new decade, the 1970s, started.  
 
Significant institutional reforms within the public sector were carried out during the last 
years of the 1960s. Sitra, the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development was 
founded 1967 and a reform of the Academy of Finland was implemented couple of 
years later, in 1969. An administratively important step was taken in the beginning of 
the 1970s, when industrial policy and technology policy were institutionally and 
administratively separated from each other. The industry department of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry was divided into separate lines for industrial policy, technology 
policy and energy policy, and the staff of the industrial department was increased. (e.g. 
Lönnqvist & Nykänen, 1999, 32) 
 
The development of science and technology policy was not centrally co-ordinated at 
that time: Different stakeholders and actors in the research system were involved in the 
process which led to the birth of a new policy area. The impacts of the decisions were 
however long lasting. For example, the separation of science and technology 
administration in the end of the 1960s has left its mark on later developments. The 
responsibility for the administration of science and technology policy was divided 
between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The former 
was responsible for science and institutions directly related to basic research and its 
promotion (the Academy of Finland and universities), whereas technology policy 
belonged to the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s line of duty. Increase of resources for 
research and development work became a focus area in the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. Additional resources were to be targeted to technical research institutes 
(VTT), technical universities and companies’ R&D work in the form of loans and non-
repayable support. (Lemola, 2001a, 33) 
 
The Science Council, a government advisory body, was one of the actors participating 
in defining of national science and technology policy. The council did not restrict itself 
only to matters of science and research. Also aspects of technology policy found their 
way to the reviews of the Science Council, even though the issues of technology policy 
did not directly belong to the council’s sphere of authority. Questions of technology 
policy have been touched upon in the reviews from the first review in 1973 and 
onwards. The handling of issues related to technology policy was motivated by the 
importance of scientific-technical research for economic growth, among other reasons. 
(Eela, 2001, 17) 
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The emphasis in the arguments used for legitimizing the Government’s intervention in 
the development of science and technology has changed over the time. In the first 
review of the Science Council, in 1973, the Government is presented as a competent 
actor setting national goals for science and research policy: The Government has to 
intervene, because the scientific research is increasingly affecting society. It is 
Government’s role to ensure that the direction science moves in is in compliance with 
the broader societal goals. The State is also presented as an international benefactor: 
The solution of global problems requires that research activities are increased also in 
Finland. The third line of justification used at that time underlined the State’s task to 
promote the adaptation of society to general international developments and to technical 
developments in particular. (Eela, 2001, 20) 
 
According to Michelsen (1993, 262-263), the technology policy of the 1970s focused 
mainly on the quantitative growth of the research system. This policy line supported the 
adaptation of industry to changes in markets. Policies aiming to increase the 
competitiveness of industry through qualitative actions were implemented to a lesser 
extent. 
 
Different kinds of thoughts were also presented in the policy discussion of the 1970s. 
The industry department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry published a review in 
1972 which dealt with development traits of industry during the decade. In the review 
the primary tasks of economic and industrial policies was defined to be acceleration of 
structural change in industry, improvement of operating preconditions of industry and 
supporting growth of industrial output. Expansion of production should be directed to 
competitive sectors and areas with growth potential. 
 
A watershed in the development of Finnish technology policy was the year 1979, when 
the Government appointed a broadly based Technology Committee to assess technical 
development and its impacts and to propose actions by which beneficial effects could be 
increased, harmful could be reduced and technical know-how strengthened.  
 
The Technology Committee highlighted in its report the role of automation and micro-
electronics, which according to the committee would radically change the industrial 
structure of industrialised countries in the course of 1980s. In the committee’s opinion 
the development of automation would decrease and change the demand for workers, 
accelerate manufacturing processes and intensify competition. The committee 
concluded that forceful technology policy actions would be required in order to keep the 
impacts of automation under control. Therefore, the committee urged the Government 
to make initiatives, which would secure the competitiveness of Finland’s industry and 
service sectors. In addition, the committee noted that industry must prepare itself to take 
advantage of the expansion of micro-electronics, to develop telecommunication and 
data-processing, to create automatic production control systems and to familiarize itself 
with the newest knowledge of bio- and material technology. (Michelsen, 1993, 263) 
 
Lemola remarks (2001b, 21), that the Technology Committee’s principal 
recommendations included the strengthening of science and technology policy both 
quantitatively (increased resources) and qualitatively (allocation of resources to the 
fields of high technology). The committee recommended that financing of research and 
development work should be increased immediately to a level equivalent of 2 percent of 
GDP. At the same it was seen necessary to create a system through which it could be 
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possible to develop enterprises’ operational preconditions as well as their 
responsiveness to innovation. The committee also recommended that the basics of 
information technology and technology in general should be included into the curricula. 
(Michelsen, 1993, 264) 
 
The Technology Committee’s work also laid the basis for the creation of the national 
technology agency, Tekes, a couple of years later. The committee urged a reform of the 
organisation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This recommendation led the 
Government to appoint the KTM-81 Committee to untangle reform requirements both 
within the Ministry and its administrative field. The KTM-81 Committee recommended 
that technology policy planning and steering in Finland should be subsumed within an 
administrative body, which would be subordinate to the Ministry of Trade and industry 
but not although belonging to the Ministry’s organisation. 
The 1980s - big programmes and new institutions 
In the 1980s technology policy became more interventionist in Finland. Another visible 
phenomenon in the 1980s was the strengthening of technology policy. Part of that 
change was the restructuring of the institutional landscape of the policy area. At the 
same time the development of a broad based industrial policy was emphasized, which 
was reflected by the gradual convergence of science and technology policies. (cf. 
Jääskeläinen, 2002, 60) 
 
Active exploitation of the opportunities opened up by new technologies for the benefit 
of economic growth and employment became the guideline for the Finnish science and 
technology policy in the 1980s. If the earlier phase of science and technology policy had 
been characterized by the construction and renewal of the institutions and organisations 
of the R&D system, a distinctive feature of the new policy was increasing government 
involvement in the promotion of industrial innovation. A belief in rational policymaking 
came back, but science with social objectives was replaced by technology and 
competitiveness of industry as the main guideline. (Lemola, 2001b, 21) 
 
A new organisation, Tekes, the National Technology Agency was established in 1983 as 
the key planner and executor of the new technology oriented policy. Tekes was 
designed after the model of the Swedish Board for Technical Development (Styrelsen 
för teknisk utveckling). Later, the founding of Tekes has been identified to be an 
important turning point in public R&D funding in Finland. The new organisation grew 
rapidly into the role of the most important R&D funding body of the country. Promising 
international examples from Japan and Sweden encouraged Finnish technology policy 
makers to include national technology programmes into Tekes’ service and instrument 
portfolio. The new instrument was not only developed to channel public funding but 
also to draw together and strengthen co-operation between universities, government 
research institutes and companies.  
 
In the 1980s, information technologies were the focus area of Tekes’ activities - in line 
with the recommendations of the Technology Committee some years earlier. 
Technology programmes relating to information technologies were launched already in 
the end of the 1970s, prior to the establishment of Tekes. One dealt with solid state 
technology and another with information technology. In the latter part of the decade 
Tekes was criticized for having been too much oriented towards information 
technologies at the cost of basic industry. According to Lemola this criticism was not 
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wholly justified, because the share of information technology in Tekes’ funding had 
been decreasing during the last part of the 1980s. (Lemola, 2001a, 40) 
 
The establishment of the Science and Technology Policy Council in 1987 was another 
significant institutional reform in the 1980s. The transformation the Science Policy 
Council underwent in order to become reborn as the Science and Technology Policy 
Council manifests the technology orientation of the decade. (Lemola, 2001b, 23) 
 
In its first review in 1987 the new-born Science and Technology Policy Council lists the 
creation of Tekes as the most important development in technology policy during the 
decade. The review further states that technology policy has been established as one of 
the focus areas in the national policy sphere in the 1980s. Eela (2001, 17), who has 
studied the reviews of Science and Technology Policy Council thoroughly, maintains 
that in the review in 1987 technology policy is understood to be a kind of lobbying in 
relation to other policy sectors: The creation of favourable conditions and environment 
for innovation demands influence on financial and educational policies, among other 
things. To put it more neutrally, this stance represents the idea of co-ordinating public 
policies and actions in order to increase chances to achieve the goals deemed to be 
desirable.  
 
Besides institutional reforms of the science and technology policy field, the 
internationalisation of R&D activities was taking big leaps forward in the 1980s. Efforts 
were made to increase and develop international research interaction especially with 
Western-European organisations. Until then, Finland had avoided to bind itself too 
closely to research activities which had connections to the European Commission (ESF, 
CERN, ESA). Previously, official research collaboration was mostly geared towards 
Nordic co-operation and bilateral co-operation with socialist countries. At individual 
researcher level close ties and co-operation took place with researchers from Western 
Europe and the USA. For example, the exchange programmes had offered for talented 
Finnish researchers an opportunity to study in the USA already from the 1950s-1960s. 
(Lemola, 2001a, 40) 
 
The first official step towards closer official relations with Western-European R&D 
partners was taken in 1985, when Finland joined Eureka. Tekes played an important 
role in that case. Tekes was also a prominent actor when Finland started to prepare for 
participation in the framework programmes of the EU, which were opened to Finland in 
1987. Participation in the EU research programmes became a substantial part of Finnish 
science and technology policy at the end of the 1980s.  
 
Lemola (2001a) assesses that technology transfer and commercialisation was a third 
visible trend in the Finnish science and technology policy of the 1980s. Utilization of 
results of R&D activities was under discussion already in the 1970s but with somewhat 
different emphasis: At that time utilization of research results was referring mainly to 
needs to improve library and information services, develop ways to inform decision-
makers and the public about science, and tighten links between researchers and users of 
research results. A new phase began in the middle of the 1980s when first technology 
centres (or ‘villages’ as they were known at that time) and technology transfer 
companies were founded. The first technology centre of Finland was founded in Oulu in 
1982.  
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Technology transfer and commercialization of research results were gradually getting 
more attention also in Tekes’ technology programmes. The basis for technology transfer 
and utilization of research results was laid in the 1980s and the founding of technology 
centres had an especially strong regional and political support. The technology centres 
were understood to support regional political aims to promote even development 
between regions. The centres were even seen to offer an opportunity to promote the 
kind of public services that stimulate the development and introduction of new 
technologies in SMEs. 
The 1990s - consolidation of systemic policy-making 
When reviewing Finland’s recent history the economic depression in the beginning of 
the 1990’s cannot be left unmentioned. In the beginning of the decade the Finnish 
national economy entered a very severe crisis. Between 1990-1993 gross national 
product (GDP) figures dropped 13 percent, the national currency - markka - devalued 
almost 40 percent and unemployment peaked close to 20 percent. Also the bank system 
was in serious crisis which eventually led to a new alignment of the whole banking 
business in Finland. The negative economic spiral had deteriorating effects on the state 
finances: At the same time as tax incomes dropped, the need for public expenditure 
rose. This, in turn, caused both a deficit in the state budget and external debt. (e.g. 
Lemola, 2001a, 44) 
 
What caused the economic crisis of the early 1990s? There were both internal and 
external reasons for the crisis, as many researchers have pointed out. External causes 
which are often referred to are the sharp rises in European interest rates and the collapse 
of Soviet Union, which was an important trading partner for Finland. Some researchers, 
though, maintain that the role of external factors has been emphasized too much in the 
discussion about the economic crisis (cf. Honkapohja & Koskela, 1999 and Kiander, 
2001). According to them, the key reasons for the crisis were internal, e.g. the poorly 
designed deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and the crumbling of the 
overheated ‘casino economy’ of the late 1980s. However, the relative contribution of 
external and internal factors to the economic crisis remains an open and politically 
sensitive issue.  
 
In the middle of economic crisis the Government launched a preparation for a new 
national industrial strategy. According to Jääskeläinen (2002, 61), the reasons for 
launching this strategy work were several: The rapidly weakening situation of the 
national economy and state finances, the need for structural reform of the Finnish 
economy, the deterioration of Finland’s international competitiveness, the upsurge of 
unemployment and the impacts of the European integration process on the general 
framework of economic policy-making. In the face of mounting challenges, demands 
for national strategies targeting problem areas emerged. The Government responded 
quickly to these demands by commissioning several crisis analyses and programmes on 
in 1992.  
 
The creation of the new industrial policy strategy was carried out in small working 
groups, the core of which consisted in two officials of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and a senior researcher of ETLA, the Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy. This was a new approach. Previously, a committee presenting a wide 
selection of interested parties and stakeholders would have been nominated to draft a 
policy strategy. Now, however, the small working groups were chosen to prepare a 
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strategy in order to accomplish work quickly and produce guidelines for reform of 
industrial policy. The decision to assign the preparation to the small expert groups was 
also a way to avoid conflict of interests. The strategy aimed among other things at 
adopting modern industrial policy thinking, sketching solutions which could target 
Finland’s problems in the 1990s and strengthening the position of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in industrial policy-making. (Jääskeläinen, 2002, 61) 
 
The new industrial strategy was prepared within short time span from autumn 1992 to 
spring 1993. Preparation of the industrial strategy gained a lot from an on-going project 
of ETLA. So called cluster research project analysed Finnish industry and 
competitiveness. Theoretically the project applied Porter's diamond and cluster models 
in Finnish context and the ideas and results of the project were used in the redefinition 
of Finnish industrial policy. This theoretical underpinnings were also clearly stated in 
the strategy rapport (1993, 42), according to which "Porter's competitiveness model 
offers a natural framework for contemplation of a new industrial policy". (See also 
Miettinen, 2002, 135). 
 
The redefined strategy made clear distinction between the old and new industrial 
policies. The old industrial policy was described to consist of direct subsidies for firms 
as well as regional and sectoral subventions. Also public planning trying to direct 
structural development and the production decisions of companies was seen as an 
important element in the old approach. The new sketched industrial strategy meant ‘the 
end of having a dispersed system of supports and financial aid’, as it was put in the 
report (1993, 43).  
 
Juxtaposition of the old and the new way of thinking can be seen even at the level of 
policy goals: ‘the goal is not the reallocation of current resources but rather the 
influencing of quantity and quality of resources to be born in the future’. The new 
guidelines for industrial policy promoted structural changes indirectly by targeting the 
areas where markets are working insufficiently (cf. the market failure argument), by 
utilizing external effects of investments in R&D, by developing production factors 
(mainly know-how and research) and by advancing the working of markets. 
(Jääskeläinen, 2002, 61-62) 
 
The redefined national industrial strategy was welcomed by various stakeholders. It 
gave impetus for discussion in different policy areas and its lifecycle has been unusually 
long. Jääskeläinen (2002, 62) sees a number of reasons for the popularity of the new 
industrial strategy. As a policy guideline the strategy was based on an exceptionally 
thorough analysis of business life, economic development, policy environment and 
pressures for a change of policy tools. Arguments for industrial policy were based on 
concepts from topical research, which gave more credibility for the strategy also among 
those who were not directly involved with industrial policy-making. 
 
The framework adopted in the industrial strategy coupled together different 
stakeholders, the language was largely understood and things could be said in fresh and 
clear ways in order to induce action. In addition, Porter’s diamond model was used to 
explain and illustrate why a wide approach of industrial policy-making was a necessity. 
The cluster model did not itself provide content or direction for the new policy, as such. 
Instead, it served as a instrument the various stakeholders could use to speak about the 
new policy. (Jääskeläinen, 2001, 128 and Miettinen, 2002, 136) 
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The basic idea behind the approach was presented already in 1981 by the KTM-81 
committee which made a proposition for an extensive industrial policy. The committee 
had proposed that the goals of industrial policy should be followed up in all relevant 
policy areas. This wide definition of industrial policy was again presented in the 
national industrial strategy of 1993 and the policy spheres included were defined more 
carefully than earlier. 
 
A consequence of this wide definition was that industrial policy did not stay as a 
sectoral policy per se. Instead it was transformed into a policy which touched upon the 
goals and activities of society as a whole – the perspective of industrial policy 
broadened from industrial sector policy to national social policy. In this way the 
diamond model presented in the industrial strategy in 1993 translated into a political 
programme, which defined key areas of national competitiveness, policy arenas and the 
role of Government. (Jääskeläinen 2001 and 2002) 
 
Later on, the cluster approach was applied more widely in the context of an additional 
appropriation for research programme, which Government approved in 1996. The 
additional funding programme worth FIM 1,5 billion (€ 252 million) was implemented 
in the years 1997-1999 and part of the increased funding was channelled through eight 
cluster programmes, which were formed under five sectoral ministries. The international 
expert group, which performed an overall evaluation of the additional appropriation 
programme, concluded that the idea of a cluster programme was one of the main new 
elements in the additional funding of research from 1997. (Prihti et al, 2000, 34 and 51) 
 
Jääskeläinen (2002, 67) crystallizes the role of the cluster concept in the Finnish policy-
making of the 1990s in the following way: ‘the concept has served as a framework for 
research and method, as a description of economy, as a means of policy-making, as a 
means of strengthening the role and influence of an organisation (MTI) and as an 
expression of modernist attitude’. 
Technology policy and recovery from the economic crisis 
The impact of the economic crisis on R&D expenditure was surprisingly short-lived. In 
the midst of the crisis (1989-1993) the average real annual growth in R&D expenditure 
dropped to around one percent, whereas in preceding years (1983-1987) it had been 
about 10 percent. The average annual growth of the R&D expenditure of firms in the 
years 1989-1993 was about 0.3 percent, whereas the corresponding figure over the same 
period was 1 percent for the universities. The growth rate of R&D expenditure towards 
the end of the 1990s climbed back to over 10 percent. (Lemola,  2001c, 11) 
 
The deep economic crisis did however cause a commonly felt ‘sense of urgency’ to 
redirect economic development. This sense of urgency also paved the way for a re-
allocation of massive amounts of government budgets in the favour of science and 
technology policy in the 1990s. A reflection of this is the government decision to 
increase public investments in R&D through the additional appropriation for research 
programme (1997-1999). 
 
Official guidelines for science and technology policy were changing at the turn of the 
1990s. Two concepts, ‘a national innovation system’ and ‘knowledge and know-how’, 
were building blocks of the new science and technology policy paradigm. It was the 
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Science and Technology Policy Council that in its Review in 1990 introduced both 
concepts in the official Finnish technology policy discussion. (Lemola 2001a. Also Eela 
2001) 
 
With the emergence of the concept of national innovation system the role of the State in 
technology policy was redefined. In the earlier reviews the State was seen to be the 
principal goal-setter of the technology policy. In the new policy framework the role of 
the State is to be an providing actor, which supports other actors in the innovation 
system to achieve the targets they have set for themselves. The other principal actors 
were in this discourse understood to be mainly enterprises. (Eela, 2001, 23) 
 
The Review of 1990 defines the national innovation system as follows: NIS is a whole, 
which includes all factors affecting to development and utilization of new knowledge 
and know-how. Eela maintains that the factors are not referring to actors, but somewhat 
ambiguously to ‘features’ of the national innovation system. Representatives of 
research, education, business and administrative circles are understood to be actors in 
the innovation system. The national research system (including universities, research 
institutes and company R&D), education, the general social atmosphere, interaction and 
co-operation between actors, internationalisation and factors having an impact on 
innovation creation and diffusion are listed in the review among the features of the 
innovation system. (Eela, 2001, 24) 
 
The breakthrough of cluster thinking in the policy discourse took place concurrently 
with the breakthrough of the concept of the national innovation system. As mentioned 
above, Porter’s idea of clusters was welcomed by Finnish policy-makers and researchers 
both in the field of technology policy and industrial policy. The titles of publications 
from the mid-nineties tell something about the interest cluster thinking evoked in 
Finland. Ylä-Anttila’s paper Industrial Clusters - A Key to New Industrialisation? came 
out in 1994. Two years later, in 1996 Ylä-Anttila published with Vartia a paper called 
Technology Policy and Industrial Clusters in a Small Open Economy - The Case of 
Finland. 
 
In the wake of the breakthrough of innovation system and cluster thinking, the 
justification for policy-making shifted somewhat. The use of innovation systems as a 
framework for policy-making set additional demands on education and research. The 
Science and Technology Policy Council’s review in 1996 notes that education and 
research are considered more and more from utilitarian viewpoint – among other things, 
the funding decisions and allocation of public resources for R&D testified for that. This 
shift was welcomed in the review and potential dangers, such as directing education too 
short-sightedly, were to be avoided through regular evaluations. (Eela, 2001, 22) 
 
In general, evaluation was increasingly understood in the 1990s as an instrument 
suitable for controlling and monitoring the functioning of various facets of the national 
innovation system. The Finnish science and technology policy field had seen the 
emergence of evaluation efforts already in the early 1980s. The first efforts inspired by 
international examples and internal considerations were carried out at the Academy of 
Finland and the Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT in 1983. The Academy of 
Finland was primarily interested in carrying out evaluations in scientific fields, whereas 
the evaluations at the VTT focused on the institute’s research programmes. Some years 
later, Tekes adopted the evaluation model in its technology programme procedures. It 
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was however in the next decade, the 1990s, that evaluation really anchored in the 
Finnish research and development system. (Oksanen, 2000, 16) 
 
The Science and Technology Policy Council played an important role in the nurturing 
of evaluation practices on the Finnish R&D scene. The Council actively promoted the 
diffusion of evaluation activities into different areas of the country’s public R&D 
system. For example, as a part of the development of sectoral research, the Council 
recommended in 1995 that all sectoral research institutes should be evaluated by the end 
of the decade. This was included in the official action programme for the development 
of sectoral research, which was approved by the Council in 1996. Around the same 
time, a recommendation to evaluate all Finnish universities before the turn of the 
century was also made. These two proposals have had an important role in diffusing and 
establishing the institutional evaluation practice in Finland. (Oksanen, 2000, 17) 
 
All in all, the diffusion of the evaluation activities has been profound: Between the 
beginning of the 1980s and 2000 over 170 evaluations connected to R&D were carried 
out. The focus of the evaluations has evolved as the evaluation practise has been 
diffused to new areas and as changes have occurred in societal interests. In the 1980s 
and in the early 90s evaluations focused more on the quality of Finnish research, on the 
positions of basic research, and on the conditions of research. Since then, more attention 
has been paid to the relevance and impact of public R&D activities, and to the 
efficiency of organizational operation and strategic questions. (Oksanen, 2000, 17-20) 
The emerging role of regions 
The strengthening of regional innovation policy is according to Lemola (2001, 46-49) 
one of the reforms of the Finnish science and technology policy which took place in the 
1990s. The establishment of the regional centres of expertise programme is a clear 
expression of the development. The first programme period was launched in 1994, a 
year before Finland’s accession to the EU. The second programme period started in 
2000 and runs to 2006. The new instrument did not in itself increase funding for R&D 
significantly - rather the centres of expertise programme is an umbrella-like instrument 
assisting regions in targeting resources in areas which are defined as strategic. The 
regional centres of expertise programme also constitute a national instrument of 
channelling the EU funding that is meant for regional development. (cf. also Miettinen, 
2002, 81-82) 
The first years of the new century - a quest for new landmarks of 
national technology policy 
In the Science and Technology Policy Council’s review in 2000 the adaptation of 
society to a changing environment is defined as one of the tasks of policy-making. 
According to the text we are currently living in the midst of epochal break, which is 
assumed to last for a long time. Working co-operation between private and public 
sectors within the framework of the national innovation system and continuous 
development of the system are among of the requirements which are needed when times 
are changing. (Eela, 2001, 22) 
 
The idea of the role of State in the Science and Technology Policy Council’s review in 
2000 differs markedly from the earlier reviews. The public sector is now understood to 
be first of all a facilitator and promoter, which opens the way for new success stories of 
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individuals and companies. A control function is no longer part of the Government’s 
role. Instead focus is on co-operation and securing good starting points for other actors. 
(Eela, 2001, 25) 
 
Lately, new challenges have emerged for national technology policy. Various signs hint 
that the resource and input oriented technology policy paradigm is at a crossroads. After 
years of substantial increases in R&D financing Finland has reached the international 
top league as to the share of R&D expenditures of GDP. The private sector stands for 
the major part of the increase in R&D expenditures but public funding also rose 
substantially during the second part of the 1990s. Additional government input to R&D 
was channelled through the additional appropriation for research programme, which 
was implemented between 1996 and 1999. Resources for the programme were 
generated by privatizing government owned businesses. At the moment there are no 
equivalent additional sources of finance at hand.  
 
There is no longer common consensus among policy-makers that more public resources 
should be put into R&D and technology policy. Major national technology policy 
organisations, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tekes and VTT, alongside the 
national federation of employers have pronounced repeatedly concerns because the 
government funding of R&D has not increased at the same pace as in the end of the 
1990s. According to these arguments government funding of R&D has stayed more or 
less on the same level for the last three years (2000-2002). This turn in policy is 
maintained to threaten the competitiveness of Finnish companies and Finland in the 
long run.  
 
During the 1990s large public investments in R&D were made in order to support a 
restructuring process of the Finnish industry and economy. Recently this strategy is 
being cautiously questioned especially by policy-makers responsible for state finances. 
Even if the strategy was fruitful in the past it may no longer be an adequate basis for 
future science and technology policy. Some commentators have also remarked that the 
growth of government spending on R&D has not stopped but increased more modestly 
for the last 3 years compared to the prior years of the additional appropriation 
programme.  
 
An intriguing detail related to the debate on public support is brought up by a fresh 
study concerning government funding for small and medium sized enterprises in 
Finland. One of the findings of the study was that the total amount of government 
funding awarded to SMEs has over the past four years grown quite rapidly and 
simultaneously with increases in the availability of external finance on the marketplace. 
This finding raises questions about the additionality of public support - is it 
supplementing financial gaps found in markets or even in some instances substituting 
private finance? (Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2002) 
 
European and global megatrends are also casting some doubts as to the possibilities of 
national technology policy-making. So far, Finnish technology policy has been a 
national project in essence, and its justification has rested on alleged positive impacts on 
welfare and development of society at large. In line with that, technology policy has 
been geared towards the needs of Finnish companies, whose success especially on the 
international market has contributed to - if not wholly determined - national welfare. In 
times when companies are becoming more globally minded in their strategies, this 
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causal link is not that self-evident any more. At the same time the role of the state is 
curbed by the emergence of the European Union and the regions in technology policy-
making. ‘New public participants necessitate an alternative view of public intervention 
in research and innovation’ (Mustar & Laredo, 2002, 67). It seems that technology 
policy-making is not any longer the monopoly of the national states. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s new technology policy guidelines for the years 
2003-2006 include some, even though cautious, references to challenges. The guidelines 
emphasize the need to be capable of identifying changes and new phenomena as well as 
new possibilities and chances created by changes. It is seen necessary that the 
innovation environment is developed more dynamically in order for it to be able to 
respond proactively to the needs of tomorrow’s operational environment - and not just 
react to the requirements of changing environment. Dynamism and flexibility of actors 
involved in innovation activities and technology policy is defined to be decisive for the 
efficiency of the innovation environment as well. The adjusted definition of technology 
policy points out that efficient national innovation environment ensures Finland’s 
international competitiveness also in future. The growing importance of international 
and European-wide arrangements in technology policy-making is covered directly in the 
guidelines, according to which utilization of European research and technology co-
operation and other international co-operation related to business and technology policy 
is an important part of the national innovation environment. 
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Iceland 
By Thorvald Finnbjörnsson 
 
This presentation is partly based on documents published on the Web pages of the 
Icelandic Government (http://www.raduneyti.is/interpro/stjr/stjr.nsf/pages/english-
index). 
 
The policy work of the Research Councils and its development 
The Icelandic Research Council RANNÍS was established by law No 61/1994 which 
entered into force that same year. Still the Council has a longer history, actually much 
longer than any other Nordic country, as well as many other countries for that matter. 
The beginning of the work of the council is to be found in the Government Consultant 
Committee established in 1938 to supervise experimental research of undeveloped 
natural resources. 
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In the beginning the work of the Council was coloured by imminent problems related to 
isolation of the country in case of a war in Europe. The Council was closely connect to 
the Industry committee of the University of Iceland and even had the same residence. 
The Council and the committee were located in the first house built on the University 
campus in 1937, the geology building. 
 
In 1955 the Science Fund was established by recommendation of the Research Council. 
The fund was under supervision of a board, which had no consultation role towards the 
Government, but awarded grants to basic research and to further education of scientists. 
There was at that time no direct formal relation to the Research Council. 
 
 160 
Iceland [Historical review] 
In 1987 a new law was passed about the National Research Council and the Research 
Fund. Simultaneously the Science Council was established, with three divisions with a 
common board. Oversight and management of the Science Fund was placed under the 
new Science Council. The Science Council formed a policy for awarding grants from 
the Science Fund based on scientific requisites, but had nothing to do with the forming 
of scientific policy. The National Research Council did prioritize some defined research 
areas for a period of time, e.g. biotechnology, information technology, material 
technology, environment and aquaculture. In the first three years of the operations of the 
Research Fund about one third of available funds were utilized to build up knowledge 
and promote experimental developments in field of biotechnology. Another fund, the 
Building and Equipment Fund was used to support the building up of facilities in this 
field. Figure 2 shows some of the overriding goals of the Research Council in 1987. 
 
Figure 2 Research Council Recommendations 1987 
 
The Research Council recommended In 1987 
• Increasing R&D investments 10% annually - by state and industry 
• Improved condition for innovation - risk capital!lIncreased demands for quality 
and output of R&D 
• Cooperation between public institutes and industry 
• Involvement in international R&D cooperation 
• Evaluation of results and increased publicity for R&D outcomes   
 
 
The establishment of the Icelandic Research Council and the ending 
of the National Research Council 
Following the economic stagnation that started in the latter half of the 1980s, an OECD 
evaluation on science and technology policy in Iceland was asked for. Simultaneously 
an evaluation of the environment for innovation and entrepreneurship was initiated. This 
evaluation took place in 1991 and 1992. The evaluators were rather outspoken about the 
lack of a harmonized government policy and a stimulating environment for innovation 
based on research and development. It was among other things proposed that a 
committee of ministers was to be established. The committee should be presided by the 
Prime Minister, but with the involvement of the business enterprise sector and the 
scientific society in order to harmonize government action with regards to science and 
technology policy and support to innovation. Figure 3 shows the main findings of the 
evaluations of Icelandic STI policies. 
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Figure 3. The main findings of the review of Icelandic STI policy, 1992 
STI Policy review 1992 –Main findings 
• Iceland’s strategy unclear 
• Lack of political commitment to S&T 
• Short-term thinking – Lack of co-ordination 
• No forum for setting national priorities 
• A new vision needed with science and technology at the core! 
This raised political attention! 
 
 
The advice of the evaluators was not followed at the time, but it was decided to merge 
the Science Council and The National Research Council into one Council of 11 persons, 
the Icelandic Research Council. The law on this matter entered into force in the summer 
of 1994. The members of the Council included representatives from three groups: 
Universities, research institutions and the business enterprise sector (one-third from 
each group). 
 
At this time it was also decided to drastically reorganize the business enterprise sector 
and the system of finance in the country, by privatizing public firms and loosen 
restrictions in the financial markets. Thus, a substantial renewal and reorganization 
process started. A well functioning financial market evolved in a rather short time, 
increasing the availability of risk capital and the will to invest in new ventures, such a 
those based on technology solutions. A considerable number of new firms were 
established. Most of the companies with high growth allocated quite a lot of funds to 
research and the building up of human resources. Economic growth in late nineties 
partly reflects this development. 
 
Figure 4 shows how the evaluations of Icelandic STI policies were followed up. 
 
 
Figure 4. Iceland’s response to the 1992 evaluation of the country’s STI policy  
 
OECD Review 1992 the Icelandic Response 
• Merged two research councils into one 
• Interdepartmental committee on research 
• Some increase in funding 
• Res. training fund- Research professors 
• Financial liberalisation - Risk finance 
• Emerging STP mechanism-emerging high-tech economy 
• Serious efforts - Concrete Results! 
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The policy and operations of the Icelandic Research Council, 1994 
to 2002 
When the new Icelandic Research Council was established in the autumn of 1994 it 
started to discuss and decide upon policy and operations, which has been characteristic 
for its work during the period. Three councils have been constituted in the period from 
1994 to 2002. They have all worked with the same emphasis, which for a large part has 
been on organising an inner structure and methods for awarding grants from the funds 
which is under the control of the Council. It can be stated that the way of operating the 
Research Funds has gained confidence from the community of researchers. The Council 
appointed 7 groups of experts to ensure peer review of applications, and also 2 
independent grants committees to propose awarding of grants according to the emphasis 
of the Research Council. The Council has worked towards the goal of ensuring active 
participation of young scientists and cooperation of research institutes and companies. 
Participation in foreign research cooperation has been highly regarded in the work of 
the Council. The mission of the Icelandic Research Council is presented in figure 5. 
Figure 5. The mission of the Icelandic Research Council established in 1994 
 
 
The Mission of the Icelandic Research Council (Established 1994 ) 
 
To reinforce and underpin the cultural and economic foundation of Icelandic society by promoting 
vigorous and well co-ordinated -  scientific research, technical development and innovation 
 
 
The Icelandic Research Council’s preconditions for the policy 
making 
The present Icelandic research and innovation system is characterised by some 
seemingly contradictory features: 
 
It is one of the smallest such national systems in the world in absolute terms, but 
relative to the national economy as measured by GDP it is among the five most resource 
intensive systems, and it is growing fast.  
 
It attempts to address the full spectrum of modern societal needs and as a result may be 
one of the most organizationally fragmented systems in the world. However, relative to 
its size it is one of the most productive systems among OECD countries with regards to 
scientific output, as measured by publications rate,  to international engagement and 
collaboration, and most surprisingly, recently also to the growth rate in patenting.  
 
The impact of research in the economy is also measurable by the success with 
harnessing renewable natural resources, meeting natural environmental challenges and 
more recently, by the rapidly growing share of knowledge based products and services 
in export figures and in the number of new technology start-ups. Some of the start-ups 
are not yet readily apparent in trade figures. In particular the heavy investments in 
biotechnology is still not turning sustainable income and profit to the economy as it is 
still in the investment phase. 
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Overall, Icelandic research has played a major role in the economic and social 
development of the country in the 20th century, and has recently become very important 
in creating the conditions for continued and sustainable economic growth in the 21st 
century. A recent survey conducted by the European Commission published in the 
European Innovation Scoreboard has shown Iceland to be among the leading European 
Nations in innovation capacity.  
 
How has this been possible with so small and scattered resources? 
The answers lies perhaps in several sources of strengths that are cultural and linked to 
the ‘strength of the small’ when properly exploited.  
 
Icelanders are on the average a well-educated and still relatively homogenous people 
with strong common, cultural values. A relatively large number of Icelanders receive an 
important part of their education abroad, but have a strong preference to return home 
and eagerly transfer their new knowledge and experience to the country’s benefit across 
the whole spectrum of national endeavours. 
 
The nation is receptive to new and advanced technologies and quickly adopts and adapts 
them to every day life in Iceland. Many indicators attest to this fact. 
 
There is close proximity between the science system - or the science community - and 
the users of science and technology. The short lines of communication greatly facilitate 
pragmatic and cost effective approaches to research problems and issues and the speedy 
transfer of research results to the users. This last point is becoming an increasingly 
important feature of the national system of innovation, which greatly serves to 
strengthen Iceland’s competitive position among nations. 
 
Also, Iceland has managed to create a favourable environment for innovation - a 
veritable living laboratory for research and development related to natural environment 
and processes, as well as human and technical systems with a great creative and 
innovative potential.  
 
Last but not least - we should not overlook that over the last 15-20 years Iceland has 
conducted a consistent science and technology policy which in hindsight has been very 
successful in the long run and the results of which can now be convincingly 
documented. 
 
The formal organization of our research system has not changed much over the last 40 
years although the functioning and the relative strengths of its various parts have greatly 
shifted, especially with the emergence of industry based R&D in the 1980s and its 
dramatic growth in the 1990s. The system appears to be ripe for a major change but that 
is the subject of another lecture.  
Challenges ahead 
This list of relative strengths (though with the inherent weakness due to absolute 
numbers and institutional fragmentation) should not blind us from the challenges that lie 
ahead.  In terms of R&D inputs (in 2001) Iceland is now at the stage coveted by the EC 
with an overall 3% of GDP spent on research of which nearly 2/3 comes from the 
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private sector economy. The weakness in that figure is that more than half of the 
industrial inputs come from one company, which has yet to turn profitable. 
 
The government input to R&D is currently close to 1,2% when measured in public 
performance (partly financed by the private sector and international funds), but about 
1,04 % when measured by the funding that comes directly from the national budget paid 
out of the common coffer. That is already the highest share by OECD comparison.  
 
A very large share of the Government’s funding inputs is in the form of direct 
institutional appropriations. The share of the free competitive funding through the 
Research Council (RANNÍS) Funds has remained more or less at a constant level over 
many years. Thus they have been rapidly decreasing in relative terms, and in influence 
as compared both to total government inputs for R&D and the total national funding of 
R&D. This is a real cause for concern because RANNÍS has been able to play an 
important long-term role in creating flexibility by supporting young researchers and 
leveraging other funds for the financing of forward looking scientific research and 
technological ventures. With the rapid relative erosion of competitive funds we may be 
facing a real difficulty in maintaining the quality and creative powers of our R&D 
system unless the channelling of funds are in part redirected from budget appropriations 
to competitive project funding. 
Past experience  
The relative success of our S&T policies since the middle 1980s lies in the strategy 
adopted and recommended by the Research Council in 1987, after the institution had 
been given the legal mandate to manage the newly established Research Fund - which 
later became the Technology Fund. The Council resolved to call for a common effort by 
industry and public institutions to increase total national investments in R&D by 10% 
per annum through much strengthened cooperation within the fragmented research 
system, through increased international R&D cooperation, and through increased 
demands for the quality and public visibility of research outputs. The Council also 
called for greatly improved conditions for innovation and availability of risk capital. 
This overall strategy - and the vision of the future that lies behind it - has been followed 
by subsequent councils irrespective of repeated reorganizations and changes in 
membership.  
 
The two major funds used by the Council to support science and technology through 
competitive project grants are the Science Fund and the Technology Fund. The strategic 
function of the Science Fund has long been to maintain a minimum level of activity of 
high quality, basic research across all major disciplines. The Technology Fund has been 
more instrumental in leveraging more resource intensive investments in applied research 
and development through cooperation between public and private research actors and 
through co-funding by different public and private funding organisations. 
Supplementing and enhancing this strategy through the Buildings and Instruments Fund, 
also operated by the Council, has also had very positive effects in leveraging the 
funding of major investments in instruments and facilities. This in particular has 
enhanced the cooperation between institutes and also attracted other private and public 
resources into R&D investments. Thus the Science Fund has kept the candles burning 
but the Technology Fund has been used to light some substantial fires that are now 
warming the economy and underpinning future growth. This strategy has been quite 
effective as can be shown through many concrete examples. 
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In the early days of the Technology Fund (previously Research Fund) in the latter part 
of the 1980s, the Research Council established technological priorities and encouraged 
applications in specific fields. This was possible because the Fund was new, and new 
money is more easily directed to create flexibility and daring investments. The 
technological priorities in the early years included aquaculture, information and 
computer technology, biotechnology, materials and energy technology, food and fish 
processing technology and finally productivity and quality enhancing technology. The 
major initial investments were in biotechnology and aquaculture but later in food and 
fish processing technology. The time horizon for the application of this research was 
considerably longer than might have been expected, especially in biotechnology. One 
can, however, well argue that the very active area of bio-genomic and pharmacy-
medical start-ups in Iceland today was facilitated by these early investments where 1/3 
of the Technology Fund resources were used in biotechnology alone. This is also linked 
up with the support given to biomedical and clinical research by the Science Fund. The 
same holds for the early investments in computer vision technology and image 
processing. Those investments have already paid handsomely off in the economy. In 
recent years the attention has been moving more towards software development, 
materials and production and construction technology with relatively shorter time 
horizons and the absence of clearly defined priorities. Only in the so-called specific 
programme for IT and Environmental Research (1998-2004) have there been clearly 
defined priorities. 
Industry-related policies  
In early 2001 the Ministry of Industry and Commerce made public its overall policy 
objectives and corresponding measures for the coming four years, as follows: 
 
1. Increasing diversity in Icelandic industry and improving its competitiveness 
2. Strengthening the Regional Economic Development   
3. Increasing the use of domestic energy sources 
4. Encouraging competition and strengthening consumer protection 
 
Increasing diversity in Icelandic industry and improving its competitiveness 
There have been major changes in Icelandic industries in recent years. Innovation has 
been stimulated primarily by a more liberal business climate and by rapid progress in 
science and technology, particularly in information and communications technologies. 
This has provided Icelandic industry with numerous opportunities to create a variety of 
jobs in new and demanding areas and enabled it to play an active and profitable role in 
international trade. 
 
The exploitation of scientific knowledge is becoming steadily more important as a 
catalyst to economic growth and a prerequisite for improving the competitiveness of 
business and industry. It is essential that the necessary framework conditions are 
provided that allow the market forces to deliver their best results. This involves 
devoting special attention to transmitting knowledge, promoting innovation in all areas, 
and encouraging the creation of start up enterprises. 
 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce has defined the following measures for 
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achieving the objective of increasing diversity and improving the competitiveness of the 
Icelandic economy: 
• New areas of knowledge, such as the biotechnology industry, will be given 
special encouragement, in order to develop profitable enterprises in this sector. 
• The dissemination of specialized knowledge will be strengthened. This will 
include measures to improve competitiveness by exploring ways to increase 
productivity and improve companies’ internal structures. 
• Public funds will be used to attract financing from private investors for major 
research projects.  
• Studies will be undertaken on ways to improve the tax position of enterprises, 
including their operations abroad. There will also be investigations of the 
possibility of using tax incentives to encourage research and development, and 
of waiving taxes and fees if they damage companies’ competitive position. 
• A survey will be done of the competitiveness of the Icelandic financial market 
with a view to strengthen its position in an international context. 
• The Icelandic Government will withdraw from its involvement in the banking 
and insurance sectors that compete with private enterprise. 
• Co-operative societies and savings and loan associations will be assisted in 
transforming themselves into limited companies, and they will be given the 
opportunity to issue listed shares so that they can compete on an equal footing 
with other enterprises in today’s capital markets. 
• The activities of IMPRA (Service Centre for Entrepreneurs and SMEs) will be 
strengthened by setting up service centres for entrepreneurs and companies in 
areas outside the capital. 
• There will be greater efforts dedicated to providing information on the 
importance of protecting intellectual property rights in the industrial area. 
• There will be a review of legislation concerning intellectual property rights in 
industry, including the provisions applying to design rights, utility certificates, 
and employees’ inventions. 
• Industries based on intellectual property, such as the film and music sectors, will 
be encouraged. A development fund will be established for the music industry, 
the main objective being to increase the export value of Icelandic music. 
• The Ministry will encourage expansion in the information technology sector by 
giving companies the opportunity to co-operate on solutions that relate to 
government services. 
• There will be consideration of ways to encourage innovation in business and 
industry by co-ordinating and combining research activities conducted by 
government agencies, improving their efficiency, making them more effective, 
and increasing their success rate. 
• Foreign investment will be encouraged, among other things, by providing a 
favourable legal environment through review and simplification of legislation 
applying to this area. 
• Marketing efforts for foreign investment will be strengthened, placing special 
emphasis on investment opportunities outside the capital area. 
• There will be a concerted effort to increase the number of bilateral investment 
agreements. 
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Providing employment opportunities outside the capital area 
Traditional forms of production in rural areas will continue to play an important role in 
the Icelandic economy, even though their percentage of the gross national product will 
diminish as new industries expand. These sectors will not be able to meet the need for 
new jobs directly, but can probably promote employment in an indirect manner by 
serving as a basis for new technologies, especially in the area of biotechnology. To this 
end, the Minister of Industry and Commerce intends to support efforts in the areas of 
plant and marine biotechnology as a basis for regional development. 
 
Information and telecommunications technology will heavily influence population 
developments in areas outside the capital. It will support new enterprises and play an 
important role in promoting equal employment opportunities and living standards 
throughout the country. 
 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce has defined the following methods of 
achieving the aims of promoting new industry and supporting regional development: 
• The Institute of Regional Development will take the lead in establishing new 
enterprises in rural areas by implementing a progressive regional development 
policy. The Institute will employ men and women with broad experience and 
knowledge of business, industrial innovation, and the development of new 
employment opportunities. 
• In developing new regional development plans, special attention will be given to 
measures that must acquire the force of law in order to ensure their 
implementation. 
• Measures to support new employment options will be assessed on the basis of 
the overall benefits they provide during an extended period of time. 
• The relocation of government activities in centres outside the capital will 
continue, with the objective of providing incentives for further economic 
development in these areas. 
• In co-operation with other parties, the Institute of Regional Development will 
initiate and support regional initiatives for industrial innovation, knowledge 
transfer and employment opportunities in accordance with government policy at 
any given time. 
• The Institute of Regional Development will play a leading role in establishing 
and reinforcing research centres outside the capital area, which will co-operate 
with universities, government research centres and industry. 
• The Institute will take the lead in ensuring that government advisory services 
serving regional industries are co-ordinated and merged as far as possible. 
• Service centres for individuals and companies with innovative ideas will be 
established in three locations outside the capital. 
• A centre for industrial innovation specialising in biotechnology will be 
established in Akureyri, where emphasis will be placed on the implementation of 
genetic research on marine resources. 
• Another centre will be established in Hvanneyri to work with opportunities that 
result from genetic research on agricultural resources. 
• A competition will be launched for local government authorities involving 
experimental projects to promote an electronic society. 
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Increasing the use of domestic power sources 
Iceland possesses extensive sources of renewable energy that have been exploited only 
to a limited degree. However, they are more intensively utilized than anywhere else in 
the world. Approximately 2/3 of primary power use in the country comes from 
renewable resources, and their share of electric power production is 99%. 
 
The production and export of aluminium, along with other energy-intensive industry, 
are actually exports of renewable Icelandic energy. Economic growth in recent years 
can be attributed largely to foreign investment in renewable energy sources, and 
experience has shown that industry based on these resources can play a role in halting 
migration from rural areas. 
 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce considers it essential to increase the utilization 
of domestic renewable energy resources in order to encourage diversification in 
industry, create a basis for foreign investment, increase the number of well-paid jobs, 
and support business and population development in rural areas. 
 
There must be competition in the production and sale of electricity. At the same time, 
there must be continuing research and development on new sources of energy/means of 
transmitting energy, to replace dependence on fossil fuels. Environmental concerns 
must also be taken into account in exploiting domestic energy sources, and there must 
be attempts to reconcile interests in utilising and conserving natural resources. 
 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce has defined the following means of achieving 
the aims of increasing use of domestic sources of energy and promoting competition in 
the energy sector: 
• Sufficient basic research should always be available concerning the possibilities 
of exploiting sources of hydroelectric and geothermal power. 
• Location, environmental, and planning studies for potential industrial areas will 
be done in accordance with plans for energy use. 
• Proposals by the Resources Committee for licensing fees for exploiting energy 
sources will be assessed in view of potential implementation. 
• A regulatory framework will be established concerning repayment of 
government research costs in power development areas. 
• Energy will be utilized as close as possible to its point of origin. Negotiations for 
energy-intensive industrial projects will also include discussion of possibilities 
for further processing of primary products in Iceland. 
• A permanent basis will be established for research on and development of new 
sources of energy and methods of energy transmission, including those 
associated with wind energy, hydrogen, and methane gas. 
• The role of the National Energy Authority as an advisory and public 
administrative body will be strengthened, and the division of labour between the 
Ministry and the Authority will be subjected to review. The Authority’s 
organizational structure will also be reassessed, among other things in view of 
competitive operation of the research department. 
• The first stage of a comprehensive plan for the utilization of hydropower and 
geothermal power will be concluded before the end of the year 2002. 
Preliminary conclusions will be utilized, if decisions on exploiting energy 
sources have to be taken before the plan is complete. 
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• Environmental concerns will be taken into account and thoroughly 
considered in the Ministry’s examination of energy development plans. The 
broadest possible public support will be secured for development projects. 
• When reviewing energy sector legislation, there will be emphasis on 
encouraging competition in the production and sale of electric power as well as 
greater efficiency and security of energy supplies. 
• The legal position of energy companies and their customers will be clarified. 
• Price equalization, subsidy payments, and other social welfare measures 
associated with electric power distribution in Iceland will be made more 
transparent and kept separate from competitive operations. 
• Energy companies will be permitted to form subsidiaries and acquire shares in 
other companies whose primary activities include producing, transmitting, 
distributing or selling energy, as well as exploit the expertise and equipment 
they possess for research and development in the areas of energy and energy 
projects in this country and abroad. 
• The regulatory framework for electricity producers and district heating 
companies will be co-ordinated and simplified. Monitoring of their rate 
schedules will transferred to the National Energy Authority. 
• Contacts will be initiated with foreign firms regarding research on the Icelandic 
continental shelf on the basis of upcoming legislation concerning the 
exploration, research, and extraction of fossil fuels. 
Encouraging competition and strengthening consumer protection 
A competitive environment is essential for modern business, and consumer protection 
must be assured in every respect. Business performance and a country’s standard of 
living are dependent on the existence of healthy competition, good services, a wide 
selection of goods, and reasonable prices. It is essential that business be provided with 
rules of the game that stimulate competition as well as promote efficiency and 
innovation. 
 
The competitive ability of the financial markets must be improved as much as possible 
in order to protect the interests of investment company clients. Consumers must also be 
fully cognizant of their rights. 
 
Government can make an important contribution toward improving service to 
individuals and companies by initiating electronic business and administration. Both 
will improve the country’s competitive position, and it is essential to provide the proper 
legal environment for these matters. It is also important to increase public access to 
official information and promote transparency in government administration. 
 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce has defined the following means of achieving 
the objectives of promoting competition and improving consumer protection: 
• The activities of the Competition Authority will be strengthened, so that it can 
effectively monitor obstacles to competition, unfair business practices, and 
market transparency. 
• The Ministry will mount an extensive information campaign on consumer 
legislation in order to inform consumers of their rights. 
• The Ministry will promote the dissemination of information for consumers, 
among other things, via the Internet. 
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• The public will be informed about the arbitration committees that handle 
relations between consumers and enterprises so that these bodies can better serve 
their purpose. 
• The legal framework for business will be consolidated through new legislation. 
The laws governing interest and depreciation will be reviewed and a special 
securities act passed. 
• Legislation concerning the financial markets will be simplified and better 
adapted to new market conditions, among other things through the addition of 
legislation concerning investment companies, unit trusts, and insurance 
contracts. 
• The Financial Supervisory Authority will be given the necessary powers to fulfil 
its monitoring function. 
• The legal environment for electronic commerce will be simplified. Special 
regulations for this sector will be kept to a minimum, and they will be adapted as 
far as possible to the legal framework of traditional business. 
• In its areas of activity, the Ministry will make every effort to adopt electronic 
administration in order to improve service to the public, thereby reinforcing 
public confidence in Icelandic governance and strengthening democracy. 
• Information technology will be employed in all contacts with the public, with 
the aim of expanding service and improving efficiency, as well as lowering 
costs. 
• It will be possible to receive 24-hour electronic service via the Ministry’s home 
page to the extent permitted by the most advanced technology available at any 
given time. 
• The public will be assured access to official information on the principle that 
knowledge acquired by government institutions is public property and should 
therefore be accessible to the public without charge in open databases. 
 
Recent technological developments have resulted in the continuous growth of 
knowledge-based industries and services. The five fastest-growing industrial sectors in 
Iceland over the past few years have been in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industry, health technologies (including pharmaceuticals), 
biotechnology, genetics, biomedical engineering and IT-based equipment production for 
food processing. After years of effort, developments in these fields have progressed 
from research to profitable operations. These industries have shown that the boundaries 
between traditional economic sectors and research institutions are gradually 
disappearing. The Ministry promotes closer links between industry on one hand, and 
universities and research institutions on the other, through increased innovation efforts, 
with the objective that public research funding should yield more economic returns. The 
primary function of the Icelandic Patent Office is to receive and handle applications for 
patents, trademarks and design protection. 
 
It could be stated that in the beginning of the 21st century, the Icelandic economy has 
gone through a reorganization following the global developments, and that it is now 
based on knowledge and human resources. Science and technological knowledge play a 
fundamental role in the social and economic development of the country. The 
importance of science and technological knowledge is supported by the establishment of 
the new Science and Technology Council, presided by the Prime Minister and with the 
participation of quite many other ministers and representatives of industry and the 
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science community. This implies the introduction of a new chapter in development of 
science and theology in Iceland.  
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Norway 
By Johan Hauknes, Olav Wicken, Per Koch and Siri Aanstad 
 
While only a few years ago, research and innovation policies were not part of the 
general public debate in Norway, at the moment it seems that major politicians can 
hardly utter a word without mentioning the need for innovation, research and a 
knowledge based economy. Internationally, the term innovation policies appeared as a 
term for policy concern in the 1970s.  
 
In Norway, the term was generally introduced in 1981 in the report to Government of 
the Thulin Commission, laying the foundation of major elements of Norwegian 
technology and innovation policies during the 1980s. A wider set of ideas for a 
Norwegian innovation policy was presented in three White Papers around 1990. A 
White Paper on industrial policies in 1989 implied a stronger emphasis on inter-
ministerial coordination of innovation policies, a White Paper on regional policies in 
1993 summed up a reorientation of regional policies that had been underway over a 
period of 5-10 years, while a White Paper on research policy in 1993 expanded the 
perspective of innovation policies by arguing for a stronger systemic approach to 
innovation, science and technology policies.  
 
Although the term innovation policy is fairly recent, innovation policies as functional 
concerns of public technology and industrial policies are not new. They are an integral 
part of wider industrial policies, covering areas such as science and technology (S&T) 
policies, regional policies, education policies, etc. Here, we survey trends in Norwegian 
innovation policies over the recent period. Although we focus on the trends of the last 
two decades, the developments will be seen in a broader historical context. 
 
In the decades following the Second World War and up to the late 1970s, Norwegian 
industrial policies were strongly influenced by the idea that there existed a ‘productivity 
gap’ or ‘technology gap’ between the USA and Europe. Subsequently, ‘America’ stood 
out as a model for industrial development, and the dominant strategy was to use state 
measures to promote the construction of big industry: Large producing units, large 
organisational units directed towards large scale production. These ‘traditional’ 
industrial policies were gradually dismantled in the second half of the 1970s, and the 
1980s saw several new policy developments.  
 
Central characteristics of innovation policies in this decade are the introduction of the 
so-called strategic technology areas (hovedinnsatsområdene), based on a set of 
recommendations from the Thulin Commission; a technology-push orientation; a focus 
on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and a shift in regional policies from a 
subsidy oriented policy support to rural areas to an innovation policy focus on the 
determinants and drivers for regional and local economic development. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, Norwegian industrial policy was characterised by attempts to 
reconstruct industrial structures – to generate a policy led structural change into 
‘progressive’ industries and industrial structures. The development of this specific 
structure was regarded as necessary to achieve long term economic growth and to be 
able to compete in an international market. This had in fact been a central strategy since 
the late 1940s, but the 1980s saw a shift in focus of these strategies. While the emphasis 
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until the late 1970s had been on establishing a corporate structure based on large and 
financially strong companies competing in international oligopolistic markets, from the 
1980s there was a shift towards attempts to develop new industrial sectors based on 
new, generic and enabling technologies. Technology policy priorities as these were 
widely shared among industrialised countries and were generally focussed on ICTs, 
material technology and biotechnology. 
 
The theoretical basis for this shift was the assumption that Western economy was going 
through a structural transition period characterised as an industrial revolution or change 
of technological paradigm. Theories of economic development as being stage led, with 
stages constituted by major technological shifts, as introduced by i.a. Chris Freeman 
was the foremost argument for a policy arguing that new technologies would create new 
growth industries which in the long run could become the driving force for wealth and 
welfare. 118  
 
The theory became one of the theoretical bases for a strategy for re-industrialisation in 
a period characterised by stagnation in manufacturing industry. The new strategy was 
based on the idea that future industrial expansion was dependent on success within a 
few core high-tech technologies.119 Growth could not be achieved by improving old 
products and industries, but could only be achieved by developing new products or 
completely new industries, i.e. by an industry wide process of structural replacement of 
old industries – often at the time denoted sunset industries – with new, sunrise 
industries. 
 
In Norway, the main new instrument to increase re-industrialisation of high tech 
industries was the policy of strategic technology areas. There was broad national 
consensus behind the idea to increase funding for a few selected technologies - IT, oil 
and gas, new materials, biotechnology, and fish farming - and to improve the co-
ordination between public and private actors - such as companies, universities, R&D 
institutes, public agencies, etc.- within each technology area.  
 
It was generally accepted that the development of new industries was the outcome of 
scientific and technological processes. The new industries were defined as ‘science 
based industries’. R&D became the core element in this industrial strategy, and the main 
supporters of the strategy were people closely connected to the R&D system. Therefore 
the R&D system played a central role in the re-industrialisation policy of the 1980s. The 
policy had two main objectives: To expand the R&D sector (public and private), and to 
improve the industry-research relationship so that more science-based industries could 
be established. 
 
The strategic areas policy was successful in the sense that public funding for the 
selected areas increased, but there is less evidence that the system succeeded in 
improving co-ordination. Each technology area had different histories and institutional 
settings, and there were different policy measures used for each area.  
                                                 
118 Freeman, C.,Clark, J. and Soete, L., Unemployment and technical innovation : a study of long waves 
and economic development, London: Pinter, 1982 
119  In Norway, this policy was developed over the period 1982-85 and was introduced fully in 1986 in the 
State Budget for the financial year 1987. 
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The most complex policy was in the IT sector where a number of initiatives were taken 
to improve both education, research, production and the use of technology. As an 
industrial policy, R&D and direct support for companies became a main tool for 
improving growth and development.120 In the oil and gas sector also, R&D became an 
important instrument for the development of a strong national industry directed toward 
the market for investment goods in the North Sea. In 1978 the Labour government 
introduced a series of measures to ensure long term supply of inputs to oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation, most prominent and successful among these being the so-
called ‘Goodwill agreements’. By procuring R&D and technological services from 
Norwegian suppliers international oil companies improved their position vis à vis the 
competition for getting concessions to explore and produce oil and gas from petroleum 
fields in the North Sea. The Goodwill agreements rapidly increased the size of the 
research sector of Norway, in particular the institute sector. The main winner was 
SINTEF in Trondheim which became the largest industrial research institute in 
Northern Europe. A third policy was used towards the rapidly expanding fish farming 
industry, where R&D also played an important role. This industry was dependent on a 
rapidly expanding international food market, and the important aspect was to ensure 
quality of the product and a low price to the consumer. Public R&D played a crucial 
role in developing the core technologies for the new sector of the industry.  
 
Gro Harlem Brundtland’s second Labour government, in government during 1986-
1989, set the goal of increasing public funding of R&D activities by 5 per cent per year 
in real terms in the Research Policy White paper of 1989.121 In spite of the rapid 
increase of R&D activities during the 1980s – partly as a consequence of the 
introduction of the targeted technology areas, partly as a reflection of the rapid increase 
up to 1986-87 of S&T activities related to the expansion of offshore petroleum 
exploitation – the general policy apprehension at the end of the 1980s was that there 
was a serious underinvestment in Norwegian R&D activities. Several policy priorities 
were introduced in this period to counter the perceived gap in R&D performance and 
bring Norwegian R&D performance up to OECD levels in terms of the GERD/GDP-
indicator122.  
 
The outcome of the various policies was that R&D funding grew rapidly through the 
1980s (see table 1). 
 
Table 1. R&D funding by sources, private/public 1983-1991 (mill NOK) 
Year 
 
Public sources Other industries Oil companies Other sources 
1983 
 
2924 1824 684 160 
1987 4830 3654 1329 299 
                                                 
120  However, market forces made it impossible to produce the 50 000 new jobs in the sector 
which promotors of a national IT plan promised in the mid-1980s. 
121 White Paper No 28 (1988-1989) On research (Om forskning) 
122 No one at the time seemed to notice that in terms of the alternative intensity indicator – GERD/capita 
or GERD/employment - Norwegian R&D performance was at least comparable with the level of all major 
trade partners. 
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1991 
 
6883 4478 902 331 
 
Source: National R&D statistics, Forskningsrådenes samarbeidsutvalg 
The numbers indicate the importance of public funding for industrial R&D in Norway 
throughout the 1980s. Even though industrial funding increased more rapidly than 
public funding, privately funded R&D still accounted for less than 50% of overall R&D 
expenditures. The table shows the dramatic structural change that affected the R&D 
performance during the 1980s; up to 1986 R&D funded by oil and gas companies 
showed a rapid growth and came to dominate substantial parts of the industrially 
oriented research system. Following the collapse of the price of crude oil on 
international markets, the expected profitability of a range of oil and gas fields offshore 
Norway fell and even turned negative. Hence, R&D related to exploration, construction 
of production facilities etc. was rapidly scaled down. 
 
In the course of the 1980s, the Norwegian research institutes were criticized for 
neglecting their industrial role, and the criticism led to a stronger policy stance of 
‘pushing the institute sector towards the market’ – to increase its receptivity to the needs 
and expectations of the industrial sectors. Though some of the RTD organisations in the 
national institute sector were formally autonomous - while others were public 
organisations – they were up to the early 1980s generally seen in functional terms as 
performing a public task: Producing and supplying the public good of technological 
knowledge. In 1982 a ‘deregulative’ priority was set for the institute sector, and the 
formerly public institutes were devolved from the public sector. The relation to NTNF 
and other R&D funding agencies were implicitly seen in terms of these agencies buying 
a service – the performance of specific research activities – on behalf of society, while 
the commercial viability and competitivity of the institutes were their own 
responsibility.  
 
The institutes gradually received less direct basic funding from the research council 
(Norges Teknisk Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd, NTNF) and were forced to rely 
more on income from industrial contractors and partners. Over time the institutes were 
turned into service institutions for industry more than the politically strategic 
technology institutions they had been from their establishment. Beyond this increased 
market exposure of the institute sector, the ‘new industry’ strategy did not however 
radically challenge the existing structure of institutions established in the post WW2 
period to promote industrialisation.123  
 
A striking aspect of the innovation policies of the 1980s is that they grew out of the 
former R&D industrial based S&T policies. The period saw a specialisation of S&T 
policies, with an emerging policy focus on the need to direct attention to other issues 
than the former S&T dominated policies, relying heavily on scientific research as the 
main vehicle. The former focus on the science base shifted to a view of the criticality of 
the technology base. There were still links between science and technology, but the 
                                                 
123 Elsewhere we have denoted the overall process as a KIBSification of the national R&D institutes – a 
process with evident parallels during the last 20 years in a range of countries. 
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acknowledgement of essential differences between the two, implied an autonomous 
technology.  
 
The shift in focus from science to technology made the technology push characteristic 
of the policies quite dominant. The considerable focus of generic technologies as the 
base for a re-industrialisation did not necessarily imply a dominant technology push 
view. But in the specification of this focus that came with the strategic technology areas 
and the related plans, this became evident. More explicitly expressed, a belief in 
technology push dynamics was dominant in technology diffusion initiatives of the mid 
1980s. 
 
As noted above, the period following World War II had seen a strong orientation 
towards large enterprises. In the late 1970s and the 1980s this changed, when increased 
emphasis was put on SMEs. This shift is reflected in the SME White Paper which was 
published in 1978.124 The emergence of the innovation policy concept in Norwegian 
politics at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen against this background. The 
concomitance of the SME White Paper and the Thulin Commission is probably not 
coincidental - innovation policy emerged as a policy concern in this period as a 
consequence of the increased SME focus. 
 
The Thulin Commission was set up by the Labour Government in 1980, and handed in 
its report in the following year. 125 The terms of reference the Commission was given 
was to consider the volume, organisation and efficiency of public support to industrial 
R&D in Norway, with a considerable bias towards assessing the role of public R&D 
institutions, the structure of public funds and agencies supporting industrial R&D and 
the role of higher education institutions. The weight given to industry-academy links is 
clearly reflected in the composition of the five members of the Commission; beside 
representation of LO, the major trade union organisation in industry, and Norges 
Industriforbund (the Norwegian Association of Industries), the other two ordinary 
members were representatives for the major relevant universities (Universitetet i 
Trondheim and Universitetet i Oslo). 
 
The 1980s also saw a new orientation in regional policies. While focus during the 1960s 
and 1970s had been on regional distribution and on de-population of rural areas, there 
was a shift towards a stronger emphasis of regional innovation policy rather than 
regional distribution policy from the mid 1980s. This shift is evident in the White Paper 
on regional policies published in 1989.126 
 
Another trend, discernable from the late 1970s, was the ideological shift away from 
using direct state intervention to promote industry towards using market mechanisms. In 
the immediate post-war period, there had been a substantial distrust in the market 
system to deliver its welfare benefits. In the area of industrial policy this view was 
clearly evident in the strong role the Labour governments in the 1950s and 1960s had in 
                                                 
124 White Paper No 7 (1977-78), Small and medium sized industrial firms (Små og mellomstore 
industribedrifter) 
125 NOU 1981:30A Research, technological development and industrial innovation (Forskning, teknisk 
utvikling og industriell innovasjon) 
126 White Paper No 29 (1988-89), Policies for regional development (Politikk for regional utvikling) 
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industrial development, also with a substantial and actively used public ownership. The 
final breakdown of these policies came with the breakdown of the counter-cyclical 
policies of 1976-78. In fact the new phase is opened by one of the most ardent 
organisers of public involvement in industrial development, Finn Lied. The Lied 
Commission of 1979 was a signal of the need of a new market oriented approach,127 a 
transition that was brought to fruition with the second Brundtland Government.  
 
Around 1990, an increasing dissatisfaction with the outcomes of both the strategic 
technology area strategy and the technology push orientation became evident, and the 
policies of the 1980s were consequently reassessed. Although not representing a radical 
break with previous policies, the White Paper on industrial policy published in 1989 
was felt to signal a new approach.128 However, the 1990s saw no coherent new strategy 
for industrial policies, and the decade was in general characterized by a lack of an 
overriding vision in this policy area. In retrospect, the following trends can be 
identified: A departure from the ‘best industrial structure’ strategy (at least in theory), 
and an orientation towards a broad innovation policy; an increased focus on SMEs; a 
diffusion of technology strategy; institutional restructuring; and, towards the end of the 
decade, a stronger emphasis on R&D and innovation policies. 
 
The broader socio-economic background for a new industrial policy of the 1990s was 
the problems which started by the fall in oil prices 1986, followed by the stock market 
collapse in 1987, the bankruptcy of the high tech national champions Norsk Data and 
KV in the years 1987-89, rapid de-industrialisation, increased flow of people from the 
periphery to the centre, collapse of fishing resources and the fish farming industry, 
collapse of the national financial system, the highest unemployment figures since WW2 
and social problems for large groups. In total, these problems constituted a period 
defined by politicians as ‘crisis’(1986-93). The perceived crisis led to a departure from 
the ‘best industrial structure’ orientation we have seen had prevailed in Norwegian 
industrial policies since the Second World War; old ideas and institutions were 
abolished, new ones were introduced.  
 
The emphasis on a ‘best industrial structure’ lost ground to new arguments in favour of 
broad innovation activities in various parts of the economy. These arguments were 
based on the view that policies should not be directed towards specific (and radical) 
structural changes, but to promoting improved productivity and diffusion of new 
technologies throughout all parts of the economy. Norwegian industrial policy studies 
submitted by the Aakvaag, Henriksen and (the first) Hervik Commissions - all in the 
latter half of the 1990s - attached importance to maintaining a broad perspective on 
innovation.129 
 
From the late 1980s, policy documents - for the first time since WW2 - stopped arguing 
for the importance for growth in manufacturing industry: The 1990s was the decade 
                                                 
127 NOU 1979:35, Structural problems and possibilities for growth in Norwegian industry 
(Strukturproblemer og vekstmuligheter i norsk industri) 
128 White Paper No 53 (1988-1989), On industrial policy (Om næringspolitikk) 
129 Aakvaag Commission, The Challenge – Research and innovation for new growth (Utfordringen – 
Forskning og innovasjon for ny vekst), Report prepared by a commission appointed by the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy; NOU 1996:23 Competition, competence and environment (Konkurranse, 
kompetanse og miljø); NOU 1997:27 Cost-benefit-anayses  (Nytte-kostnadsanalyser) 
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when Norway entered into a ‘post-industrial policy’ era in the sense that manufacturing 
industry was not any longer given political priority relative to other sectors of the 
economy. Therefore instruments promoting industrialisation should - in theory - not 
give priority to any specific type of production and industry (in other words, they should 
be industrially neutral). The general conditions and infrastructure for industry became 
core elements of industrial policy.  
 
These priorities were clearly expressed in the new industrial strategy defined by the 
Brundtland government (1986-1989), which consisted of the following elements: 130 
• focus on ‘healthy’ general economic conditions: inflation, cost level, interest 
rates, infrastructure (including a more efficient public sector)  
• no longer only priority to manufacturing industry  
• less direct support to any industry 
• de-centralising instruments for industrial policy; local communities and regional 
authorities responsible for development 
The Government also argued that the number of instruments available for industrial 
policies was rather limited. International agreements like WTO and European Space 
Agreement (EU) to a large extent defined the instruments which could - formally - be 
used to shape industrial development. The Government defined the main areas for 
governmental intervention as:131  
• R&D, technology and competence development 
• capital supply (venture capital) 
• infrastructure (transport and communication) 
The basic underlying philosophy of the new policy of the late 1980s was to develop a 
new basis for future welfare by a ‘modernisation’ of the total economy. The Brundtland 
Government argued that Norwegian economy had to become less dependent on oil 
revenues and exports of non-processed products. Norway was too dependent on exports 
based on natural resources, and in the long term welfare would depend on a successful 
transformation towards less resource based productions. The government’s LTP (Long 
period plans) from the late 1980s therefore argued for the need to transform the national 
economy and ensure a radical structural change. The main difference from the policies 
of the earlier 1980s was that the Government refused to indicate how the structure of the 
future economy ought to be. 
 
Looking at the initiatives taken by the governments and Parliament (Stortinget) during 
the 1990s, there is little doubt that IT/ ICT de facto remained a core technology of 
industrial policies. There are strong indications that many politicians - and other groups 
and individuals - still followed the ‘new industries’ strategy from the 1980s and argued 
that future welfare was dependent on the development of a strong ICT sector in the 
                                                 
130 White Paper No 53 (1988-1989), On industrial policy (Om næringspolitikk) is the first White Paper 
presenting the new policy of the Labour Government. 
131 The three point list is from White Paper No 53 (1988-1989), On industrial policy (Om næringspolitikk) 
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economy. During the 1990s, and in particular from 1996, a number of initiatives were 
taken in Parliament and by the governments to support the development of IT and 
promote increased ICT production. The establishment by the Jagland Government 
(1996-97) of an IT department and the proposal for a broad national ICT plan indicate 
the wide belief that this technology represented modernity and ‘the future’ for large 
parts of the political establishment. 
 
The new strategy of the late 1980s was to a large extent in line with the ideas promoted 
by ‘the small-is-beautiful’ supporters. They argued for less direct state intervention and 
for improvement of the general conditions for SMEs. In addition, they supported the 
instruments which during the inter war period supported a rapid de-centralisation of 
industry. The most important of these were instruments for diffusion of technology and 
of best practices in the company. What can be called a diffusion of technology strategy 
gained political support from the late 1980s and early 1990s, and a number of new 
instruments for promoting diffusion of best practices and technology were introduced. 
 
The restructuring of the policy instruments directed towards diffusion of technologies 
was part of a broader international trend with a number of policy measures undertaken 
in particularly in the USA. The old state owned diffusion institution, STI (Statens 
Teknologiske Institutt), was transformed into a private foundation with the objective to 
promote knowledge on technology and management for SMEs, and changed name to TI 
(Teknologisk Institutt) in 1988. A new Service Office for industry for Northern Norway 
(Veiledningstjenesten for Nord-Norge, VINN) had parallel functions to TI but only 
focused on the special needs of the northern parts of the country. Similar services were 
offered by BRT (Bedriftenes Rådgivingstjeneste), established 1991, consisting of 18 
advisory companies offering consultancy services to SMEs. Information on new 
technologies was also provided by Norges Industriattacher which is a part of the TI 
system, and on design by Norsk Designråd. 
 
Also, the funding agencies and R&D institutions that had been a central part of S&T 
policies in the post-war period increasingly came under scrutiny from the late 1980s. In 
1990, the Grøholt Commission was initiated, and its conclusions led to the disbanding 
of the former five research councils and the establishment of an intended single body 
research council, The Research Council of Norway (RCN, Norges forskningsråd), in 
1993.132 
 
Norges forskningsråd was given a strengthened and formalised agenda that went beyond 
the role as a classical research council cum funding agency. Besides being a research 
council in the established sense, the new body was given the explicit task of being a 
central policy formulating and advising body for national R&D and innovation policies. 
The formalisation of this independent policy making role and the expectations linked to 
it is probably the main aspect that explains the establishment of the new research 
council; it grows directly out of the criticism of the former research council structure 
handling of national coordination and organisation of the strategic S&T priorities during 
the 1980s, viz. in the organisation of the strategic technology areas. 
 
                                                 
132 NOU 1991:24 Organization for totality and diversity in Norwegian research (Organisering for helhet 
og mangfold i norsk forskning) 
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The 1990s also saw the establishment of the Norwegian Industrial and Regional 
Development Fund (Statens Nærings- og Distriktsutviklingsfond, SND). Like RCN, 
SND was established as a re-organisation and re-orientation of several pre-existing 
institutions, including the Regional Development Fund (Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond), 
The SME Fund (Småbedriftsfondet) and the Industrial Fund (Industrifondet). The 
initiative came from several commissions involved in evaluating the Norwegian credit 
market policies and groupings advocating a reorganization and simplification of the 
instrument portfolio.133 SND’s main task was to stimulate industrial development, by 
contributing to the development, modernization and readjustment of Norwegian 
industry in general, and by promoting initiatives which would secure lasting and 
profitable regional employment. 
 
The new emphasis on regional innovation policy - rather than the traditional regional 
distribution policy - from the mid 1980s, was upheld in the 1990s. This is evident i.a. 
from the explicit consideration of ‘regional policies for metropolitan areas’, with a 
White Paper launched in 1991.134 With 1993 and 1997 White Papers on regional policy 
these aspects were integrated into a perspective that highlighted the policy need of 
considering the ‘broad’ and the ‘narrow’ regional policy. 135 The distinction was used to 
argue that to make regional policy in the narrow sense efficient, an explicit assessment 
and regulation of the broad regional policy was necessary. This led to reorganisations 
within the relevant ministry, with the responsibility for the assessment of broad regional 
policies being institutionalised within the ministry. The point to note here is that this 
involves a supervisory role from the perspective of regional innovation policies towards 
the regional implications of innovation policies as formulated in other ministries. 
 
In the latter half of the 1990s the importance of financial strength of large companies 
once more became a political matter. Globalisation - and in particularly the increased 
importance of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the global economy - raised the 
question of how Norwegian companies could compete with large global multinationals 
in increasingly more open international capital and goods markets. The sale of the most 
successful Norwegian company of the early 1990s, Nycomed, and the national symbol 
company Freia (chocolates) to foreign competitors, as well as Kværner’s decision to 
move its headquarter to London, triggered a discussion on how to keep national control 
of the more important companies as well as being an attractive economy for MNCs. The 
argument for national control was the need for keeping knowledge production and R&D 
in the country.  
 
The political problem on the agenda in the middle of the 1990s was therefore partly to 
develop financially strong national companies and ownership. The State had become a 
major owner in Norwegian industry, controlling both big manufacturing industry 
(Statoil, Norsk Hydro), the bank sector (the largest commercial banks) and high tech 
institutions (Telenor). State ownership could be used to make sure that important 
industrial companies remained Norwegian. In addition the government returned to the 
                                                 
133 e.g. the Steigum Commission and the Kleppe Commission 
134 White Paper No 17 (1991-92), Norway needs its big cities (Norge trenger storbyene) 
135 White Paper No 33 (1992-1993), City and countryside side by side. On regional development (By og 
land hand i hand. Om regional utvikling); White Paper No 31 (1996-97), On district and regional 
policies (Om distrikts- og regionalpolitikken) 
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old policy of selecting some ‘national champions’ which could be a collaborator in 
developing strong national ownership.  
 
The politically most interesting case was K.I. Røkke’s role in developing an integrated 
company in fishing and fish processing industry in collaboration with SND from 1993. 
Røkke also became an important player in shipbuilding and investments products for the 
oil sector as he became a majority owner of the Aker company in 1996. Another 
example of new ‘national champions’ is IT Fornebu/ Norsk Investorforum where Fred 
Olsen, the former owner of Aker, followed a long tradition of his old company to enter 
into agreements with the Government to support the Government’s strategy. However, 
we may argue that there were not many industrial owners in the late 1990s who were 
willing to play the role as a ‘national champions’. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ideas of an innovation policy was first presented in Norway in 
a White Paper on research policy in 1993.136 Although the document introduced 
innovation and systems theory to a larger audience and stressed the need for larger R&D 
investments, it did not give birth to a larger debate. Neither did it lead to any substantial 
increase in national investments in R&D.   
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, however, the interest in innovation and R&D policies 
seemed to be stronger. A White Paper on research policy published in 1999 was 
completely structured around innovation theory. 137 The Research Council became the 
institutional stronghold for the theory and was supported by the Research Department at 
the Ministry of Education and partly by the research department of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. In addition there were individuals in ministries and in other 
agencies working on industrial policy for developing a new strategy based on 
innovation theory. I 1999 the Research Council succeeded in creating an alliance with 
the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) and the Norwegian 
Export Council (Eksportrådet) to promote the idea that Norway needed a new industrial 
strategy and that this strategy should be based on innovation theory. 
 
The 1999 White Paper on research mentioned above - entitled Research at the 
beginning of a new era - was published by the Bondevik I Government (1997-2000). 
The White Paper contained an analysis of the whole Norwegian knowledge system, 
from university and college research to industrial innovation activities. It recommended 
that Norwegian national R&D funding should reach the OECD average, measured as a 
proportion of GDP, in the course of five years. Also, it proposed the establishment of a 
research and innovation fund. It further argued that a main priority in the use of public 
funds should be the strengthening of long-term fundamental research, and priority 
should be given to increased research commitment in the fields of marine research; 
information and communication technology; medical and health-care research; and 
research in the area of intersection between energy and the environment. 
 
The White Paper was well received by the various research institutions, by industry as 
well as by the opposition in Parliament. Parliament did, however, emphasize that the 
national goal of reaching the OECD-average as regards the R&D proportion of the GDP 
                                                 
136 White Paper No 36 (1992-93) Research for the community (Forskning for fellesskapet) 
137 White Paper No 39 (1998-1999), Research at the beginning of a new era (Forskning ved et tidsskille) 
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must be considered a minimum.138 It explicitly asked the Government to increase the 
public investments in basic science in the universities and colleges ‘substantially’. The 
capital of the Fund for Research and Innovation - which was established in July 1999 - 
should also be increased ‘substantially’.  
 
In March 2000, the Hervik Commission handed in its report.139 The Commission had 
been appointed by the Bondevik I Government to consider policy measures that could 
stimulate an increase in private investments in R&D. The report proposed that 
companies investing in certain types of R&D projects should get 25 per cent of the 
expenses covered by the State. While the majority of the Commission argued that this 
should be given as a tax credit, the minority was in favour of it being given as direct 
financial support. Further, the Commission recommended that the number of doctorate 
recruits should be increased substantially in the sector of higher education in order to 
support the demand for new researchers. It also underlined the need for investments in 
new scientific equipment in this sector. Moreover, the report suggested an increase in 
the public investments in R&D programmes targeting the business enterprise sector by 
500 million kroner. It also recommended an increase in strategic university programmes 
for basic science and in SND’s high-risk loans. 
 
Two months after the Hervik Commision, the Commission of Higher Education, led by 
Professor Ole Danbolt Mjøs, delivered its report on Norwegian universities and 
colleges.140 This Commission had been given a very broad mandate, covering most 
issues concerning higher education. The report included some very radical and 
controversial proposals, which led to much debate. 
 
The Commission wanted to give the state universities and colleges more independence 
and responsibility. The Commission’s majority wanted to organize them as independent 
legal entities fully owned by the state. A reform along these lines would mean that the 
Ministry of Education and Research no longer could instruct the management of the 
institutions directly, but would normally have to go through the board of the institutions.   
 
The Commission stressed the need for change in the university and college sector, 
pointing to the internationalisation of higher education, new forms of teaching and 
learning, the increasing complexity of the knowledge system, and the need for high 
quality learning environments, research and development. It proposed a new degree 
system in Norwegian higher education - one more similar to the Anglo-Saxon model. 
The new system should, according to the Commission, be implemented in as many 
disciplines and professions as possible 
 
Also, it was emphasized that the goal of reaching the OECD-average as regards national 
R&D investments should be the first step towards a higher goal: Norway should invest 
as much in R&D as its Nordic neighbours, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The public 
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139 NOU 2000:7, A New Start at Innovation - Analysis of instruments for increasing private investments in 
R&D (Ny giv for nyskaping − Vurdering av tiltak for økt FoU i næringslivet) 
140 NOU 2000:14, Freedom and responsibility – on higher education and research in Norway (Frihet med 
ansvar - Om høgre utdanning i Norge) 
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support to basic science should be increased considerably and the Fund for Research 
and Innovation should reach the size of 20 billion Norwegian kroner. 
 
The Mjøs Commission’s proposals regarding the organisation of higher education led to 
an intense debate on the future of universities and colleges. The debate showed a clear 
divide in the understanding of the traditional higher education system. The supporters of 
the report argued that a radical reform in Norwegian higher education would be 
necessary in order to meet the challenges posed by new information and communication 
technologies, new private educational facilities and new technologies. The opponents 
argued that major parts of the present system must be preserved in order to defend 
academic freedom and curiosity driven basic research. 
 
The Hervik and Mjøs Commissions both underlined the need for an increase in public 
investments in R&D. Many of the participants in the debate regarding the need for a 
general strengthening of the national investments in R&D, have pointed to concepts like 
‘the new economy’, ‘the knowledge society’ or ‘the information society, feeling that 
Norway ought to invest more in high-tech and ICT. Others have claimed that the State 
invests too little in basic research at the universities. The debate has shown, however, 
that few have had any clear concept of what is meant by a ‘knowledge society’. Apart 
form the call for larger public spending on R&D it remains unclear how Norway is 
going to reach the national goal of an R&D spending (as measured as part of GDP) at 
the level of the OECD average.  
 
In 2000, a new Labour government, led by Jens Stoltenberg, entered office. The 
Stoltenberg Government (2000-2001) did not signal any major change of course from 
the strategy suggested by the outgoing centrist government, and the plans of the 
Bondevik I Government to increase investments in Norwegian research were upheld. 
The Government’s first regular budget proposal led to an increase in R&D investments. 
The increase was however not in any way sufficient if one is to reach the national goal 
of reaching the OECD average within 2005, and the budget was criticized for being too 
restrained as regards public investments in R&D.  
 
The Stoltenberg Government followed up the recommendations of the Hervik 
Commission - though rather modestly - by introducing the FUNN measure, which gave 
public financial support to companies buying research and development from the 
universities, colleges and research institutes. The proposal of the Commission to give 
tax deductions for R&D investments was however rejected.  
 
Several documents of relevance for R&D and innovation policies were published under 
the Labour Government. A White Paper on higher education followed up the 
controversial Mjøs Commission report.141 The strong resistance to this report felt in the 
universities and colleges had taken its toll, and the White Paper was in no way as radical 
as the Green Paper. However, the Government wanted to ensure the institutions more 
freedom, and supported the idea of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ degree structure. 
 
                                                 
141 White Paper No 27 (2000-2001), Fulfil your duty - Ask for your rights. Quality reform in higher 
education (Gjør din plikt - krev din rett, Kvalitetsreform av høyere utdanning) 
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At the heart of the White Paper was the idea that we presently live in a ‘knowledge 
based society’, and the goal for Norway to become a leading ‘knowledge nation’ was 
upheld. Among the actions presented in the document were: More academic and 
economic freedom for the institutions; a new degree structure; a new content-reform; a 
new grade-scale common for all disciplines and institutions; a new system of 
institutional funding; expanded possibilities for institutional profiling (focus); and 
improved, simplified and result-oriented student grants. 
 
Another central document presented by the Stoltenberg Government was a White Paper 
on regional affairs.142 The main policy objective of this White Paper was to secure a 
balanced development as regards population settlement and industrial growth. Much 
emphasis was put on the need for innovative and competitive companies in the regions. 
It was argued that more of the funding should be distributed according to the population 
density of the various regions. The changes in policies were summed up by saying that 
there should be a shift as regards focus, organisation and measures from municipalities 
to regions; from individual measures to more coherent need; from individual companies 
to a common effort for regional development; from sector-oriented measures to co-
ordinated efforts; and from centralised regulations to more regional freedom. 
  
A White Paper on the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) 
was also published.143 In the introduction, it was pointed to new challenges in the use of 
knowledge, research and innovation. The technological development and the increasing 
globalisation was said to open up for new solutions in all parts of industry. The 
Government’s overall objective was to develop framework conditions for profitable 
industrial development in all parts of the country. In order to achieve this, the White 
Paper argued that regional resources must be mobilized and connected to relevant 
competence institutions and networks. The innovation systems, consisting of 
entrepreneurs, companies, research and finance institutions, advisers and others, must 
contribute to high levels of innovation. 
 
The White Paper stressed that industrial policy is knowledge policy, and that 
competences cannot be understood separately from other framework conditions 
underpinning wealth creation. This together with the ongoing internationalisation, the 
White Paper maintained, lead to a demand for a more coherent industry policy. It also 
argued that industry policy must be co-ordinated with general economic policies as well 
as regional-, R&D, fishery-oriented-, agricultural- and environmental policies. 
 
The White Paper further proposed that SND should co-operate with the Research 
Council of Norway and other organisations in order to ensure that the regional SND 
offices become competent and effective gateways to industry oriented policy 
instruments. SND should be able to adapt its instruments to regional differences and the 
needs of the individual enterprises. Within a fixed budget SND would be given freedom 
to decide whether the institution should offer grants, loan guarantees or a combination 
of these. Moreover, SND should work more proactively vis-à-vis firms and innovation 
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and competence institutions. The organization should use its competence and networks 
to bring companies together. The White Paper proposed a new measure for 
entrepreneurs, consisting of grants as well as loans, and maintained that SND is to give 
priority to entrepreneurs that use most of their time on the supported project. 
 
In 2000, the Stoltenberg Government appointed a Commission to evaluate measures for 
increasing the commercialization of university and college research. The Commission, 
which was led by Jan Fridthjof Bernt, presented its report on March 28th 2001.144 The 
Commission believed that the universities and colleges must consider 
commercialization as part of their activities. However, the researchers must have the 
freedom to choose their research topic. The commercialization process should involve 
the institution, the research unit as well as the researcher or the group of researchers. 
 
The majority of the Commission believed that the researcher ought to retain the full 
property rights of an invention. These members argued that this would be necessary in 
order to defend the freedom of scientific research. A minority preferred to transfer this 
right to the institution, arguing that the institution needs this in order to promote 
commercialisation in an efficient way.  
 
The Commission as a whole believed that the income following from such 
commercialization should be split between the researcher, the institution and the 
research units. Commercialization can be strengthened, it was argued, by the use of 
various incentives, practical organizational changes and information on the importance 
of such activities. The institutions should develop relevant strategies and establish 
‘innovation centres’ with professional advisers, internally or externally. 
 
In the spring of 2001, Parliament debated the Labour Government’s White Paper on 
higher education. There was agreement as regards the need for a quality reform in the 
university and college sector. Nevertheless, Parliament made several changes in the 
government proposal, and underlined the need for an increase in funding. Parliament 
also asked the Government to forward a proposal on tax deductions on industrial R&D 
investments. The Labour Government was however reluctant to do so. It would rather 
use the aforementioned FUNN support measure for companies commissioning research 
from universities, colleges and research institutes 
 
2001 also saw the presentation of the Stoltenberg Government’s so-called Progression 
Plan (Opptrappingsplan) for the national R&D effort.145 In the plan the Government 
underlined that research had been - and should remain - a ‘strong priority area’. The 
Government’s objective was to reach the OECD average regarding R&D investments as 
a proportion of GDP as a minimum.  
 
In the fall of the same year, the Stoltenberg Government was replaced by the Bondevik 
II Government - a coalition government of the Conservative Party, the Christian 
People’s Party, and the Liberal Party, which at the time of writing (March 2003) is still 
in office. Among the main policy issues presented in the so-called ‘Government 
platform’ of the three coalition parties, were that Norwegian R&D investments should 
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reach at least the OECD-average within 2005; that the institutions of higher education 
should decide their own internal governing structure; that there should be tax deductions 
for industrial R&D investments; that the knowledge transfer between 
universities/colleges and industry should be strengthened; and that SND should sell its 
investment company (SND Invest). 
 
Whether the change of Government has actually led to a change in innovation policy is 
a matter of debate, as the various ministries seem to give different signals. The general 
trend seems to be a shift towards a greater reliance on indirect policy measure (tax 
deductions). This view is supported by the fact that the new Government started its term 
by cutting in the innovation and industry oriented R&D budgets of the Research 
Council and The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), whilst 
replacing the aforementioned FUNN measure with the tax deduction scheme, 
SkatteFUNN.  
 
Certainly, since the Bondevik II Government came to power, Norway has been going 
through a turbulent time in the field of innovation policies. The new Government has 
ambitions towards altering more than the present palette of innovation policy 
instruments. It will also reform the educational system, alter the division of labour 
between the State and the counties, and include new policy areas into innovation policy 
development.  
 
The new Minister of Education and Research reintroduced some of the more 
controversial proposals from the Mjøs Commission on higher education, and 
implemented a quality reform for universities and colleges. The Government has for 
instance introduced a new degree structure consisting of three levels: Bachelor (three 
years), master (two years) and Ph.D (three years). The studies will be shorter compared 
to the old system. The new degrees are based on the Anglo-Saxon system, and the 
institutions will use the English terms. 
 
On January 1st 2003 the Ministry of Education and Research established a new national 
organisation for quality in education: NOKUT (Nasjonalt organ for kvalitet i 
utdanningen).  This organisation is now main authority as regards the accreditation and 
approval of institutions and educations. 
 
The Minister of Education and Research has - as the leader of the Cabinet’s Research 
Committee (Regjeringens forskningsutvalg) - initiated a cross-ministerial process that 
may lead to a new ‘holistic’ Norwegian innovation policy (En helhetlig 
innovasjonspolitikk – HIP). The responsibility for this process has now been transferred 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which is expected to present an action plan 
together with the national budget presented in October 2003. The idea is to include all 
ministries in innovation policy development. The plan is related to the EU concept of a 
third generation innovation policy that goes beyond the traditional innovation policy 
areas of industry, R&D and regional policies, and includes areas that indirectly 
influence the innovative capabilities of firms.146 
 
                                                 
146 Lengrand, Louis et al, Innovation Tomorrow, Innovation Policy and the Regulatory Framwork: 
Making Innovation an Integral Part of the Broader Structural Agenda, DG Enterprise, October 2002 
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The action plan on a holistic innovation policy will discuss the knowledge base for this 
new innovation policy approach, contain concrete policy proposals in important areas 
and establish clear policy objectives. The action plan will focus on five so-called ‘focus 
areas’.147 
 
• General framework conditions 
• Knowledge and competence 
• Entrepreneurship and the establishment of new companies 
• Research, development and commercialisation 
• Infrastructure (presumably physical infrastructure) 
 
It is interesting to note the way the work is organized. Formally the work is led by a 
ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Industry and Trade. The other 
members of this committee are the Minister of Education and Research, the Minister of 
Local Government and Regional Affairs, The Minister of Oil and Energy and the 
Minister of Agriculture. On an informal basis, however, much of the work is co-
ordinated by a group of state secretaries (deputy ministers), originally state secretaries 
from the Ministry of Education and Research, Industry and Trade and Local 
Government and Regional Affairs. It seems that the new policy has been initiated due to 
the personal interest of some of these state secretaries.  This is therefore not an initiative 
taken by the bureaucracy. There are several working groups of civil servants focusing 
on various aspects of the new policy. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry also initiated an internal evaluation of the structure 
of business-oriented policy instruments and institutions. Among the topics discussed has 
been the future organization of The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
Fund, SND, The Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA), the Trade 
Council of Norway, the industry oriented parts of the Research Council of Norway, and 
more. The policy makers have also been looking into the mix of indirect and direct 
policy instruments and measures. This has been a so-called open process, where the 
Ministry has asked various relevant public institutions, counties, companies and 
industrial organisations to voice their opinion on the future of the Norwegian industry 
policy instruments. All these contributions have been published on the Net.148 
 
A proposition based on the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s evaluation of the structure 
of business-oriented policy instruments and institutions, was presented to Parliament on 
March 28th 2003.149 According to this document, the main goal of the innovation policy 
instrument system should be to contribute to more innovation in industry all over the 
country, and particular focus should be on research and competence development; the 
idea, development and commercialization phases; and internationalization. Also, it is 
proposed that a new organization is to be established, which is to be given the 
responsibility for the measures administered by The Norwegian Government 
Consultative Office for Inventors, SVO (Statens veiledningskontor for oppfinnere), the 
Norwegian Trade Council (Norges Eksportråd), and the Norwegian Industrial and 
                                                 
147 http://www.odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/024071-990018/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
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149 White Paper No 51 (2002-2003), Instruments for an innovative and creative industry (Virkemidler for 
et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv) 
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Regional Development Fund, SND. The proposal is clearly motivated by an ambition to 
unite the most important institutions targeting near market innovation and 
entrepreneurship. It is suggested that the new organization should be organized as a 
‘special law company’ (særlovselskap) – i.e. a state company with special authority, and 
that it should take over some of the innovation oriented policy measures administered 
by the Research Council of Norway.  
 
The present Ministry of Regional and Local affairs is very much involved in the 
development of policy instruments targeting regional innovation. The Ministry is in 
favour of giving counties more responsibility for policy measures targeting regions and 
districts. This will include giving the county administrators more influence over the 
administration and allocation of innovation policy measures and funds.  
 
Another development in regional policy is the establishment by SND of a new program 
for regional innovation, which is to stimulate the development of regional innovation 
systems and industrial clusters. The basic idea is that regional conditions are of great 
importance to innovation and value creation. By promoting regional co-operation 
between companies, R&D environments and innovation policy institutions, the 
programme is to contribute to increased growth and international competitiveness at 
firm level 
 
In the early fall of 2002, the Bondevik II Government announced a reorganization of the 
Research Council of Norway. The current six divisions will be replaced by three: A 
Division of Disciplinary Development, a Division of Innovation and User-initiated 
R&D and a Division for Strategic Efforts. The background for this reorganization is an 
evaluation of RCN made by Technopolis. The evaluators were in part very critical 
towards the activities of the institution, arguing that the RCN has not been able to 
coordinate Norwegian research as originally planned in 1993, when the former research 
councils were united in this new institution. This can partly be explained by a lack of 
funding and coordination on the ministerial level, the evaluators explain, but the 
Research Council itself has also found it hard to coordinate their own internal activities. 
The main report argues that ‘the experiment’ with one council should continue, 
although with a different internal structure.  
 
The 2002 October national budget proposal from the Government reaffirms the goal of 
reaching the OECD-average as regards R&D investments as a proportion of GDP.150 
However, it underlines that industry must take care of 60 per cent of this increase. This 
is a rather unrealistic objective, and the Prime Minister recently commented that 
although the objective is clear, Norway might not reach this goal within the deadline of 
2005.151 
 
That being said, the Government has shown a clear willingness to do its part to achieve 
an increase in national R&D investments. Although the Norwegian economy is strong 
and the national surplus is large, the Government has in fact small room for 
manoeuvring. Most of the budget is already committed to regular expenses as health and 
                                                 
150 St.prp. nr. 1 (2002 – 2003), see for instance the proposition for the Ministry of Education and 
Research, http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/publ/stprp/045001-030004/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
151 Interview Aftenposten. 
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social services. Moreover, this being a minority coalition government, it will not only 
have to make internal compromises, it must also negotiate with a rather aggressive 
opposition. All parties in Parliament support an increase in R&D investments, however, 
meaning there is a fair chance that the new investments will go through. 
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Sweden 
By Staffan Larsson, Lennart Norgren and Jennie Granat 
 
In Sweden the concept of innovation policy, i.e. fostering economic growth and 
competitive power of national industry by creating favorable conditions for innovative 
activities, entered the general, political rhetoric in the 1990s. The concept of innovation 
systems in general, and national innovation systems in particular, began to spread in the 
policy debate and in policy thinking in the late 90s. At the end of the 90s a policy 
reformulation took place against the background of comparatively slow economic 
growth and increasing regional economic imbalances. The Government presented two 
major strategies for turning these trends. The first one focused on creating increased 
economic growth by increasing the co-ordination of industrial and research policies, 
which manifested itself in a considerable reorganisation of the public research funding 
structure in January 2001. The second strategy for correcting regional imbalances meant 
implementing so called ‘regional growth agreements’. 
 
In the following we try to trace the roots of the current Swedish ‘innovation policy’ by 
focusing on the changes in research policy and industrial policy since 1980.  
 
Although it was in the 90s that the concept of innovation policy began to be used, policy 
measures aiming at influencing innovation performance by improving the conditions for 
innovative activities have been important for a longer time. These measures have to a 
large extent been directed towards technology development and research in universities. 
The reason for this is the rather unique Swedish pattern with a quite small research 
institute sector in international comparison. A long-standing principle has been that 
publicly funded research as far as possible should be carried out in universities and less 
in research institutes. Hence, the main actors in the production of knowledge, 
technology and innovations have been universities and enterprises. R&D activities have 
also been concentrated to the business enterprise sector and the higher education sector, 
i.e. universities. The enterprise sector accounted for around 75 per cent of R&D 
expenditures in 1999. The corresponding figure for universities was 22 per cent (see 
figure 1 next page) 
 
The ‘innovation policies’ directed towards university research have focused on two 
issues. The first issue concerns the direction of research and joint industry-university 
programs and the second on the commercialisation of research findings. Governments 
have for several decades tried to influence the direction of research in universities 
towards specific technologies and the demands of industry and society. In the 1970s 
commercialisation of research findings was introduced as a policy issue at the Ministry 
of Industry. In the 1980s new measures aiming at promoting commercialisation of 
research were introduced.  
 
The two policy fields that have primarily been involved in the evolution of a Swedish 
innovation policy are research policy and industrial policy. Industrial policy, however, 
involves many other issues than innovation. In this paper we limit the scope of 
industrial policy to technology policy and innovative activities, i.e. measures aiming at 
steering the direction of research towards specific technologies and at increasing 
commercialisation of research. 
 
 192 
Sweden [Historical review] 
Figure 1. R&D expenditures in Sweden in sectors as a percentage of GDP, 1981-1999 
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Source: Statistics Sweden 
The 1980s – first steps towards an innovation policy 
‘Innovation policy’ has developed in Sweden since the 70s, in the beginning primarily 
with focus on how to make public funded research at universities useful to society, i.e. 
not how to make industry more innovative. Research policy, or the government 
organisation for steering and financing research, in the 1960s and 70s was characterised 
by sectorisation, i.e. a growing share of public research funding was distributed by other 
ministries than the ministry responsible for research issues, i.e. the Ministry of 
Education. Most of the ministries established their own research priorities on the basis 
of needs and demands of their sectors of responsibility. Some ministries had agencies 
with the objective to handle industry-oriented research funding, for instance the agency 
STU (Swedish Board for Technical Development) under the Ministry of Industry. The 
Ministry of Education was responsible for distributing faculty bloc grants and funds to 
research councils. Two models of public funding and steering of research existed in 
parallel: The research council model, where scientists decided the direction of research, 
and the sector model, where societal and scientific interest in collaboration decided the 
direction of research.152  
 
A recurrent question during the 1980s and 1990s was which of the two steering models 
for research, the sector model or the research council model, is most appropriate for 
inducing innovation, industrial renewal and economic growth? 
 
In the 1970s, as mentioned, the sector model gained ground at the expense of the 
research council model. The increase in public research funding was primarily 
distributed to ministries and agencies that prioritised research from the point of view of 
societal needs and objectives. The predominating doctrine was that the Government 
should steer the direction of research carried out in universities through sector research 
in order to make research useful for society. In the 1980s this doctrine began to be 
                                                 
152 Persson Bo, Motsträviga myndigheter? Sektorsforskning och politisk styrning under 1980-talet, 
Stockholm: ISTER, 2001 
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questioned. Research bills presented by the Government in the 80s dealt with the ‘right’ 
balance between basic and applied research, or in other terms, between the research 
council model and the sector model. It was argued that the sector model emphasised 
applied and short-term research. Basic research tended to get too little funding, which in 
the long run would undermine applied research.153  
 
In the Research Bill of 1982 it was stated that engineering sciences were to be geared 
towards fields that were prioritised in industrial policy. In the following Research Bill of 
1984 increased funding of basic sciences was proposed, i.e. research motivated not by 
the needs of society but by scientific search for new knowledge. The research councils 
were given increased resources.154  
 
In the middle of the 1980s the debate heated concerning the volume and quality of 
research funded by agencies and ministries, i.e. the sector model was questioned. It was 
argued that the scientific quality of sector research was low and that basic research was 
loosing ground. At this time the economy was booming and resources were made 
available for increased public research funding, which the Government channelled to 
the research councils. In the Research Bill of 1987 it was emphasised that sector 
agencies should increase their long-term research funding. In the Bill of 1990 it was 
stated that agencies and ministries should strengthen long-term basic research. It was 
proposed to alter sector agencies towards more research council like organisations with 
the objective of increasing the influence of scientists in decision processes, i.e. in 
steering the direction of research.155  
 
The new research policy that emerged in the 1980s focused on supporting long-term 
knowledge development primarily by using the research council model. The importance 
of the research council model grew at the expense of the sector model. The new 
research policy also meant that research funding by sector agencies began to change. 
Long-term knowledge build up within the sectors was emphasised as a responsibility of 
the agencies/ministries. The scientific community increased its influence in the decision 
process and scientific quality became the primary criterion when evaluating project 
proposals. The sector agencies became more like research councils. The new research 
policy also aimed at achieving an overall planning and coordination of research issues at 
the level of government. It manifested itself in research bills every third year.  
 
STU - a tool in industrial policy 
The link between research policy and industrial policy in the 1970s and 80s was 
measures taken to make public research useful to society, i.e. steering research towards 
the technology needs of industry and society. STU, an agency of the Ministry of 
Industry, had the responsibility for funding technology research of relevance to 
industry. It was established in 1968 as an instrument for implementing a technology 
policy by supporting engineering research and development of industrial relevance.156 
In this way STU acted as a mediator between research policy and industrial policy. 
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During the 1980s increased public research funding was, as mentioned, channelled to 
research councils. The exception was the funding of the sector agency STU, which got 
increased research budgets. This was motivated by industrial reasons.157  
 
During the 1970s the funding of STU was aimed towards industry’s ability to deepen 
and widen its technological base for new and already existing products and 
technologies. In the beginning of the 80s STU began to focus more on new research 
fields and technologies of future relevance to industry. The objective was to renew the 
scientific and technological base of industry. A central task was to identify and fund 
research in so-called strategic technologies like ICT, biotechnology and new materials. 
In the process of identifying research problems in these technology fields, scientists as 
well as industrialists were involved. STU became a mediator between scientific research 
and industrial practice and a substitute purchaser of new technology on behalf of a 
future industry, i.e. STU acted as a change agent in industrial evolution. In a sense 
research policy and industrial policy converged in the research funding of STU.158 
 
When STU in the early 1980s focused its activities on the generation of new 
technologies like ICT, biotechnology and new materials, the instruments used were the 
so-called framework programmes and programme areas for special initiatives. These 
two types of programmes were both of long duration, which made it possible to train 
doctoral students within these programmes. STU now shifted the focus of funding R&D 
from products to the generation of knowledge and new technology. An important 
feature of the STU-programs was that research problems were formulated by STU in 
close collaboration with scientists at universities and industrial representatives. The 
programmes were cross-disciplinary. STU also fostered co-operation between industry 
and universities in the programmes, thus acting as a network entrepreneur.159  
 
In Sweden, as in many other OECD-countries, programmes were established in 1980s to 
promote so-called generic technologies like micro-electronics, biotechnology and new 
materials. These technologies were judged to be strategic for future technical 
development and for the competitiveness of national industries. In 1984 a national 
micro-electronic programme (NMP) was initiated, which included large R&D 
investments, support for product development and promoting cooperation between 
universities and industry. Government and industry jointly financed the programme. 
STU was the most important public agency in the programme since it was in line with 
the mission of STU. i.e. to increase knowledge and expertise in technology fields of 
strategic relevance to industry. The generation of the new technology was heavily 
dependent on investments in basic research, applied research and development 
activities. Later in the 1980s NMP was followed by the IT4-programme.  
 
The new research policy in the 1980s described above, affected STU. Most important 
was that STU had to take responsibility for funding basic engineering research in certain 
fields at universities. STU should fund to long-term knowledge build up in universities. 
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In 1983 STU set up a scientist-controlled advisory function within the organisation, i.e. 
a research council function, which should fund basic engineering research. However in 
the bill of 1990 the Government stated that engineering research needed to be increased 
and a new engineering research council was proposed. Resources were to be transferred 
from STU during a three-year period. This meant that STU left the field of basic 
engineering research.160 
 
The principle in the 1980s was that the Government should take responsibility for basic 
research and industry should take responsibility for technology development. The social 
democratic Government regarded research policy, especially engineering research, as a 
supplement to industrial policy. Through increased and focused investments in 
engineering research the competitiveness of industry would be improved. The role of 
Government was to guarantee basic engineering research of volume and quality. This 
included strategic research investments in certain technology fields.161  
 
In 1977, a report that concerned the future organisation of the Swedish Board for 
Technical Development was published.162 The report strongly underlined the 
importance of having knowledge of the innovation process and its prerequisites when 
designing measures supporting technical development. R&D and technical development 
was seen as one of many elements in innovation processes. However, the innovation 
perspective presented in the report didn’t have any major impact on policy making in 
the 1970s. 
 
The experiences of STU and the development of innovation theories during the 1980s 
led the agency to question the linear model of technical progress, i.e. basic research 
should lead to applied research should lead to development activities. These activities 
were related to each other but in a much more complicated way, e.g. they could take 
place at the same point in time. This gave rise to new ideas of how technical progress 
and innovations come into being. Science was still seen as an engine in innovation, 
however in a new role. The fact that OECD got interested in innovation theories, cp. the 
TEP-project, made it politically possible to questioning the linear model.163 
 
A new focus in industrial policy – promoting the growth of New Technology Based 
Firms 
During the 1980s main stream industrial policy mainly included facilitating 
restructuring of industry and improving industrial productivity. Swedish industrial 
policy was, as in earlier decades, directed towards supporting large well-established 
companies. However, some measures aiming at supporting new technology-based firms 
(NTBF) were at hand. For instance STU had ever since its establishment supported 
inventors in their efforts to start new companies. In the late 1970s the Government’s 
interest in start-ups and the growth in new companies increased. The Swedish Industrial 
Development Fund was created in 1979 with the objective to encourage profitable 
growth and innovation in SMEs. Policies to support the funding of research- and 
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technology-based start-ups were initiated at the local level, e.g. supporting the 
establishment of technology parks in the vicinity of universities.164 
 
In 1980s the so-called Technopole-program was introduced by STU. The objective was 
to support commercialization of innovations and technologies developed at universities 
and technological parks. A number of Technopoles were established in university 
towns. They provided potential entrepreneurs with financing and support in building 
companies. 
 
The initial reason for supporting NTBFs was that they were thought to be the big 
companies of the future. Later this expectation was proved to be ‘wrong’. The new 
NTBFs of the 1980s did not grow to big companies. However they came to play another 
role in the economy. The NTBFs acted as carriers of new technology in the process of 
technology diffusion in the economy165. 
The 1990s – innovation a source for economic growth 
In the beginning of the 1990s an economic slow down hit Sweden with increasing 
unemployment and budget deficits. In 1991 the social democrats lost the election for the 
Parliament and a centre right-wing government came into power. The challenge that 
met the new Government was to design a policy that turned the slow-down into 
economic growth. Hence policies that could support increasing international 
competitiveness of Swedish industry came into focus. In industrial policy the main 
measures used to counteract the crisis was privatisation of public companies and 
deregulation of markets.166  
 
The new Government identified the emergence of an IT-revolution and of a knowledge 
society (including increased knowledge content of products and services) as important 
trends, which had policy implications. The role of the State, according to Government, 
was to create favourable conditions for the transformation of society. This meant among 
other things supporting the development of high-tech industries. Policy needed to be 
concerned with increasing competitiveness of fast-growing high-tech industries. These 
industries are dependent on a well-functioning infrastructure including a public research 
system that are able to develop new fields of knowledge and that can collaborate with 
industry in developing and diffusing new technology. Thus research policy became a 
policy area of great significance in achieving the objectives of competitiveness and 
growth.167 
 
The growth policy adopted meant that competitiveness should be supported by a well-
developed and flexible R&D system. Research should contribute to the renewal of 
industry. The role of research in economic growth was to act as an engine of renewal. 
The link between research policy and growth policy was explicit; the task to support 
long-term competitiveness of Swedish industry based on technology development 
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became the prime task of research policy. Research and highly qualified researchers was 
identified as key components in and prerequisites for economic growth.168  
 
Swedish research policy incorporated at this time two models for research funding, the 
research council model (scientifically motivated research) and the sector model 
(research motivated by societal needs). The new Government decided to introduce a 
third model for steering the direction of research towards the needs of industry and 
society, the research foundation model.  
 
An important feature of these new research foundations was that once they had been 
established Government could not control their activities. These new research 
foundations became the main instrument for a combined research and industrial policy 
for economic growth. The centre right-wing Government used the capital of the so-
called wage earners funds to establish the foundations. The wage earners funds were 
liquidated and the capital was transferred to a number of new research foundations. In 
an economic growth perspective the most important foundations were the Foundation 
for Strategic Research and the Knowledge Foundation.169 
 
The establishment of these foundations meant an inflow of significant resources in the 
research system. The objective of the foundation’s funding was to promote the 
emergence of new industries and thus future economic growth; their funding of 
university research should improve the long-term competitiveness of Swedish industry. 
The objective should be achieved by investments in long-term research and in training 
of new researchers in strategic technology fields like IT, biotechnology and new 
materials. The foundations involved both scientists from universities and industrial 
representatives when deciding scientific agendas.170  
 
The choice, according to this Government, of foundations as the instrument for 
achieving these goals was that foundations compared to research councils and sector 
agencies were more flexible in relation to the needs of society. Another reason was that 
future governments could not liquidate them even if they wanted to. The new research-
funding model meant that the influence of policy on the direction of research decreased. 
Large-scale, offensive and multi-disciplinary research investments in strategic 
technology fields were managed outside the policy domain.171 
 
Government invested large sums in enhancing the research system with the objective to 
establish a platform for new high-tech and science based enterprises. However this 
policy and investments was one reason for increasing the State’s budget deficits. In 
1994 the centre right-wing Government lost the election for Parliament and the social-
democrats came into power. At this time Sweden had a huge budget deficit. The main 
challenge of the new Government was to overcome the large budgetary deficits and 
regain budgetary balance. Thus, the rest of the 90s was characterised by huge reductions 
in public spending and by cuts in public research funding. These cuts hit faculty bloc 
grants and research councils (around 15 per cent) and sector agencies. For instance the 
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budget of NUTEK, the successor of STU, was cut with 300 MSEK (almost a 30% cut). 
The reduction in the research budget was supposed to be compensated by the research 
funding of foundations. Cuts in research spending aimed at shrinking funding to the 
level that existed before the increase.172 
 
If the period between 1991 and 1994 mainly was about expanding research, the rest of 
the 90s was about savings and budget cuts in public research funding. A consequence of 
the savings was a displacement from public to private research funding. The public 
research funding by research councils concerned investments in the infrastructure of 
research, while the private funding by foundations concerned strategic research 
investments. This was an unintended consequence and a privatisation of research policy. 
An issue for the Social-Democrats in the second half of the 1990s was to gain control of 
the research funding of foundations, and to coordinate their funding with other public 
funding. However, the Government never succeeded in getting full control of the 
foundations. Coordination of research funding was though, to some extent, achieved 
through agreements with the foundations.173 
 
A changing role of STU 
In the beginning of the 1990s a new research council was established; the Research 
Council for Engineering Research (TFR). In 1983 STU had set up a scientist-controlled 
advisory function within the organisation, i.e. a research council function. This was an 
answer to government demands on sectorial agencies of increasing the funding of basic 
long-term research. This function was separated from STU and formed the basis for the 
establishment of TFR.174 
 
In the closing years of the 1980s ideas were presented of coordinating industrial policy 
at the agency level. A result was that STU amalgamated with the National Energy 
Administration and the National Industrial Board into the new agency Swedish Board 
for Technical and Industrial Development (NUTEK) in 1991. Government emphasised 
that an important objective of the new agency was to promote collaboration between 
universities and industry in its research funding activities.175  
 
NUTEK used several instruments in its activities to increase collaboration between 
industry and universities. In the beginning of the 1990s the so-called materials-consortia 
were introduced together with NFR (SSF was later to take over the responsibility for 
these consortia). In the middle of the 90s the so-called competence centres were 
introduced. These aimed at building bridges between science and industry in Sweden by 
creating excellent academic research environments where industrial companies 
participate actively and continuously. The programme runs for 10 years. NUTEK’s 
(later VINNOVA) contribution to the cost of the programme is 32%, which means that 
the other parties - universities and the participating companies - are the main investors. 
 
In hindsight it is possible to identify a line from the framework programmes of STU in 
the 1980s to materials-consortia and to competence centres. All of them aimed at 
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steering research towards the demands and needs of industry by involving industry in 
deciding research problems and in carrying out research. Another objective was to 
expose academics to industrial problems and vice versa.176  
 
NUTEK had, compared to its predecessor STU, lost the funding of engineering 
research. Later in the 1990s cuts in the budget of NUTEK had impact on its activities. 
Some activities, e.g. the materials-consortia, were transferred to the research 
foundations that were established in the middle of the 1990s. NUTEK became more of a 
networking entrepreneur than a research financier.177 
 
Industrial policy emphasise commercialisation of research  
The centre right-wing Government in the first years of the 1990s did not only introduce 
research foundations as an instrument for making research useful to industry and 
society. It also established organisations with the objective to promote the 
commercialisation of research. In the Research Bill of 1993 it was proposed that 
technology parks should be assigned public grants to establish so-called innovation 
centres, located on university campuses. The reason for the proposal was that 
universities lacked incentives to commercialise results and collaboration with industry 
since the intellectual property rights (IPR) of research findings belonged to the 
researcher, i.e. the so-called ‘teacher exemption’. A new supporting organisation was 
considered to be necessary. 
 
The proposal resulted in the establishment in 1993 of seven foundations for technology 
transfer using 1 billion SEK. The objectives of the Foundations for Technology Transfer 
(Teknikbrostiftelserna) were to promote commercialisation of research findings at 
universities and collaborations between industry and universities. They came to provide 
researchers with commercialisation services, e.g. patenting/licensing services and seed 
financing.178 
 
In an effort to bridge the gap between independent inventors and resources for 
commercialisation of their inventions, the Innovation Centre Foundation (SIC) was 
established in 1995. As the other foundations established during this period, the capital 
was originated from the liquidated Employee Monetary Fund. SIC focuses on 
inventors/inventions in very early stages by offering seed financing. 
 
In the middle of the 1990s the Government also established eleven holding companies, 
which were expected to support university researchers in developing research findings 
into patents, which could be licensed out or be the base for spin-offs. Commissioned 
research for companies should also be handled by these holding companies. In 2001 all 
universities was given the opportunity to establish holding companies.  
 
In 1995 the Government commissioned a committee (NYFOR) to analyse and propose 
additional measures, which would improve the societal and industrial use of research. 
The key issue was to assess whether or not the ‘teacher exemption’ should be abolished 
                                                 
176 Ibid. 
177 Weinberger H, Nätverksentreprenören, Avd. för teknik-och vetenskapshistoria, KTH, 1997 
178Diaco, Enrico et al, Teknikparkens roll i det svenska systemet – historien om kommersialisering av 
forskningsresultat, VINNOVA VFI 2002:3 
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and the IPR of research findings transferred to universities. The commission 
recommended keeping the ‘teacher exemption’. It also proposed a new instrument for 
increasing the commercialisation of research findings. According to the Commission the 
growth of the knowledge society demanded an increasing collaboration with society and 
industry. University research and researchers ought to be integrated in technological 
innovation processes of industry as active partners. The proposal was to give 
universities the responsibility for making its research useful to society, i.e. a third 
mission was introduced besides education and research. At that time universities were 
only obliged to inform about their research. This information duty was regarded to be 
too passive and having a one-sided view on the role of universities in society.179  
 
The point of departure for the Commission was the innovation system perspective. In 
their argument for the third mission of universities the linear model of innovation was 
criticized. The role of research in innovations was not only to diffuse research findings 
to industry. Research also had a role in assisting industrial R&D in its R&D-activities. 
Thus collaboration was necessary. The universities should be involved as active partners 
in the innovation process. According to Benner, the NYFOR investigation can be seen 
as the first attempt to establish an interactive view on the relation between the university 
and industry.180 The links between research teams and industrial partners should be 
strengthened. By introducing the third mission, this could be accomplished.  
 
Government followed these proposals. The ‘teacher exemption’ was preserved and in 
the Research Bill of 1996 a third mission for the universities was proposed. The third 
mission, to collaborate with the society, was later included in the Higher Education Act. 
The Research Bill presented in September 1996 also included guidelines for the 
research policy. In the Bill it was stated that research should be driven by the needs of 
society. Research should be made useful through increased collaboration with society 
and industry. The Bill included several statements indicating a move towards an 
innovation policy. For instance public research should interface with industrial R&D 
thus contributing to developing knowledge and technology in industry. The idea was 
that industrial competitiveness is strengthened by collaboration between industry and 
universities and that the Government could and should influence collaboration. 
 
Increased policy attention on NTBFs and SMEs 
A consequence of the economic crisis in the early 1990s was the questioning of the 
opinion that the big Swedish multinational companies would generate economic growth 
also in the future. At this time these companies were struggling, focusing on their core 
activities and laying-off employees. Thus, future economic growth in Sweden was 
dependent on the growth of new companies and of existing SMEs. The following 
initiatives and measures directed towards SMEs were introduced during the second half 
of the 90s and the first year of 2000. 
 
Invest Forum CapTec is an annual investment forum for young technology-based firms 
and venture capital companies. The programme began in 1994 and its main objective is 
funding of young technology-based firms. NUTEK, ALMI and VINNOVA organize the 
forum.  
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In 1994 SNITS (Small and New Companies’ Development of Innovations, and 
Technology Transfer Support) was established with the objective to motivate SMEs to 
carry out advanced technical R&D projects. The important feature of SNITS is that the 
small business is required to create an early strategic customer relationship - normally 
with a large company - during the feasibility study, and initiate discussions with 
potential investors. The measure consists of financial awards, 200 000 SEK, for 
feasibility studies including customer contacts and business planning. 
 
The TUFF programme (Technology Transfer for SMEs) was created by NUTEK. 
TUFF promotes trade in technology services between public R&D technology providers 
and SMEs. The programme encourages SMEs to cooperate in order to become stronger 
customers of qualified technology services. It stimulates SMEs’ demand through 
support for feasibility studies and the creation of groups or networks of firms.  A 
technology broker acts as a single entry point to the expertise offered by the entire 
network. TUFF was the result of a special government mission  
 
In 1996 the Swedish Industrial Fund was mandated to invest in SMEs as a way to 
support growth. It could invest in equity as a way to strengthen the capital base of 
SMEs. 
 
In 1997 several Industrial Development Centres were set up to stimulate development 
processes, competence and products in technology-oriented SMEs and to promote 
entrepreneurship education in schools. 
 
The Venture Capital Database (Riskkapitaldatabasen) was set up by NUTEK in 1999 to 
improve access and transparency of the venture capital market. It is a database on the 
Internet by which start-ups and small firms can search for suitable venture capital 
companies.  
 
Another measure directed towards new companies was NUTEK’s seed financing 
programme. It was the successor of the STU seed financing.  
Swedish innovation policy in the first years of the new century 
Main themes in the research and industrial policy debate at the beginning of the new 
century have been the commercialisation of research through supporting interaction and 
collaboration in the knowledge generating process and fostering spin-offs from 
research. Research policy and industrial policy have become more and more intertwined 
being viewed in an innovation system perspective.  
 
A new public research funding structure 
In the late 90s a parliamentary commission presented a report labelled Research 2000. It 
proposed the abolishment of sectorial research funding and the transfer of resources to 
research councils. This report was important to the reorganisation of the public research 
funding structure that was presented in two bills in spring 2000. These bills closely 
relate to each other. The first one, issued by the Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communications, outlines a new organisational structure for public support of business 
and regional development. The second one, issued by the Ministry of Education and 
Science, outlines a new organisational structure for public funding of research.  
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In figure 2 the restructuring is described. The research councils amalgamated into one 
council, the Science Council. The R&D funding sector agencies was merged into three 
agencies, FORMAS, FAS and VINNOVA. The first two became more or less research 
councils while VINNOVA got the character of a sector agency. Its research funding was 
to be directed towards knowledge fields of industrial importance like information 
technology, biotechnology and new materials. However this should be done in an 
innovation system perspective. The objective of establishing VINNOVA was to create 
an effective and forceful organisation for promoting Swedish innovation systems. It 
took over the R&D-funding responsibilities from NUTEK, and it also included the 
activities of the former Transport and Communications Research Board (KFB) and 
about half of the activities of the former Council for Work Life Research.  
 
 
Figure 2. The restructuring of the Swedish public RTD funding 
 
 
The mission of VINNOVA was to initiate and fund need-oriented (primarily the needs 
of industry) research and development for promoting Swedish innovation systems and 
sustainable growth. Government argued that the capability of enterprises to innovate is 
an important factor behind economic growth. An efficient national innovation system 
was seen as important for economic growth and increasing welfare. The capability to 
innovate is dependent on several support conditions like education, research, technical 
development, venture capital, labour market, regulation and legislation, infrastructure of 
transport and communication.  
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A Research Forum was established with the mission to coordinate the heterogeneous 
funding system and to be responsible for research ethics, research in working life, 
gender and equality, etc. 
 
What was left of NUTEK and ALMI was consolidated into a new NUTEK with the 
objective to support enterprise development. 
 
The new agencies came into work on January 1st 2001. All in all, the reorganisation 
involves some 15 organisations. The reorganisation reduced the number of 
organisations to six. The new structure is to enable more focused public efforts in areas 
of strategic importance, greater efficiency, and a better adaptation to the needs of target 
groups.  
 
 
Rationales for an Innovation policy presented in Government Bills 
In the Bill 1998/99:94 ‘Some research issues’ the role of Government within research 
was treated. It was stated that Government is responsible for guaranteeing the freedom 
of research (a free choice of research issues, and publication of research findings) and 
for funding basic research as well as the training of researchers. The need for public 
funding of basic research and training of researchers is that private capital will not fund 
such generic and pre-competitive activities due to high risk and uncertainty, i.e. the 
market failure rationale. The objectives of research policy are the following: 
• Sweden should be a prominent research nation, i.e. conduct research of high 
scientific quality and make research investments that give the opportunity to 
both breadth and specialisation. 
• Research findings should be used by society and/or commercialised by industry.  
• Collaboration between society/industry and universities should be improved 
continuously.  
 
Government stated that research funding must be based in scientific needs and in the 
needs of different sectors of society. The distribution of funds between these needs is 
the responsibility of Government. Research at universities must lay the ground (develop 
new knowledge and train researchers) for R&D in industry, and universities are to have 
qualified research teams for industry to co-operate with.  
 
In the Bill 1999/2000:71 ‘Some organisational issues in industrial policy’ the theory of 
national innovation systems is explicitly referred to. It is stated that the wealth of 
Sweden builds on the ability to innovate. This means, among other things, that Sweden 
must have a strong base of research. It is also the task of policy to design appropriate 
framework conditions. Swedish industrial policy and innovation policy needs and 
perspectives are to be renewed in order to better support industrial needs and to foster 
innovation abilities and sustainable growth. In the context of innovation systems 
knowledge generation, collaboration between actors and entrepreneurship are of 
decisive importance for the generation of innovations.  
 
Future dynamism and innovation abilities in industry will depend on how well the 
absorption and transfer of knowledge between individuals and enterprises function. 
Collaboration between university research and industry is a precondition for the 
exploitation of research findings. It is the responsibility of the State to act as an 
intermediary and improving the exchange. 
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An innovation system includes those conditions and actors, which together contribute to 
the generation, use and diffusion of knowledge in order to develop products and 
services. The national innovation system includes many different sub-systems (regional 
and sectoral) with their own dynamic and driving forces. Research and education are 
important parts in these systems as well as entrepreneurship, venture capital, rules like 
taxes and standards. The functioning and dynamism of systems is also dependent on 
how well actors interact and exchange knowledge.  
 
In the Bill 2001/02:2 ‘R&D and collaboration in the innovation system’ principles are 
presented concerning need-oriented research in the context of the national innovation 
system as well as measures to strengthen the innovation system. Government argues 
that society is becoming more and more dependent on knowledge and the ability to 
apply this knowledge to industrial and societal problems. R&D and innovations are 
fundamental driving forces in economic growth and increased welfare. This means that 
issues concerning education, R&D and innovations are in the focus of welfare- and 
growth- policy. Industry often needs access to first-rate expertise/competence, research 
environments and new research findings to be able to develop new products and 
services and thereby to increase its competitiveness. The importance of need-oriented 
research to competitiveness and economic growth has increased due to the growing 
importance of innovation. Need-oriented research in universities contributes to 
innovation in industry and the public sector. At the same time need-oriented research 
identifies new research issues for basic research. This exchange and loops of 
collaboration contribute to mutual learning in universities and industry.  
 
According to the Government the efficiency of a national innovation system is highly 
dependent on well-functioning collaboration between enterprises, research institutes, 
universities and financiers of need-oriented research. It is important to transform 
knowledge into innovations and an important task of Government is to promote 
entrepreneurship and to create conditions that foster new enterprises and growth of 
enterprises.  
 
The Government states in the Bill that innovation policy is of great importance for 
economic growth. Enterprises in expansive and knowledge intensive industries often 
localise sites in countries with efficient innovation systems, high quality research and a 
well-educated labour force. Hence, Sweden must be competitive in these fields. 
Innovation policy must build on clearly defined responsibilities of the State and other 
actors. The responsibility of the State is to create conditions that promote economic 
growth in all parts of the country. Innovation policy aims at designing good conditions 
for innovative activities, e.g. supplying an excellent infrastructure as regards education 
and research 
 
The State has the responsibility to create conditions that foster innovation. It also has a 
responsibility to fund need-oriented research in areas of commercial potential. 
Objectives of need-oriented research are: 
• high scientific quality and industrial relevance 
• research in fields of technologies with future economic growth potentials 
• public-private co-financed R&D  
• promote international R&D collaboration 
• promote commercialisation of research findings 
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• facilitate knowledge exchange and mobility between universities and enterprises 
 
Regional Policy and Innovations 
A regional policy bill ‘A Policy for Growth and viability throughout Sweden’ presented 
in 2001/02:4, focused on the establishment of a new policy field - regional development 
policy. The purpose was to establish a well-coordinated policy for all parts of the 
country, i.e. to create regions with well-functioning and sustainable local labour markets 
and with good services. Furthermore, municipal co-operation bodies should be 
established in all counties from the year 2003. These partnership bodies will have the 
authority to make decisions about county plans for regional infrastructure and authority 
to decide about some governmental funds for regional development. This was a major 
change in regional policy. One task of these bodies is to create programs for the 
development of the county, e.g. regional growth programs. The present regional growth 
agreements will develop into regional growth programs in 2004. 
The programme ‘Regional growth through dynamic innovation systems’ (VINNVÄXT) 
was introduced by VINNOVA in 2002. The aim is increased growth and innovation 
activities in selected functional regions through increased co-operation between 
universities, companies and public organisations. The concept of the programme is the 
promotion of effective local cooperation between companies, research and development 
organisations and the political system (the triple helix) within each region, with the aim 
of achieving dynamic regional innovation systems that will allow the region to be 
competitive at an international level within specific areas of growth. VINNOVA is 
allocating € 4,5 million per year to selected regions (5-10) after a competitive call for 
proposals, and will offer support for process management and competence development 
in that specific area. 
 
Recent developments 
In the spring of 2002 the Government initiated a process that aims at creating a new 
policy field, i.e. the field of innovation policy. This calls for integrating parts of 
industrial policy and of research policy. It also demands an integration of departments 
within the Ministries of Education and of Industry, Employment and Communication as 
well as integration between the two ministries. 
 
Innovation policies have for some years been an important part of the debate that has 
focused on the seeming Swedish paradox of slow long-term economic growth and 
simultaneously very high R&D-spending, primarily by industry. As a consequence the 
efficiency of the national innovation system (although not always discussed in this 
wording) in terms of producing innovation and economic growth has been questioned. 
One aspect of the debate concerns the commercialisation of university research and how 
to increase it. In this debate it has been proposed to alter intellectual property rights and 
tax regulations, to increase public seed funding and the number of incubators. 
Arguments have also been voiced for the necessity to improve national, regional and 
sectoral innovation systems in order to increase economic growth. During the summer 
of 2002 the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education and Science and the Minister 
of Industry, Employment and Communications argued in media for improved 
innovation systems as one way to increase economic growth.  
 
As a response to Sweden’s apparent ‘paradox’ the Minister of Industry and the Minister 
of Education jointly established a process for better-coordinated policy responses. The 
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Innovation Policy Expert Group (IPE) was established to assess the systemic factors to 
be addressed.181 As one result of the work, ITPS was mandated to measure the barriers 
to entrepreneurship in the Swedish economy. The Government is also considering 
adjustments in taxation.  
 
Within the process a series of reports have been produced. The first report, 
commissioned by the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication and 
Ministry of Education and Science, aims to be a starting point for the work and a 
process that will lead to a gathering around the issue of innovation and competitiveness.  
 
Another report concerning the subject was published in May 2002 by the so-called 
Bennet & Jonsson Group, ‘The future of Swedish Industry’. The group consisted of 
representatives from industry (primarily large multinational enterprises) and labour 
unions. The group proposed measures in 15 fields that would support the 
competitiveness of Swedish industry and increase economic growth. One field 
concerned the issue of how to improve the Swedish innovation system and others 
concerned the need for collaborative research between universities and industry in 
different technologies. The Minister of Industry, Employment and Communication 
commented on the report in a press release. He agreed with many of the proposed 
measures and said that it was his ambition to improve the conditions for innovativeness.  
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Statistical annex 
In this appendix is presented numerical data for the figures presented in the chapter on 
Nordic Innovation Indicators. 
Structural indicators 
Table A.1.1: Educational attainment of the population, 2001  
 ISCED 1 -2 ISCED 3-4 ISCED 5-6 
Country 
pre-
primary 
and 
primary 
education
lower 
secondary 
education 
upper 
secondary 
education 
post 
secondary 
non-
tertiary 
education 
tertiary-
type B 
education
tertiary type 
A and 
advanced 
research 
programmes 
Denmark  20 52 2 19 8 
Finland  26 42  17 15 
Iceland 2 34 29 10 6 19 
Norway 1 14 54 3 3 26 
Sweden 9 10 49  15 17 
OECD 19 41               3 8 15 
Source: OECD Indicators 2002, Education at a Glance 
 
Table A.1.2: Gross Domestic Product, GDP, in million current PPP$ 
Country 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Denmark 93 408 127 390 135 022 141 543 147 208 155 126 160 047 
Finland 79 279 99 538 108 708 114 010 120 925 130 307 134 160 
Iceland 4 657 6 305 6 760 7 244 7 676 8 243 8 546 
Norway 79 541 111 541 121 576 125 658 129 509 135 474 140 282 
Sweden 150 449 181 479 192 566 195 136 207 960 220 384 228 180 
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.1.3: Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 1999 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden OECD 
Tax revenue 50,6 46,5 35,4 41,8 52,1 37 
Source: OECD 2002: Trends in Tax Burdens and Tax Structures 
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Resources to research and development  
Table A.2.1: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
Country 
GERD in 
million 
current 
PPP$ 
1999 
GERD in 
million 
current 
PPP$ 
2000 
GERD as 
a 
percenta
ge of 
GDP 
1999 
GERD as 
a 
percenta
ge of 
GDP 
2001 2) 
GERD per 
capita 
population 
in current 
PPP$ 1999 
GERD per 
capita 
population 
in current 
PPP$ 2001 
 
GERD 
per 
capita in 
Norwegia
n crown, 
20012) 
Denmark 3071  2,09 2,43 577  6518
Finland 3893 4460 3,22 3,40 754 861,6 8274
Iceland 179 215 2,33 3,01 645 765,9 8164
Norway 2198 24321) 1,70 1,62 493 538,91) 5416
Sweden 7865  3,78 4,28 888  10208
OECD 557157 602899 2,21 501  
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
1)2001 2) Source: NIFU 2003 
 
Table A.2.2: Percentage of GERD per source of finance, 1999 
Country Industry Government Other national sources Abroad 
Denmark 58 33 4 5
Finland  67 29 1 3
Iceland 43 41 2 14
Norway 50 43 2 6
Sweden 68 25 4 4
OECD 63 30 5  
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.2.3: Percentage of GERD performed by sector, 19991) and 20012) 
Country 
Business 
Enterprise 
Sector 
1999 
Business 
Enterprise 
Sector 
20012) 
Higher 
Education 
Sector 
1999 
Higher 
Education 
Sector 
20012) 
Govern-
ment 
Sector 
1999 
Govern-
ment 
Sector 
20012) 
Private 
Non-
profit 
Sector  
1999 
Denmark 63 69 20 22 15 9 1
Finland 68 71 20 18 11 11 1
Iceland 47 59 21 19 30 23 2
Norway 56 60 29 26 15 15 
Sweden 75 78 21 19 3 3 
OECD 69 17 11  3
1) OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 2) NIFU 
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Table A.2.4: Researchers and R&D personnel in total FTE and per thousand 
total employment, 1999 
 Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden OECD 
Total researchers (FTE) 18 438 25398 1578 18295 39921 3248999
Total researchers per 
thousand total employment 6 10 10 8 9 6
Total R&D personnel 
(FTE) 35 650 50604 2390 25400 66674  
Total R&D personnel per 
thousand total employment 12 20 15 11 15  
Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.2.5:  Business Enterprise, Higher Education and Government 
researchers 1999182 
 
Business 
Enterprise 
researchers 
(FTE) 
Business 
Enterprise 
researchers 
as a 
percentage of 
national total 
Business 
researchers 
per 
thousand 
employment 
in industry 
Higher 
education 
researchers 
(FTE) 
Higher 
Education 
researchers 
as a 
percentage of 
national total 
Government 
researchers 
(FTE) 
Government 
researchers 
as a 
percentage 
of national 
total 
Denmark 8575 47 5 5722 31 3918 21
Finland 10555 42 7 10395 41 4115 16
Iceland 626 40  480 30 422 27
Norway 9737 53 7 5521 30 3037 17
Sweden 22822 57 9 14623 36 2423 6
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.2.6: Higher Education Expenditure on R & D HERD, 1999 
 
HERD on R&D in 
million current PPP$ 
HERD as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Denmark 623 0,42
Finland 768 0,63
Iceland 37 0,49
Norway 629 0,49
Sweden 1683 0,81
OECD 96223 0,38
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators  
 
Table A.2.7:  Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D, 
GBAORD in percentage of GDP, 1999 
Country  1999
Denmark  2,1
Finland  3,2
Iceland  2,3
Norway  1,7
Sweden  3,8
Source: Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2002 
                                                 
182 Data is not available for business enterprise researchers per thousand employed in industry in Iceland. 
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[Statistical annex] 
Innovation in industry 
Table A.3.1: Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D, BERD 1999 
Country 
BERD in 
million 
current PPP$ 
BERD as a 
percentage of GDP 
BERD as a 
percentage of value 
added in industry 
Denmark 1947 1,32 2,14 
Finland 2654 2,19 3,26 
Iceland 83 1,09 1,33 
Norway 1230 0,95 1,45 
Sweden 5908 2,84 4,35 
OECD 385365 1,53   
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.3.2:  Percentage of BERD per source of finance, 1999183 
Country Industry Government 
Other national 
sources Abroad 
Denmark 89 4 1 6 
Finland  94 4 0 1 
Iceland 77 2 0 21 
Norway 83 10 0 7 
Sweden 89 8 0 3 
OECD 88 9 0  
Source: OECD 2002/1: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.3.3: Total business R&D broken down by size classes of firms in  
1999 percentages; total in millions of PPP dollars184 
Employees Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Fewer than 500 39 29 95 55 18 
500 or more 61 71 5 45 82 
      
Fewer than 100 16 14 39 26 4 
100 to 499 23 15 57 29 14 
500 to 999 13 10 3 45 10 
1000 or more 47 61 2  73 
Source: OECD 2001: Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
 
                                                 
183 Data for OECD is secretariat estimate or projection based on national sources and percentage of BERD 
financed abroad is missing. 
184 To compare the countries by size classes the data had to be aggregated according to two categories: 
fewer than 500 and 500 or more employees, as countries had not broken data into identical classes. 
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[Statistical annex] 
Patent data and Bibliometric Indicators 
 
Table A.4.1: Number of patents in the ICT sector, applications to the EPO 
(priority year), 1997 
Denmark 43
Finland 378
Iceland 3
Norway 46
Sweden 375
Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
Table A.4.2: Number of patents in the biotechnology sector, applications to the 
EPO (priority year) 
Denmark 52
Finland 12
Iceland 0
Norway 9
Sweden 35
Source: OECD 2001/2: Main Science and Technology Indicators 
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[Statistical annex] 
Table A.4.3 Scientific papers as a share of the scientific production in the 
world, 1981-2000 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
1981 0,84 0,57 0,50 1,50 
82 0,84 0,62 0,53 1,60 
83 0,82 0,65 0,53 1,60 
84 0,80 0,66 0,51 1,65 
85 0,79 0,62 0,53 1,67 
86 0,82 0,63 0,50 1,66 
87 0,80 0,66 0,50 1,64 
88 0,76 0,62 0,49 1,63 
89 0,78 0,63 0,47 1,66 
90 0,77 0,65 0,50 1,64 
91 0,77 0,66 0,49 1,60 
92 0,82 0,67 0,52 1,58 
93 0,81 0,71 0,52 1,65 
94 0,85 0,74 0,52 1,65 
95 0,83 0,74 0,55 1,65 
96 0,83 0,77 0,54 1,71 
97 0,84 0,79 0,55 1,70 
98 0,88 0,78 0,56 1,71 
99 0,86 0,80 0,55 1,70 
2000 0,87 0,82 0,54 1,66 
Source: Norges Forsningsråd 2001 
 
Table A. 4.4 Scientific papers per thousand inhabitants, 1981-85 and 1996-
2000185   
 1981–1985 1996–2000 
Denmark 3,8 6,7
Finland 3,1 6,4
Iceland 1,4 5,1
Norway 3,0 5,2
Sweden 4,6 8,0
Source: Norges Forskningsråd 2001 
 
                                                 
185 See table A.4.4 
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